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This thesis studies contemporary poetry’s innovations in textual borrowing and the 
range and scope of its appropriative practices. The restrictions of the inherited 
definitions of appropriation include a limited capacity for expression and 
meaningfulness, a partial concept of appropriation’s critical capacity, and an 
inadequate sense of the poet’s individual and unique practice of appropriation. This 
thesis resolves the problematic constraints limiting contemporary definitions of 
appropriation by tracing the history of the practice to reveal an enduring relation 
between appropriation and poetic expression. 
  Close readings of Trevor Joyce’s, Alan Halsey’s, and Susan Howe’s poetry 
serve as evidence of contemporary poetry’s development of appropriation beyond 
the current ascriptions and offer some direction on how the critical understanding of 
appropriation might be extended and redefined. Here, appropriation is recognized as 
another source of lyric expression, critical innovation, and conceptual development 
in contemporary poetry. This thesis encourages a new perspective on the purpose 
and processes of poetic appropriation and the consequences of its declarative 










The practice of appropriation sits at the juncture of literary influence, authorial 
originality, and cultural inheritance, and it has long maintained a conflicted and 
productive place in the process of poetic composition. Appropriation is a contested 
term and is often replaced with allusion, reference, or adaptation as the cultural, 
historical, and political specificities of a particular moment in time reconfigure the 
critical perception of textual borrowing. Appropriation gained new prominence 
among the modernist and postmodernist schools and movements of the twentieth 
century where it was feted for its anti-lyrical, anti-expressive, and anti-authoritarian 
imperatives. The practice has a history much longer than either of these aesthetics. 
Appropriation is often attributed to the Latin poetry of the late second century B.C.E. 
and it extends up to the present day. The modernist, and later postmodernist 
predilection towards rupture with past literary forms and styles, modes of expression, 
and political ideology have made appropriation a popular practice for many decades, 
and yet it is worth remembering that these characteristics are not implicit within the 
practice. Appropriation has enjoyed something of a resurgence in recent years with 
the emergence of American conceptualist poetry; however, far from relinquishing 
the practice of these inherited definitions, conceptualism elaborates these strictures 
on the meaning and definition of appropriation in poetry.  
 Conceptualist poetry presents itself as the teleological consequence of 
modernist and postmodernist appropriative practices, and yet contemporary 
invocations of appropriation by late-modernist poets such as Trevor Joyce, Alan 
Halsey, and Susan Howe demonstrate that received understandings no longer befit 
the practice. These poets and their poetry reflect the inability of inherited definitions 
of appropriation to accommodate contemporary innovation. The failure to critically 
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redefine appropriation in accordance with poetic developments is significant because 
it reflects a lack of knowledge and awareness about the range and scope of textual 
borrowing in contemporary poetry. This failure also conveys the critical neglect of 
broader patterns, practices, and processes of appropriation that shape literature, 
culture, and society.   
 In order to resolve this problem, I trace the poetic innovations in 
appropriation by Joyce, Halsey, and Howe and show how their poetry productively 
extends the critical definition of appropriation. By tracing the practice from the 
Classical era, through the Renaissance and Romantic poets, and up to contemporary 
conceptualists, I demonstrate the critical development of the practice and the 
possibility for alternative definitions of appropriation. Each poet pursues 
appropriation in distinct and different ways. From the block text paragraphs of 
Joyce’s altered borrowings, which verge on lyricism, to Halsey’s scholarly poetic 
variorum of P.B. Shelley’s death, and on to Howe’s deriving from a patriarchal 
lineage of literature and authorship in The King’s Book a feminist redefinition of 
authorship, these poets broach the critical redefinition of appropriation, its role and 
function in poetry, and its consequences for our understanding of literary 
interrelation and reference. This process of redefinition asserts the declarative force 
of these poets’ engagements with appropriation in their poetry. Appropriation has 
long maintained a central role in the reading and the composition of poetry, but in 
order to understand the significance of this critical redefinition of the practice, it is 
necessary to consider this phenomenon within its broader aesthetic and critical 
parameters. In the following pages, I will outline the contemporary understanding of 
appropriation as it has developed, and, in so doing, demonstrate the significance of 
this project of redefinition.   
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i. Contextualizing Appropriation in Literary Criticism 
In his 2011 essay, “Towards an Open Source Poetics,” Stephen Voyce situates 
appropriation at the centre of artistic and poetic innovation over the last two 
centuries. Reflecting on the distinguishing features of aesthetic advancement in 
recent decades, Voyce asserts that “The history of the twentieth- and twenty-first-
century avant-garde is a history of plundering, transforming, excavating, 
cataloguing, splicing, and sharing the creative output of others” (408). Fredric 
Jameson explains the movement from modernism to postmodernism as resulting, at 
least in part, from Roland Barthes’s 1967 essay, “Death of the Author,” which he 
says constitutes “the end of individualism as such” (114). From Pablo Picasso’s 
collage aesthetic to T.S. Eliot’s cultural restitution of tradition in The Waste Land, 
and Ezra Pound’s appropriative engagement with cultural transmission in the 
Cantos, appropriation maintains a pivotal place in the modernist panoply of aesthetic 
practices, and yet, for Jameson, both Eliot and Pound appropriate text in a manner 
that is wholly recognizable and distinct. The postmodern critic is explicit about the 
individuality of the artists’ and poets’ appropriative practices, stating that:  
The great modernisms were … predicated on the invention of a 
personal, private style, as unmistakable as your fingerprint, as 
incomparable as your own body … [T]his means that the modernist 
aesthetic is in some way organically linked to the conception of a 
unique self and private identity, a unique personality and 
individuality, which can be expected to generate its own unique 




For Jameson, the twin imperatives of postmodern art manifest a radical divergence 
from modernism’s faithfulness to a purportedly Romantic conception of individual 
authorship. The first of these postmodern ideals is a reaction against the “formerly 
subversive and embattled styles” of high modernism “felt to be the establishment and 
the enemy” by artists and critics of the early eighties (111-12). The second of 
Jameson’s postmodern ideals is “the effacement … of some key boundaries or 
separations” within modernism, namely the oppositions of high and low culture and 
originality and appropriation (112). Read this way, appropriation finds new purchase 
in the postmodern period by relinquishing the bonds of authorial originality which is 
“expected,” and indeed obliged, to “generate its own unique vision of the world and 
to forge its own unique, unmistakeable style” (114).  
Marjorie Perloff’s response to Jameson in her 1999 essay on “Language 
Poetry and the Lyric Subject” is indicative of the poetic and critical instability of 
appropriation and its on-going redefinition across different eras and aesthetics. 
Perloff is clear in asserting that “One of the cardinal principles ... of American 
Language poetics ... has been the dismissal of ‘voice’ as the foundational principle of 
lyric poetry” (405). Language Poetry consciously dissociated itself from the “‘simple 
ego psychology in which the poetic text represents not a person, but a persona, the 
human as unified object. And the reader likewise.’” By the close of the 1990s, 
Perloff says that this shared poetic commitment to effacing the poet’s subjective self 
had begun to lose its force. This effacement which constituted a significant tenet of 
Language poetry, with which Susan Howe has often been associated, was no longer 
palpable as a unifying force among this broad group of experimental American 
poets, and the differences that emerge between them become more emphatic. By 
1999, Perloff says, these differences “strike us as more significant than similarities or 
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group labels” (410). Irrespective of the effacement of the self, “asyntacticality or the 
disappearance of the referent, or even the materiality of the sign,” she states, “we can 
easily tell a Charles Bernstein poem from one by Steve McCaffery, a Tom Raworth 
sequence from one by Allen Fisher, a Maggie O’Sullivan ‘verbovisivocal’ text from 
one by Susan Howe.” Appropriation is as important to these poets in 1999 as it was 
when Jameson was writing in 1985, and yet, as Perloff demonstrates, the practice of 
appropriation need not disable or reduce the distinctive and recognizable 
characteristics of the poet writing. In more recent texts such as Conceptualisms Old 
and New (2007) and The Sound of Poetry / The Poetry of Sound (2009), Perloff 
might be said to reverse this position because conceptualist poetry presents itself as 
appropriating text as a means of effacing the author. These divergences in the 
application and interpretation of appropriation serve as evidence of the problems of 
defining the term and the proclivity to practice appropriation from a variety of 
conflicting and often contradictory standpoints. In order to understand the critical 
history of appropriation and the restrictive engagements with it as rejecting or 
effacing individuality and expression, it is worth considering the broader history of 
appropriation and its consequences for the proposed redefinition of the practice in 
this thesis.       
The conflicted nature of a practice such as appropriation may make it an 
unusual choice as the subject of a thesis, and indeed literary criticism has tended to 
relegate appropriation both as a practice and as a symptom of more established 
critical concepts. Linda Hutcheon’s seminal work on adaptation in literature and film 
incorporates appropriation as a feature of the broader concept of adaptation, and this 
pattern is reflected across critical invocations of the term. In A Theory of Adaptation, 
Hutcheon defines her primary concept, adaptation, from three distinct but 
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interrelated perspectives. The three different but overlapping definitions of 
adaptation in Hutcheon’s Theory are, adaptation as “formal entity or product,” 
adaptation as a “process of creation,” and adaptation as a “process of reception” (7-
8). The second of these definitions invokes appropriation, though it is worth 
considering her tripartite definition to understand the critical relegation of 
appropriation. Defining adaptation as a “formal entity or product” means that 
“adaptation is an announced and extensive transposition of a particular work or 
works” (7). According to Hutcheon, such “transposition” or “‘transcoding’” usually 
involves a “shift of medium (a poem to a film) or genre … or a change of frame and 
therefore context” (7-8). The second perspective on adaptation as a “process of 
creation” suggests that adaptation will “always involve[ ] both (re)-interpretation and 
then (re)-creation,” and, more importantly for our purposes, “this has been called 
both appropriation and salvaging” (8). The third definition of adaptation as a 
“process of reception” reflects the intertextual nature of the concept as it provokes 
connections and recollections in the mind of the reader between earlier and later 
readings and works. It is significant to the proposed redefinition of appropriation in 
this thesis that Hutcheon situates appropriation as the creative capacity within 
adaptation, and yet the critic does not explain her couching of appropriation within 
adaptation, or indeed how or why appropriation achieves this creative capacity.  
Hutcheon’s Theory of Adaptation does much to elaborate the processes of 
textual borrowing and transformation, the effects of adaptation on the art work and 
art criticism, and the broader legal, cultural, and aesthetic ramifications of 
adaptation. I will return to this secondary status of appropriation later, but for now it 
is worth considering the important questions that Hutcheon’s text raises regarding 
appropriation. In her discussion of adaptation, Hutcheon outlines the problem of 
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responsibility in the practice of textual borrowing. Just as the screenwriter “‘Charlie 
Kaufman’” in the 2002 film Adaptation, “faces an anguished dilemma” regarding his 
responsibility in the process of adaptation, so too is responsibility a potent issue for 
the appropriating poet (18). Kaufman is anxious about adapting as a “process of 
appropriation, of taking possession of another’s story, and filtering it … through 
one’s own sensibility, interests, and talents.” Hutcheon ascribes a concern with 
responsibility to Kaufman’s adaptations, but palpable within her account of his 
concerns are the problems of ownership, in “taking possession” of another’s text, and 
authority, in “filtering” that text in accordance with one’s own practice and poetics. 
These issues of responsibility, authority, and ownership attend to adaptation and 
appropriation equally, and they become more serious when Hutcheon outlines the 
legal ramifications of these problems.  
When A Theory of Adaptation was published in 2006, the “literary copyright 
infringement standards” were still limited to the “literal copying of words” (89). An 
author only had a viable copyright infringement case if he or she could prove 
“financial damage through unauthorized or unremunerated appropriation” (90). 
Seeing as most cinema adaptations boost sales of the adapted novel, authors often 
struggled to prove copyright infringement. The legal questions of copyright and fair 
use recur in the poetic interrogation of appropriation, and court cases on 
appropriation compound these issues with the result that copyright law is in a 
constant state of flux.
1
 Michael Geist analyses the on-going transformation of 
                                                 
1
 Rogers v. Koons (1992) set historical precedent in the US by demonstrating the ambiguity within the 
‘fair use’ defence. In this case, the photographer Art Rogers sued the artist Jeff Koons for copyright 
infringement after Koons created statues mirroring Rogers’s ‘line of puppies’ photo and sold them at 
a profit. Koons’s lawyers argued that the artist’s reproductions are parodies of Rogers’s originals, and 
while Koons lost and was compelled to pay a settlement, the trial instilled the principle, inherited 
from the Salinger v. Random House trial of 1987, that an appropriative artwork which is 
“substantially similar” to its predecessor is not protected by ‘fair use’ (Rogers v. Koons n. pag.). The 




copyright in his reports from the December 2011 Canadian Supreme Court hearings 
on Alberta (Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access 
Copyright). The issue at hand, the legality of copying materials for use by students in 
school classrooms, diverges from the more creative, poetic appropriations that 
preoccupy this thesis, however Geist’s report is indicative of the progressive 
development of copyright law. Reflecting on the second day of hearings on the case, 
Geist states that: 
One of the most interesting exchanges occurred late in the day, as 
Chief Justice McLachlin discussed the creative process and noted that 
works often involve bringing together several other works into a new 
whole. When counsel responded that this was a compilation, the 
Chief Justice replied that it might actually be an entirely new work, 
bringing the issue of remix and transformative works to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. (n. pag.) 
Justice McLachlin’s comments reflect the awareness among certain legal 
jurisdictions of the difficulty of defining fair use and copyright, and the impact that 
creative works such as poetry can have on transforming the language and rhetoric of 
the law. The problem of copyright law reflects the anxieties over responsibility, 
authority, and ownership in appropriation, not solely concerning the legality of 
certain borrowings, but also through the plethora of legal cases taken against poets 
and artists.  
The etymological history of appropriation prefigures these questions of law 
and legality which manifest themselves in contemporary practices of poetic 
appropriation. Hutcheon’s text reflects the critical subordination of appropriation 
under or within conceptual schema such as adaptation. The secondary status of the 
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practice in literary criticism supports the primacy of conceptual rhetoric. Here, 
appropriation is an artistic practice which necessarily eschews the rigor and scholarly 
objectivity of literary criticism. Bernard Sharratt calls this distinction into question in 
his essay on the literary critical transformation of T.S. Eliot from modernism to 
postmodernism. Considering the critical problematic that opposes the new wave of 
biographical accounts of Eliot since Peter Ackroyd’s T.S. Eliot (1984) to Eliot’s 
pronouncements on poetry, Sharratt questions his own invocation of Eliot in his 
essay. Reflecting on the critical propensity towards concept rather than practice, 
Sharratt asks, “Is the relation between my text and Eliot’s a matter of quotation, or of 
pastiche, or even parody?” (224). In this reflexive analysis, the critic considers the 
extent to which his use of Eliot is intended to “authorize … [his] own text.” In his 
essay, Sharratt argues that Eliot has been “constructed and reconstructed according 
to the ways in which his work is received.” The critic’s argument about the 
progressive reconstruction of the poet contravenes Eliot’s poetics of 
depersonalization even while his poetry garnered respect and authority with the 
progressive institutionalization of English literature in the academy. Sharratt presents 
his “echoing of Eliot” as serving “simply to get … [his] own writing under way,” 
where Eliot’s is “a shadow voice … [he] can adopt.” The author is also conscious of 
the poet’s decreased authority in contemporary criticism, asking “how persuasive, 
now, is that very tone and mode of writing, and with it Eliot’s own criticism?” 
Sharratt’s comments indicate the difficulty of critically relegating or reifying 
appropriation as a poetic practice distinguished from scholarly rigor and objectivity. 
This analysis also calls into question the propensity to prioritize concept over 
practice in the critical analysis of textual borrowing.  
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The questions Hutcheon raises regarding responsibility, authority, and 
ownership in practices of textual borrowing are as relevant to appropriation as they 
are to adaptation, and yet appropriation is often subordinated conceptually. The sole 
reference to appropriation in Thomas Leitch’s 2007 text, Film Adaptation and its 
Discontents, takes the opposite approach to Hutcheon’s ‘appropriation as creativity’. 
Leitch defines adaptation as the replication of given texts or tropes, and yet the 
subjugation of appropriation remains the same. Leitch cites Lindiwe Dovey’s 
distinction between adaptation and appropriation to demonstrate his point. The 
author outlines Dovey’s distinction as follows: 
[A]n ‘appropriational’ mode of adaption … ‘involves simply 
borrowing plot and characters’ … [while] her [Dovey’s] own ‘pro-
creative’ approach, [is] ‘an interpretive mode’ that analyzes rather 
than borrowing plot and character and also ‘foregrounds the way in 
which the film constructs a self … and expresses the desire of the 
adapter’. (19) 
According to Dovey, “‘pro-creational adaptation claims a kind of freedom for itself, 
but does not assume dominance over the text.’” In Leitch’s text, appropriation retains 
the same restricted status that Hutcheon attributes to it but in the opposite direction, 
such that Dovey’s “‘pro-creational adaptation’” denies the creativity that Hutcheon 
attributes to appropriation. Not all critics support the subsidiary status of 
appropriation, and these alternative analyses provide an insight into the critical 
interrogation of the practice.  
Julie Sanders affords appropriation a more central position than either 
Hutcheon or Leitch in her 2006 book, Adaptation and Appropriation. Sanders echoes 
Hutcheon in arguing that “Studies of adaptation and appropriation invariably conjure 
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up questions of ownership and the attendant legal discourses of copyright and 
property law,” however she is also conscious of the significant differences which 
exist between the two terms (4). For Sanders, the most pointed of these differences 
regards the extent of the new text’s engagement with the old. Sanders argues that 
adaptation “constitutes a more sustained engagement with a single text or source 
than the more glancing act of allusion or quotation, even citation, allows.” 
Appropriation shares with adaptation a “sustained engagement” with its contributing 
texts, however it “frequently adopts a posture of critique, even assault.” Sanders is 
not alone in attributing violence to the practice of appropriation, and this violence is 
reflected in the prevalence and potency of the term in critical studies of cultural 
appropriation.  
The “posture of critique” and “assault” attributed to appropriation is reflected 
in a range of cultural studies titles where the word is used to reflect the violent 
usurpation of country and culture. In The Appropriation of Native American 
Spirituality (2011), Suzanne Owen argues that “‘Appropriation’, ordinarily a value-
free term to mean ‘to make one’s own’, ‘to annex’, or ‘to assign’, in this context has 
become a negative signifier” (14). While the etymological history of the word 
undermines Owen’s assessment of it as a “value-free term,” her use of the word in 
the investigation of Native American spirituality emphasizes the negative 
implications of the term as an “act of using something in a way that was not 
intended.” Among the many insightful and diverse assessments of appropriation in 
Borrowed Power: Essays on Cultural Appropriation (1997), Bruce Ziff and Pratima 
V. Rao reference UNESCO’s 1976 declaration of “‘cultural property ... [as] a basic 
element of a people’s identity’” as evidence of the negative consequences of 
appropriation (9). Working from UNESCO’S declaration “in support of the 
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restitution of tangible cultural property,” Ziff and Rao see appropriation as having 
“corrosive effects on the integrity of an exploited culture because appropriative 
conduct can erroneously depict the heritage from which it is drawn.” Deborah Root 
reflects on the empirical support which emerged for cultural appropriation through 
history in her 1996 book, Cannibal Culture: Art, Appropriation, and the 
Commodification of Difference. Here, Root states that “At a certain point in history, 
the old smash-and-grab colonial mentality merged with notions of scientific 
expertise” (22). In this way, the institutions of Western civilisation became weapons 
to enable and approve the appropriation of “native experiences” (225). Violence, 
assault, and usurpation offer one reason for the critical relegation of appropriation, 
and yet these connotations are replete within the forms and themes of poems by 
Joyce, Halsey, and Howe, and in the societies within which they are writing. 
Rejecting the word appropriation because of its more nefarious connotations delimits 
the range and scope of the poem in representing and responding to the more 
nefarious characteristics of contemporary society, or at least of our reading and 
understanding of those representations and responses. Incorporating the question of 
violence into the critical definition of appropriation and considering its implications 
for traditional concepts of authorial individuality, textual ownership, and legality 
which prove problematic too in poetry offers more to our reading of contemporary 
appropriative poems. The social, critical, and legal contexts of appropriation reflect 
the conflicted nature of the term and yet this term has retained a central role in avant-
garde poetry over the past two centuries. Having outlined the diverse contexts 
shaping appropriation and indicated its enduring popularity among innovative poets, 
the following section will consider the problem that this thesis addresses and its 
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significance to poetry and criticism, and the broader social and cultural ramifications 
of the proposed process of redefinition.  
ii. Resolving Restrictive Definitions of Appropriation 
In her 2010 book, Unoriginal Genius, Perloff distinguishes the appropriative 
practices of Oulipean and Concretist poets as “a recovery of the past–both as source 
material and as foundational text” (83). The enemy of Oulipean and Concretist 
appropriation is “the Romanticist expressivist lyric,” Perloff says, although it is also 
opposed to art in the Surrealist tradition because of Surrealism’s commitment to 
“‘the unconscious as a means to transcendence.’” In both instances, later 
conceptualists, or at least conceptualist critics, oppose the expressive potential of 
appropriation, presenting their poetry as achieving the “fabled Death of the Author” 
which Perloff says has, “in recent poetry, … become a fait accompli” (18). By 
practising appropriation to avoid “express[ing] unique, coherent, or consistent 
individual psychologies and that, moreover, refuses familiar strategies of authorial 
control,” conceptualism assumes a very limited and specific meaning to 
appropriation (Dworkin xliii). This understanding of appropriation does not befit the 
poetries of Joyce, Halsey, and Howe which practice appropriation to explicitly 
declarative effects. If the received understanding of appropriation is too restrictive 
for the range and scope of contemporary poetic practices, then criticism must extend 
its definition of appropriation in order to reflect the innovations within the practice 
and the poetries that perpetuate these innovations.  
This thesis demonstrates the need for a new definition of appropriation in 
poetry, reading Joyce’s, Halsey’s, and Howe’s poetries as case studies whose poetic 
innovation demands that the traditional parameters of appropriation be extended and 
the received understanding of appropriation redefined. Redefining appropriation is 
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important because it enables a new critical perspective on three poets who have 
received relatively little critical attention, particularly Joyce’s and Halsey’s work. 
This transformation is also important because it fosters a deeper understanding of the 
processes of borrowing, influence, and exchange that structure communication 
across cultures and societies. Each of these poets approaches appropriation in distinct 
and different ways, and attending to their innovations encourages a close 
comparative reading of their poems, their practices, and their engagements with 
appropriation.  
 This study aims to catch up with contemporary poetry’s innovations in 
textual borrowing and the range and scope of its appropriative practices. The 
restrictions of the inherited definitions of appropriation include a limited capacity for 
expression and meaningfulness, a partial concept of appropriation’s critical capacity, 
and an inadequate sense of the poet’s individual and unique practice of 
appropriation. This thesis resolves the problematic constraints limiting contemporary 
definitions of appropriation by tracing the history of the practice to reveal an 
enduring relation between appropriation and poetic expression. Close readings of 
Joyce’s, Halsey’s, and Howe’s poetry serve as evidence of contemporary poetry’s 
development of appropriation beyond the current ascriptions, and offers some 
direction on how the critical understanding of appropriation might be extended and 
redefined. The importance of this project of redefinition emerges in the elaboration 
of the conceptual schema of contemporary criticism so critics are better equipped to 
read and understand poetic appropriation. This thesis encourages a new perspective 
on the purpose and processes of textual borrowing, its consequences for both poet 
and poem, and its declarative potential such that the form and style of appropriation 
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is recognized as another source of lyric expression, critical innovation, and 
conceptual development.  
In order to demonstrate contemporary poetry’s advancement beyond 
conventional definitions of appropriation, I align three poets from distinct cultural 
and poetic communities who variously engage practices of appropriation. These 
poets have received little attention to date, and so this analysis advances critical 
engagement with their poetry. Critically aligning Joyce, Halsey, and Howe benefits 
each poet by setting their poetry within a broader international context, comparing 
and contrasting their practices, and thus extending critical understandings of the 
similarities and differences that distinguish their work. These three poets each write 
out of a late-modernist tradition where appropriation is both a means of reconciling 
art and life and of avoiding the restrictive subjectivity of confessional poetry. In his 
1991 essay, “Picasso and Appropriation,” Timothy Anglin Burgard explains the 
artist’s appropriative practice “as a way of coming to terms with, and regaining 
control over, the ‘unknown hostile forces’ of nature and man” (484). Burgard’s 
crediting of Picasso’s appropriative practice to his father’s relinquishing painting, his 
young sister’s death, and his friend Carles Casagemas committing suicide, serve as 
evidence of the personal imperatives that motivate his appropriations. These three 
events were “traumatic and linked by the related themes of death and artistic and 
sexual impotence.” Picasso’s appropriations are motivated by explicitly personal 
imperatives, even as his practice produces highly abstract representations of the 
world. The contradiction or inconsistency between the personal imperatives of 
Picasso’s appropriative practice and the abstract nature of his art manifests itself too 
in the poetry of Joyce, Halsey, and Howe, where it constitutes a productive and 
potent response to the “‘unknown hostile forces’” invoked through the poems.   
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Joyce has been writing and publishing poetry in Ireland since 1967 and yet it 
was only in the mid-nineties that his work began to receive attention from scholars 
and literary critics. By this time, Joyce was already well-acquainted with the practice 
of appropriation: his third collection, The Poems of Sweeny, Peregrine (1972), 
carries over the story of Buile Suibhne from the eighth-century Irish myth. Joyce is 
aligned with Halsey and Howe in this thesis because his practice of appropriation 
shares their declarative effects. Joyce’s poetry is usually read and analysed in the 
context of the Irish lyric tradition where the poet’s penchant for formal complexity 
makes him and his work something of an oddity. In an interview I conducted with 
the poet in 2011, Joyce discusses the limitations that the traditional parameters of 
Irish poetry impose on the reading and criticism of his 1998 poem, Syzygy. Joyce 
uses the Excel spreadsheets he was working with in his day job as a Business 
Systems Analyst for Apple in the construction of the poem. His frustration with the 
limited responses to this compositional practice is evident in the following lines: 
I use spreadsheets a lot with the awareness of their background in 
financial analysis and in banking and such things. It’s not accidental 
that I use them … it’s not whimsical. It’s not attention-seeking, 
although it appears that the most interesting thing a lot of people can 
find to say about Syzygy is, “Oh, it’s written using an Excel 
spreadsheet. Oh, how interesting.” (O’Mahony n. pag.) 
By incorporating Joyce’s poetry, and especially his appropriative practices, into a 
broader international discussion of textual borrowing, it is possible to extend the 
critical parameters for reading and analysing his poetry.   
 Halsey, like Joyce, has received very little critical attention, despite 
publishing at least twenty-two books of poetry since 1979, nine collaborative works, 
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three graphic works, and showing his art at four separate art exhibitions between 
1980 and 2005. Like Joyce and Howe, Halsey has also published prose and criticism. 
Irrespective of this long and productive history of poetry and writing, Halsey’s work 
is the subject of just over ten individual essays and reviews, the most notable of 
which, Gavin Selerie’s “‘Tracks across the Wordland’: The Work of Alan Halsey, 
1977-’96,” was published nearly twenty years ago in 1996. Along with informative 
and enlightening interviews by Gregory Vincent St. Thomasino and Martin Corless-
Smith, the remaining essays and reviews provide insightful readings and 
perspectives on Halsey’s oeuvre. The analysis of Halsey’s Text of Shelley’s Death in 
the third chapter of this thesis retains the nationalist parameters of English literary 
tradition that shape most of the criticism of Halsey’s poetry, but by aligning his 
practice with Howe’s and Joyce’s, it is possible to perceive the connections and 
cross-currents that exist between the three poetic contexts and communities. 
Halsey’s practice of appropriating tradition to rupture tradition in The Text of 
Shelley’s Death echoes Susan Howe’s engagement with literary tradition in her 
poetry, although Howe puts appropriation to very different uses in her work.  
Howe’s poetry has received the majority of the critical attention directed 
towards these three poets. Her work is the subject of essays by noted critics such as 
Perloff, Peter Nicholls, Rachel Blau du Plessis, Fiona Green, Ming-Qian Ma, and 
Mutlu Konuk Blasing. There are also a number of monographs on her work 
including The Poetry of Susan Howe (2010) by William Montgomery, Through 
Words of Others (2007) by Stephen Collis, and Led by Language (2002) by Rachel 
Tzvia Back. Montgomery asserts that “those who write on Howe have often, with 
good reason, noted her poetry’s allegiance to silenced social groupings: women, the 
marginalized, and the nonconformists of various sorts” (xv). These approaches to 
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Howe have “frequently been aligned with arguments about the revision of the 
canon,” and yet Montgomery is interested in Howe’s “commitment to the texts that 
are central to the canon–Shakespeare, Milton, the Bible, Yeats, Eliot, and Stevens.” 
By aligning the “powerful anti-authoritarian currents in the work” with her 
“ambivalent investment in notions such as voice, literary tradition, autobiography, 
and lyric,” Howe’s appropriative practice achieves a critical capacity that belies the 
abstractness attributed to appropriation. Howe is certainly not the only contemporary 
American poet who incorporates appropriative practices into her poetry, and yet her 
poetics overlap in productive and revealing ways with Halsey’s and Joyce’s. 
 The selection of these three poets for inclusion in a thesis on poetic 
appropriation reflects a number of commonalities among their poetries and practices. 
Ostensibly, the comparison of Joyce’s, Halsey’s, and Howe’s appropriations align 
the English and American poets and situate the Irish poet as a point of contrast, 
however this does not always follow through. Howe’s Eikon Basilike and Halsey’s 
Text are historically-oriented poems, and both have a historical persona at their 
centre. Charles I and Shelley are depicted as Christ-like figures; Howe makes this 
association herself when she describes comparisons between Charles and the 
Crucifixion in her introduction to the poem, while Halsey’s source texts confer a 
Messianic character on the drowned Shelley. Eikon Basilike and The Text could be 
considered ‘books of death’, with the Eikon attributed to the executed King Charles I 
and the Text of Shelley’s Death recounting the poet’s drowning at sea. The two 
poems also address the impossibility of recovering the lost figure at the centre of the 
text from the aggregation of documentary parts and archival sources that make up 
the poems. Another similarity which again distinguishes Joyce’s poetry is that both 
Halsey and Howe situate themselves, and their poems, as the inheritors of a long 
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tradition of literary criticism about their respective subjects, and both texts are 
presented as the latest contribution to that tradition. Joyce and his poetry are not 
wholly at odds with the texts of Halsey and Howe and their appropriative practices; 
Joyce’s “Trem Neul” shares with Howe’s poem the image of thread, or in Joyce’s 
case, “rope,” which weaves together the many words, phrases, and texts that 
constitute each poem (Satris “Voices” 35). This focus on thread, or rope, is revealing 
of Joyce’s and Howe’s sense of the relations between the texts aggregated in the 
poem, and of the activity of gathering materials towards the constitution of the poem. 
 While several similarities emerge between Howe’s poem and those of Halsey 
and Joyce, many other American poets also incorporate appropriative practices in 
their work, and Howe occupies a number of quite distinct poetic positions from her 
English and Irish counterparts. Howe has been anthologized and critiqued as a 
Language poet and as a conceptual poet with poems included in The 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book (1984) and In the American Tree (1986), and in the 
conceptualist anthology, I’ll Drown my Book (2012).
2
 Language poetry and 
conceptual poetry both diverge from Halsey’s and Joyce’s poetics while still making 
appropriation a dominant feature of their practice, and yet this is not the first time 
that these three poets have been aligned. In Nate Dorward’s 2002 review of The Text 
of Shelley’s Death, the critic identifies Halsey’s Text with a scholarly poetics 
uniquely reminiscent of Howe. In introducing Halsey, Dorward acknowledges his 
status as “an independent scholar of the Romantic period,” and as “a noted poet,” 
roles which he says are “equally drawn on” in The Text (n. pag.). The resultant poem 
is a work “virtually sui generis in its exploration of a territory between scholarly 
inquiry and modernist poetics,” Dorward says, naming Howe as the only relevant 
                                                 
2
 This anthologizing of Howe as a conceptual poet appears despite her assertion in a 2008 interview 
with Christian Bok, Craig Dworkin, Kenneth Goldsmith, and Cole Swenson, all major figures in 
conceptualist poetry, that she “do[esn’t] know what conceptualist poetry is” (Guthrie n. pag.).   
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contemporary to Halsey’s practice (n. pag.). This alignment of scholarship and 
poetry which has become a defining feature of Howe’s oeuvre manifests itself too in 
several of Joyce’s poems. The bibliography of texts that make up “De Iron Trote” is 
dominated by medical textbooks from the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, with a particular focus on descriptions of breathing, respiratory problems, 
and child development. The five medical books which contribute to the poem 
consolidate themes of breath and hearing which are reflected in the Eye, Ear, and 
Throat Hospital referenced in the poem’s title. “Trem Neul” demonstrates a similar 
scholarly form with the right hand column of each page comprised of the quotations 
from “primers, phrasebooks, and dictionaries ... that translate into English the 
languages of those native to the many areas of the globe colonised by the British” 
(Satris “Voices” 41). These primers were compiled “for future visitors, colonists, and 
missionaries” to the colonies and serve as evidence, in Joyce’s poem, of “a history of 
global imperialism, hybridity, and the erasure and change of native cultures.” Such 
scholarship links Joyce’s poem with Halsey’s and Howe’s historically-oriented 
poetics, and particularly with Howe’s poetic attempts to recover those voices and 
experiences effaced by the dominant historical narratives.  
 The work of Joyce, Halsey, and Howe constitute three diverse poetries 
written out of distinct social, political, and cultural communities, and yet they share a 
personal commitment to appropriation as an explicitly declarative practice. Their 
poetry addresses the conceptual opposition between saying and showing, using 
appropriation declaratively to assert, to propose, or otherwise communicate with the 
reader. Carys J. Craig, an Associate Professor of Law, acknowledges the 
“significance of appropriation as communication” and proposes a relational theory of 
copyright law (25). Craig’s assertion that the communicative capacity of 
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appropriation is “lost beneath the commodified object of copyright,” suggests that 
the legal system is better acquainted than literary criticism with the declarative force 
of appropriation in contemporary poetry. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has argued 
that “the court ... is not at the vanguard of social change” (n. pag.). That is the job of 
the poet; hence P.B. Shelley’s assertion that “Poets are the unacknowledged 
legislators of the world” (“A Defence” 508). In order for critics to challenge and 
interrogate this poetry with all the necessary attentiveness and rigor, a suitable 
definition of appropriation is required. By redefining appropriation in accordance 
with contemporary developments in poetic innovation, it is possible to offer a more 
critically and poetically faithful response not only to Joyce, Halsey, and Howe, but 
also to the many other poets who incorporate appropriation into their practices in 
alternative and conflicting ways.  
iii. The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter traces the historical 
development of appropriation in poetry and demonstrates the limitations of 
contemporary definitions of the practice. The following three chapters address Joyce, 
Halsey, and Howe respectively and read their poetries as exceeding the current 
critical understanding of appropriation. One limitation of the close reading 
methodology is that it reduces the number of poems it is possible to read. The 
relative diversity of the three poets’ national, cultural, and poetic backgrounds is 
intended to help resolve this problem by demonstrating the simultaneous 
developments in appropriation across different contexts.   
The thesis proceeds as a series of poetic case studies which progressively 
reveal the restrictions of the current meaning of appropriation and indicate directions 
for a new critical definition of the word. In the first chapter, I trace the etymology 
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and history of appropriation and contemporary concerns about the negative 
connotations of the word. After defining appropriation, the chapter proceeds by 
distinguishing it from a range of critical alternatives including allusion, adaptation, 
accidental confluence, topos, and intertextuality. This process of definition and 
distinction provokes questions concerning the relation between appropriation and 
authorial originality. By tracing the historical development of this relation between 
the poet and his or her practice, appropriation is recognized as another feature of 
poetic communication or expression.  
If Latin poetry from the Classical to the Renaissance period celebrated 
appropriation as a productive feature of poetry, things would look very different by 
the mid-1700s. Chapter one continues by challenging the “heroic individualism” 
which contemporary critics still attribute to the Romantic era and which belies the 
endurance of appropriation, allusion, and adaptation during this period (Drucker n. 
pag.). While the “heroic individualism” attributed to Romanticism opposes 
individual authorship to textual appropriation, the affirmation of textual borrowing in 
Romantic poetry in this chapter serves to reconcile these two concepts. The chapter 
concludes by studying this conflation of late Romanticism and heroic individualism 
in conceptualist poetry, which has imposed new restrictions on the contemporary 
understanding of appropriation. Conceptualist poetry presents itself as the 
teleological consequence of modernist depersonalization, but this delimitation of 
appropriation neglects its enduring history as an expressive and declarative practice. 
This first chapter ends by articulating a growing sentiment in the criticism of 
innovative poetry regarding the restrictions of the critical opposition of formally 
complex practices such as appropriation and its potential as an explicitly expressive 
and meaningful practice. In the following three chapters on Joyce, Halsey, and 
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Howe, I read their poetries as evidence of the critical necessity of redefining 
appropriation to accommodate their writing. This poetry demonstrates the critical 
obligation to redefine appropriation by revealing time and again the provocative and 
powerful declarative force of these densely appropriative poems.      
The second chapter on Joyce’s poetry begins with a definition of the 
declarative force attributed to appropriative poetry in this thesis. From dictionary 
definitions to scholarly invocations of the term, I explain the declarative force of 
appropriation as reflecting the articulate and expressive potential of the practice in 
poetry. After outlining the Surrealist precursors to Joyce’s collage-style 
appropriations, I study the techniques and effects of Joyce’s appropriative practice 
that make more recent poems from with the first dream of fire they hunt the cold 
(2003) and What’s in Store (2007) particularly articulate and expressive. Having 
delineated the declarative nature of Joyce’s appropriative practice, I move then to a 
close reading of two of these poems, “De Iron Trote” and “Trem Neul.” The process 
of close reading reveals some of the major themes of Joyce’s poetry; however, this 
analysis also demonstrates Joyce’s appropriative practice as reinvigorating the lyrical 
codes and conventions that dominate Irish poetry. Chapter two concludes by 
reconciling the opposition of formal complexity and lyric expression problematized 
in the first chapter and asserting the declarative force of Joyce’s appropriative 
practice.  
 The third chapter attends to the English poet Alan Halsey and his 1995 poem, 
The Text of Shelley’s Death, as another example of the poetic extension of the 
critical concept of appropriation. In this chapter, I pursue Halsey’s poetic 
reformulation of tradition through his appropriative practice in this poem. In 
delineating Halsey’s appropriations in The Text, I point to the poem’s rejection of 
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traditional concepts of narrative and individual subjectivity. Halsey’s appropriations 
reveal a poem deeply concerned with the narratives of literary tradition and 
textuality. The poet’s textual rewriting of tradition is directed against the inherited 
Eliotic literary model of tradition. The chapter proceeds by reading Halsey’s poem 
with and against the many cultural and ideological critiques which emerged in a 
response to Eliot’s definition of tradition. Halsey’s appropriation of literary history 
in his poem constitutes a poetic reformulation of tradition. The poet’s textual 
approach exchanges the fragments and ruins of Eliot’s inheritance into a textually 
aware, democratic, and powerfully declarative redefinition of tradition.  
 The fourth and final chapter in this thesis addresses the American poet Susan 
Howe’s appropriative poetry through her 1989 poem, A Bibliography of the King’s 
Book, or, Eikon Basilike. The chapter begins by articulating the uniquely material 
nature of Howe’s appropriative practice which distinguishes her appropriations from 
Halsey’s and Joyce’s poetics. Howe reflects on the anxiety that surrounds 
appropriation in her poem, making appropriation itself the topic of Eikon Basilike. 
Howe’s appropriation of the patriarchal lineage of historical texts that surround The 
King’s Book paradoxically encourages their antithesis, a feminist redefinition of 
authorship which exchanges the whole for the fragment, singularity for multiplicity, 
and originality for creative repetition and recycling. Howe’s appropriative 
redefinition of authorship proceeds via the critique of enclosure which provides a 
parallel for her own investigation of etymology, morality, and authority in textual 
appropriation. Eikon Basilike asserts a female ancestry of writing and authorship 
which contravenes the authority of traditional patriarchal definitions of authorship. 
Here, Howe extends the definition of authorial originality to include appropriation, 
thus revealing the declarative critical power of the practice in contemporary poetry. 
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Chapter One: “Lawful heirs” or “Imitators”: Defining 
Appropriation and Distinguishing it from Conceptualist Anti-
subjectivity  
In his 2011 essay on the possibility of “open source poetics” in the twenty-first 
century, Stephen Voyce affirms the central role of appropriation to contemporary 
poetry and poetics. The historical importance of appropriation is well established, 
with critics tracing its influence on “modernist, dada, fluxus, pop, conceptual, and 
bio artists,” on “situationist filmmakers; visual and sound poets” and on “affiliates of 
the New York school, Oulipo, [and] Language Poetry” (408). Appropriation 
describes the avant-garde techniques and practices that distinguish twentieth-century 
art and literature, and it also applies to contemporary poetics and practices. In his 
essay, Voyce outlines appropriation’s relevance in articulating the “social production 
of literature” and “advanc[ing] … [a] defense of a shared cultural commons” in 
contemporary poetry and poetics (409). Voyce’s arguments reflect the resilience and 
mutability of appropriation in a changing poetic and cultural climate, and the insight 
and innovation it affords to contemporary poets. Trevor Joyce, Alan Halsey, and 
Susan Howe have spent a good deal of their writing lives appropriating the works 
and text of other writers in the process of composition. From their earliest poems to 
their most recent, Joyce, Halsey, and Howe have used appropriative practices in 
composing their poetry, finding in literary history the letters and lines necessary for 
the composition of a poem. This thesis investigates their engagement with textual 
history and their ability to appropriate text in a manner that is uniquely declarative. 
In asserting the declarative power of appropriative practices, this thesis is at odds 
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with the contemporary approach to appropriation as the binary opposite of poetic 
expression.  
 Before elaborating on the unique approaches to appropriation by Joyce, 
Halsey, and Howe, it is worth pitting this term, appropriation, against alternatives in 
critical discourse such as allusion, adaptation, reference, collage, and intertextuality. 
By differentiating appropriation from these other terms, I will clarify my definition 
of appropriation, explain my intentions in selecting and using this term, and 
acknowledge the problematic inferences and connotations that the word retains. Each 
of the various concepts of textual borrowing asserts a specific orientation to poetic 
intentionality, and appropriation maintains the figure of the poet against intertextual 
approaches which prioritize textual free play. Having established the centrality of the 
poet writing to the concept of appropriation, I move then to trace the historical 
development of authorship which contributes to the critical opposition of authorial 
expression and appropriation. By tracing the history of the changing definitions of 
authorship and the endurance of appropriative practices, it is possible to propose an 
alternative interpretation of appropriation. After demonstrating the endurance of 
appropriation, even at the height of the Romantic concept of the author as genius, the 
chapter will turn to consider the contemporary interpretations of appropriation as 
represented by conceptualist poetics. This poetry has already come under scrutiny 
because of the opposition it constructs between appropriation and the author. Andrea 
Brady’s critique is particularly helpful for problematizing this opposition. The 
chapter concludes with a newly extended concept of appropriation which 
acknowledges its declarative expressive powers. This redefinition of appropriation 
allows for a more insightful reading of the practice in Joyce’s, Halsey’s, and Howe’s 
writing and affords a more powerful standpoint from which to analyse their poetries.  
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1.1 Defining Appropriation and Distinguishing it from Alternatives 
Defining Appropriation 
Contemporary literary criticism comes equipped with words and concepts to describe 
the various practices of reference, adaptation, incorporation, and invocation which 
manifest themselves in poems and books whether or not an author is conscious of the 
process. Appropriation may not be the most popular or the most contemporary of 
these terms, but it carries connotations and resonances which are productive in the 
analysis of contemporary poetry. The Oxford English Dictionary offers an elaborate 
definition of the term which spans several centuries and recognizes a series of 
deviations and developments in ensuing words and definitions. The OED definition 
begins as follows:  
1. The making of a thing private property, whether another’s or (as 
now commonly) one’s own; taking as one’s own or to one’s own 
use; concr. the thing so appropriated or taken possession of.  
2. Ecclesiastical. The transference to a monastic house, or other 
corporation, of the tithes and endowments intended for the 
maintenance of religious ordinances in a parish; concr. the 
benefice or tithes so appropriated. 
3. The assignment of anything to a special purpose; concr. the thing 
so assigned, esp. a sum of money set apart for any purpose. 
Appropriation Bill n. a Bill in Parliament, allotting the revenue to 
the various purposes to which it is to be applied. 
4. Special attribution or application; specialization; concr. a special 
attribute. Obs. 
DRAFT ADDITIONS OCTOBER 2001 
32 
 
Art (orig. U.S.). The practice or technique of reworking the 
images or styles contained in earlier works of art, esp. (in later 
use) in order to provoke critical re-evaluation of well-known 
pieces by presenting them in new contexts, or to challenge 
notions of individual creativity or authenticity in art. (n. pag.) 
The OED emphasizes the relation between appropriation and property from the 
outset, unlike the Collins Dictionary which limits the definition to “setting apart or 
taking for one’s own use,” and the Longman’s Dictionary which prioritizes the 
financial connotations of the word. The OED focus on property reflects the 
etymology of the term, and both this etymology and the history of word use will be 
important to the analysis of Joyce’s, Halsey’s, and Howe’s poetry. In the OED, the 
term is traced to the Latin, appropriare, and by pursuing it through the verb, 
appropre, we learn that the original Latin verb conjoined the prefix, ad with the 
“idea of ‘rendering’” and proprius, “to own.” This social and legal etymology of the 
term supports a critical analysis of Joyce’s, Halsey’s, and Howe’s appropriative 
poetries as distinctive and socially engaged, while the artistic “draft addition” to the 
definition reflects the practice of textual borrowing in question here. This “addition” 
reinforces the dual imperatives of the fragment and the whole in appropriation. In the 
oppositional approach to appropriation, the fragment designates the lines and 
excerpts pieced together from different sources towards the constitution of the poem, 
while the holistic approach describes the process by which a text is imported to 
provide a background or organizing schema to a new poem. Gérard Genette defines 
the framing text in the holistic approach as a “hypotext” which provides the narrative 
foundation upon which the new poem “is grafted in a manner which is not that of 
commentary” (5).  This opposition of the fragment and the whole plays itself out 
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across Joyce’s, Halsey’s, and Howe’s poetics, and critics such as Sanders illuminate 
this opposition by comparing appropriation with more holistic practices of textual 
borrowing such as adaptation. I will return to this question of appropriation and 
adaptation later, but first it is necessary to further elaborate the current understanding 
and use of appropriation.  
 Stephen Prickett begins his investigation of appropriation by tracing the 
history of the word to “pre-Reformation ecclesiastical law” when it “was the legal 
word used to describe the transfer of tithes or endowed benefices from a parish to a 
monastic house” (26-7). He follows this etymology to its later usage in the English 
Reformation where appropriation became “a euphemism” for the “looting of those 
same monastic houses with well-rewarded zeal by a member of Henry’s newly 
Protestant merchant-aristocracy” (27). In the French history of the word, the 
synonyms of the “reflexive form of the verb s’approprier is usurper, ‘to usurp,’” 
Prickett says. The French term, like the English, carries the “inevitable suggestion 
that such transfers ... were often morally dubious ... [with] implications that fell 
something short of respectability.” 
1
 This question of respectability becomes more 
problematic when appropriation is compared with its antonyms, misappropriation 
and expropriation.  
Appropriation in Context 
Misappropriation and expropriation complicate rather than clarify the meaning of 
appropriation and its relevance for Joyce’s, Halsey’s, and Howe’s poetic practices. 
Appropriation first appears in John Gower’s Confessio Amantis of 1393, 
expropriation follows in the mid-1400s, and misappropriation emerges nearly three 
                                                 
1
 Hereafter, each reference to the “morally dubious” character of appropriation, or its “moral … 




hundred years later. Expropriation dates back to Randall Cotgrave’s Dictionarie of 
the French and English Tongues which translates the French word, Exproprié, as 
“Expropriated; put from the proprietie of,” or “depriued of all proprietie in” (n. pag.). 
Expropriation differs from appropriation and misappropriation in that it infers 
renunciation of one’s own property rather than the taking of someone else’s 
property. The OED refers readers to the Middle English Dictionary which defines 
“expropriation” as “the Renunciation of worldly goods” or a “vow of voluntary 
poverty taken by members of certain religious orders” (n. pag.). That said, 
expropriation still retains some sense of the appropriation of property; hence Richard 
Ellman’s assertion regarding Yeats and the modernists that “the best writers 
expropriate best, they disdain petty debates in favour of grand, authoritative 
larcenies” (8). Expropriation diverges from appropriation through its renunciation of 
property; however, the difference between the three terms becomes more vexed 
when misappropriation is brought to bear on the definition. 
 The word misappropriation first appeared in Edmund Burke’s speech against 
Warren Hastings in the trial of 1792. Hastings was accused of high crimes and 
misdemeanours during his reign as Governor-General of Bengal in India by Burke 
who held the post of Chairman of the House of Commons Committee on East Indian 
affairs. The committee was formed to investigate East India Company 
mismanagement, and yet Prickett suggests that the stakes were much higher than 
Hastings’s misdemeanours. In Origins of Narrative, Prickett proposes that “We 
might say that what was at stake in that trial was not just Hastings’s dubious conduct 
of affairs [of which he would be acquitted], but the whole legal legitimacy of the 
idea of appropriation–specifically as it had previously been understood in the 
colonial context, but also more generally throughout British legal history” (27). As 
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well as identifying the legal conflict which generated misappropriation, Prickett also 
asserts an “ironic twist” in the linguistic history of appropriation and 
misappropriation which has consequences for literary critical uses of the term. The 
critic argues that “the negative form of the word, “‘misappropriation,’” “signally 
failed” to “legitimiz[e] the idea of appropriation itself,” and thus the “morally 
dubious character” of appropriation endures in contemporary usage (27). 
Misappropriation is “not so much the opposite of appropriation,” Prickett explains, 
but is instead a “peculiarly extreme form [of it], in which the latent injustices of 
appropriation have become as blatant as to be clearly against the law” (28). This 
complex definition and differentiation of terms may make competing concepts such 
as allusion, reference, and intertextuality seem more appealing. Given these 
difficulties, it might be surprising that I have selected this term for the analysis of 
Joyce, Halsey, and Howe and their poetries. Comparing appropriation with these 
alternatives will help to explain and justify the use of this term in my study.  
Distinguishing Appropriation 
Among the many alternatives to appropriation in the vocabulary of contemporary 
poetry criticism are adaptation, allusion, reference, and intertextuality, as well as 
older concepts such as “topos” and “accidental confluence” (Hinds 34). There are 
also a range of practice-based concepts referenced in the OED “draft addition” from 
2001 such as collage and montage. These practice-based concepts are relevant to the 
work of Joyce, Halsey, and Howe, however they emerge with twentieth-century 
Cubism, Dada, and Surrealism, and thus efface the longer history of textual 
borrowing which I hope to elucidate.
2
 Sanders offers an insightful account of the 
                                                 
2
 The Tate Gallery Online Glossary states that collage was “first used as an artists’ technique in the 
twentieth century,” while the MOMA Glossary of Art Terms makes the same connection, attributing 
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distinct meaning of appropriation in her 2006 text, Adaptation and Appropriation. 
The primary difference between adaptation and appropriation regards their 
orientation to the fragment and the whole in the process of textual borrowing. For 
Sanders, the process of adaptation manifests itself in “reinterpretations of established 
texts in new generic contexts or … with relocations of an ‘original’ or sourcetext’s 
cultural and/or temporal setting” (19). Appropriation, meanwhile, reflects “a more 
decisive journey away from the informing source into a wholly new cultural product 
and domain” (26). In adaptation, artworks rely on a primary source or “hypotext” 
which provides the framing narrative or context for the new work. If adaptation 
carries the whole source text over into the new work, appropriation proceeds via the 
fragment, “encourag[ing] interplay between appropriations and their sources” even 
when “the gesture towards the source text(s) … [is] wholly more shadowy” (32). 
Sanders draws a distinction between the two practices on the basis that the 
“shadowy” nature of appropriation “brings into play, sometimes in controversial 
ways, questions of intellectual property, proper acknowledgement, and, at its worse, 
the charge of plagiarism.” If adaptation engages a singular text in the process of 
composition, appropriation invokes a multitude, and the new text is not beholden to 
any of them. This multiplicity is as productive as it is problematic in asserting the 
declarative force of Joyce’s, Halsey’s, and Howe’s appropriative practices.  
 Allusion, intertextuality, “accidental confluence,” and topos all feature in 
Hinds’s study of the “dynamics of appropriation” in Roman poetry in his 1998 book, 
Allusion and Intertext (100). Hinds traces the history of appropriative practices from 
antiquity through to contemporary scholarship by aligning Latin philology with more 
modern critical concepts such as intertextuality. Incorporating Hinds’s study of the 
                                                                                                                                          
collage to 20th-century art, “in which it has often served as a correlation with the pace and 
discontinuity of the modern world” (n. pag.). 
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poetic practices of ancient poets into the analysis of contemporary appropriative 
poetry extends the remit of critical analysis and provides a rigorous interrogation of 
the critical vocabulary of appropriation.  
 Hinds’s text revolves around the dual concepts of allusion and intertextuality 
and his analysis compares and contrasts the two on the basis of their contribution to 
the study of textual borrowing in Roman poetry. Hinds sets out the opposition as 
follows: 
A Cold War exists between those who study ‘allusion’ and those who 
study ‘intertextuality’, and each term is a shorthand for a complex 
web of affiliation to, or distaste for, particular critical and 
methodological assumptions and those who hold them. (3)  
Here, allusion is defined as “the relationship between author and reader which can 
involve indirection as much as direction, concealment as much as revelation” (25). 
The play of concealment and revelation which characterizes allusion makes it a 
problematically “frivolous” concept for some philologists, Hinds says, and this play 
sets allusion at odds with the heavy legal undertones of appropriation (21). Some 
scholars of Latin poetry prefer reference to allusion, but the critical practice of 
tracing the history of these poems is so well established that Sira Dambe claims that 
“identifying and analyzing the deliberate allusion of an author to the words of 
another has consistently been one of the principal preoccupations of Latin philology” 
(133). Allusion may be the most prominent term in the criticism of historical poetic 
borrowing, but it is certainly not the only word available, and the alternatives 
discussed by Hinds are revealing of the particular intentions and ideologies both of 
the critic writing and of the text under consideration. First, I will discuss the 
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alternatives to allusion in Roman poetry and then move on to intertextuality as a 
contemporary alternative to appropriation. 
 Alongside allusion, philologists studying Roman poetry also make use of the 
concept of “accidental confluence” which has a very different set of connotations 
than the more prevalent allusion (Hinds 19). Hinds develops the phrase “accidental 
confluence” from the following statement in Richard F. Thomas’s 1986 essay, 
“Virgil’s Georgics and the Art of Reference”: 
By ‘parallel’ I mean an accidental (and inevitable) linguistic 
confluence, occasioned by the fact that certain phrases, metaphors, 
and the like are merely a part of a society’s or language’s parlance 
and to that extent defeat any attempt to prove that a given poet’s 
usage is motivated by any other instance of the phenomenon. 
(Thomas, quoted in Hinds, 17) 
Thomas was emphatic about the difference between allusion as a clearly defined 
concept and “accidental confluence” which he says is an “inevitable” consequence of 
poetry written in a “shared or related language” (Hinds 19). Allusion is an avowedly 
literary concept while “accidental confluence” refers to a more unintentional 
borrowing, and yet neither terms offer much to the description of the nature and 
function of the word-for-word excerpts from other texts that appear in the poetries of 
Joyce, Halsey, and Howe. Alongside “accidental confluence,” one of the oldest and 
most distant concepts in this critical panoply is topos. Hinds uses the Latin word 
topos as exchangeable with the English word “commonplace” as another alternative 
to “allusion” (34):   
As normally defined, the topos is an intertextual gesture which, 
unlike the accidental confluence, is mobilized by the poet in full self-
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awareness. However, rather than demanding interpretation in relation 
to a specific model or models, like the allusion, the topos invokes its 
intertextual tradition as a collectivity, to which the individual contexts 
and connotations of individual prior instances are firmly subordinate. 
(34) 
The topos constitutes a stock of phrases and apophthegms passed down through 
history which Quintilian describes as rhetorical “‘storehouses of trains of thought’” 
(Huhtamo 29). An author’s borrowing of topoi in his or her writing does constitute 
an appropriative practice, though the development of topoi as “‘clichés’” manifests a 
distinct difference between ancient poetics and the practices of Joyce, Halsey, and 
Howe.   
 Perhaps the most relevant concept to the practice of these contemporary poets 
is that which Hinds aligns with allusion in Latin philology, intertextuality. The 
concept of intertextuality is generally traced to Julia Kristeva’s 1966 essay, “Word, 
Dialogue, and Novel,” and has been redefined and developed over the following 
decades of post-structuralist, postmodernist, and new historicist criticism. Hinds 
describes intertextuality as a more “spacious” term than allusion, which reflects 
intertextuality’s more expansive concept of reference (xi). Kristeva’s intertextuality 
“replaces” the “notion of intersubjectivity” such that the word or text “occup[ies] the 
status of mediator” rather than the author (Kristeva 37). In describing intertextuality 
as “spacious,” Hinds reflects the movement away from allusion’s author-centred 
approach towards a more pliable, open concept where text and textuality dominate. 
The difference between allusion and intertextuality is clearly significant to Hinds’s 
study of Latin philology, but this distinction blurs and fades in more recent critical 
applications of the concepts. In a 2012 essay on plagiarism in Nella Larsen’s writing, 
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Erika Williams uses the two words, allusion and intertextuality, interchangeably. 
Williams references the South African novelist, Zakes Mda, in arguing that “the 
presence of a literary allusion depends upon its being recognized by the reader” 
(208). “‘For intertextuality to function successfully,’” Mda explains, “‘it is important 
that those readers who are familiar with the original text should be able to identify its 
influences as it interplays with the new text’” (208). Here, intertextuality is made a 
symptom or process of allusion. This interchangability may reflect the progressive 
redefinition of intertextuality since Kristeva’s 1966 essay through Roland Barthes’s 
S/Z (1974), Harold Bloom’s A Map of Misreading (1975), and Graham Allen’s 
Intertextuality (2000). Such conflation also reflects technological advancements such 
that intertextuality is necessarily extended by hypertextuality and digital writing in 
contemporary criticism. Either way, the development of intertextuality in literary 
criticism sometimes problematizes clear distinctions between intertextuality and 
allusion, and yet the two concepts emerge with two distinct critical histories and 
different patterns of use. 
 Hinds is attentive in problematizing the firm critical distinctions between 
allusion and reference in Thomas’s writing, and allusion and topos in Charles 
Martindale’s, and he is also aware that the differences between intertextuality and 
allusion fade in and out of view depending on the context.
3
 It will be clear that the 
definitions of allusion, accidental confluence, topos, and intertextuality invoked here 
are relatively rudimentary and do not reflect the many insightful and important 
critical developments of each concept. With contemporary critics such as Williams 
using intertextuality and allusion interchangeably, Hinds is right to ask why critics 
                                                 
3
 Hinds argues that the similarities that emerge between the study of reference and allusion in 
Thomas’s work “collaps[e] his distinction between the two” (25). Meanwhile, Ovid’s Tristia is said to 
“force ... us to break down Martindale’s confident distinction between the interpretative procedures 




do not “abandon the apparatus of allusion altogether, and embrace intertextualism”? 
(47). The answer he provides raises another essential question for this interrogation 
of appropriation and its relevance for Joyce’s, Halsey’s, and Howe’s poetics. The 
reason critics retain allusion alongside various alternatives is that it “privileges the 
interventions in literary discourse of one intention-bearing subject, the alluding 
poet.” 
4
 The “alluding poet” is the individual responsible for the borrowing of texts 
towards the constitution of the poem, and to relinquish allusion for intertextuality 
would mean losing allusion’s focus on the author and the surety of authorial 
intentionality. Hinds puts the issue plainly in the opening pages of his book, when he 
asserts that “certain terms embrace intentionality, [while] others deny or occlude it” 
(xii). Having established this inconsistency in the various concepts of textual 
borrowing, Hinds warns that it is “impossible to adopt a wholly neutral position or to 
find wholly neutral terms in embarking upon an inquiry such as this.” With the 
etymology of appropriation embroiling critics in a history of “morally dubious” legal 
battles and the annexation of land, it would be hard to present appropriation as being 
in any way neutral. Instead of absolving myself, and appropriation, of these 
difficulties, I want to carry as many of them as possible through to the analysis of 
Joyce’s, Halsey’s, and Howe’s poetries.  
I have selected this complex and beleaguered term because it retains a 
commitment to the “alluding poet” and is not beholden to covert referencing which 
does not befit the more explicit, collage styles of Joyce, Halsey, and Howe.
5
 
Appropriation is also more suitable because it is not indebted, as allusion is, to the 
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 Hereafter, each reference to the “alluding poet” derives from the same source, page forty-seven of 
Hinds’s Allusion and Intertext.  
 
5
 Hinds makes the difference between appropriation’s more explicit nature and adaptation’s 
surreptitiousness clear when he invokes the OED definition of adaptation as “a covert, implied, or 
indirect reference” (22).    
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elite group or readership educated enough to recognize the references and trace the 
inferences. Michael H. Whitworth is explicit about allusion’s dependence on a 
reader’s ability to identify the allusion as such. Allusion requires “a reader with the 
appropriate sort of education,” that is, “an appropriately versed reader” who can 
“recognize the allusion” (87). Several critics have extended the definition of allusion, 
arguing for an alternative, covert approach to allusion and reference in poetry. In his 
1964 book, Wordsworth’s Poetry, Geoffrey Hartman argues that the poet’s overt 
allusions often give way to more covert references. I will return to this opposition of 
overt and covert allusions and the conflict it provokes in Wordsworth’s poetics later, 
but allusion’s dependence on an audience’s sophistication remains an important 
distinction between allusion and appropriation.  
Before investigating the appropriative practices of Joyce, Halsey, and Howe, 
it is necessary to consider the figure of the “alluding poet” who occupies such a 
conflicted position among the many concepts of textual borrowing. By focusing on 
the historical development of the “alluding poet” we gain a clearer sense of the 
definition of authorship which is applied to these three contemporary poets writing 
out of a tradition of late modernism. The critical interpretation of the poet writing 
has changed considerably since the Roman poetry Hinds analyses was written, and 
yet appropriation has maintained an important place in poetry from the Romans 
through to the Romantics and on to contemporary poets today. By tracking the 
changing definitions of authorship and the endurance of various appropriative 
practices through history, I hope to reconcile authorship and appropriation, which are 
positioned as opposites both by the inherited definitions of authorship and by the 
prevailing definitions of appropriation. In the following pages, I trace the changing 
critical conceptions of the author, moving through generations and centuries to bring 
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this analysis up to date with twenty-first century conceptions of the poet 
appropriating text towards the constitution of the poem. 
1.2 Appropriation and the ‘Alluding Poet’ 
Whether a critic chooses appropriation, allusion, reference, topos, or accidental 
confluence to describe the practice of textual borrowing, he or she is obliged to 
account for the poet writing. Each of these concepts reflects a different perspective 
on the role and authority of the poet and either supports or undermines poetic 
intentionality. Hinds’s study is useful again here because of the range of terms he 
incorporates in his analysis and his unwillingness to be cornered by the individual 
imperatives or perspectives of a particular concept. The conceptual multiplicity that 
characterizes Allusion and Intertext enables the author to perceive the ideological 
shifts behind these appropriative concepts; these shifts are important in 
understanding contemporary attitudes to appropriation. In assessing the critical 
alternatives to allusion, Hinds explains that “the bracketing out of the author” which 
is symptomatic of intertextuality “is often hailed as a liberation of meaning from the 
private into the public realm” which itself denotes a specific ideological era in 
literary and art criticism (48). The celebration of this “liberation of meaning” is 
reflected in the tone and titles of many of the essays establishing intertextuality. 
From Beardsley and Wimsatt’s 1946 pronouncement that “Critical inquiries are not 
settled by consulting the oracle” (487), to Barthes’s triumphant announcement in 
1968 of the “Death of the Author,” and Foucault’s 1969 assertion that “today’s 
writing has freed itself from the theme of expression” (206), there is a keen sense 
within literary criticism of the effacement of the author as a liberating idea in the 
twentieth century. These critics and their ideas are wildly different, and yet the 
relations that exist between them serve as evidence of the complex question of poetic 
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intentionality in appropriation. The New Critics, Wimsatt and Beardsley, were intent 
on prying critical analysis away from author-centred models, arguing that “the 
design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for 
judging the success of a work of literary art” (468). Devotees of the New Criticism 
were committed to reading a poem for evidence of ‘how it works’.
6
 The intentions of 
the poet, along with his or her social, political, cultural, and economic background, 
even if they are accessible, are irrelevant as shaping influences on the poem under 
New Criticism.  
 Hinds records Barthes’s and Foucault’s divergence from the New Critical 
position in his assertion that “the intertextualist critic reacts to the impasse on the 
poet’s intention by de-emphasizing the irretrievable moment of authorial production” 
(144). The New Critics and the post-structuralists serve as evidence of the 
oppositional accounts of authorial originality and appropriation that informs 
contemporary criticism. Here, the traditional preoccupation with the creative process 
which the New Critics also rejected is undermined, not because it is irrelevant to the 
poem but rather because “in practice, meaning is always constructed at the point of 
reception” (48). Hinds’s qualifier that, “in practice” meaning is constructed by the 
reader, comes under scrutiny with the introductions that Halsey and Howe append to 
their poems. Halsey’s The Text of Shelley’s Death and Howe’s A Bibliography of the 
King’s Book, or, Eikon Basilike both include introductions which frame their texts 
and provide hints and suggestions for how to read the poems. These introductions 
put pressure on the post-structuralist belief that “meaning is always constructed at 
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 This New Critical approach reflects Archibald MacLeish’s assertion that “a poem should not mean / 




the point of reception,” even, and perhaps especially, in Howe’s case where the poet 
explicitly disavows the relevance of poetic intentionality.
7
  
 The prose of the New Critics and post-structuralists reflect some of the most 
dominant permutations in critical readings of the “alluding poet,” though both 
standpoints reject one essential point according to Hinds’s study of older poetries. 
Irrespective of the many complicated and conflicting accounts of poetic 
intentionality, Hinds insists that “there is no getting away from the fact that the 
production of a poetic text is in some very important ways a private, self-reflexive, 
almost solipsistic activity” (49). Poems composed of borrowed text are still 
composed or constructed by an individual author, he argues, and “even the poet’s 
dialogue with the work of other poets can be a … solipsistic kind of dialogue.” The 
question of “the alluding poet” is at the centre of critical debates concerning textual 
borrowing, whether the critic celebrates the poet’s selections or prioritizes the 
independent play of texts. Hinds ends his study by arguing that “not even ... 
[through] the most apparently objectively verifiable allusion ... can access ultimately 
be gained to what an alluding poet at any given moment intended,” and yet, he is 
clear that this is no reason to “lose our curiosity about what poets mean to do when 
they allude” (144). Part of retaining this curiosity means attending to the changing 
configurations of “the alluding poet” through history and their implications for a 
critical understanding of appropriation both at a particular time in history and as an 
antecedent for Joyce’s, Halsey’s, and Howe’s contemporary negotiations with 
appropriation. The necessity of attending to the “alluding poet” through history is 
heightened by the fact that contemporary poets often present appropriation as the 
antithesis of declarative, meaningful poetry. This opposition becomes particularly 
                                                 
7
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disabling for these three poets whose work consistently offers to reconcile poetic 
appropriation and original authorial expression. Having indicated some of the major 
developments in twentieth-century conceptions of the poet writing which encouraged 
the critical opposition of authorial expression and appropriation, I will move now to 
consider the changing definitions of the poet through history, and the perspective it 
offers on contemporary understandings of the poetic practice of appropriation.  
The Altering Alluding Poet 
The role of the “alluding poet” has changed as often and as dramatically as has the 
critical interpretation of appropriation. The “ultimate unknowability of the poet’s 
intention” was variously celebrated and problematized by twentieth-century 
movements within literary criticism, but this question of poetic intention was not 
nearly so difficult for poets in Roman times (Hinds 144). The Roman poets were so 
confident of their role as authors that they were fond of “exert[ing] themselves to 
draw attention to the fact that they [were] ... alluding, and to reflect upon the nature 
of their allusive activity” (1). If the Romans practiced appropriation with “a high 
level of linguistic and literary self-awareness,” the conceptual poets practice 
appropriation in a diametrically opposed fashion, incorporating text so as to 
progressively efface both the poet and the writing process (xi). The figure of the 
“alluding poet” comes with a long history that reflects the many different periods of 
literary and critical tradition. Latin poetry is commonly presented as spanning three 
eras, the Classical, the Medieval, and the Renaissance, and Hinds’s study takes the 
analysis of allusion and intertextuality up as far as Milton in the 1600s.
8
 With Hinds 
attentive to the long history of Latin poetry, it is possible to begin the analysis of 
more recent seventeenth-century conceptions of authorship. Definitions of the 
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 In his book Reading Latin Poetry Aloud, Clive Brooks proposes an even more expansive history 
which regards the “whole two-thousand-year corpus of Latin poetry” (i).  
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“alluding poet” changed significantly from Virgil to Milton; however, the literature 
and criticism of the seventeenth century provoked a marked shift towards our 
contemporary definitions of authorship. By studying conceptions of the author in the 
criticism of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century poetry, it is possible to develop some 
sense of the changing figure of the poet during this era, and the implications for the 
“alluding poet” in contemporary poetry. The criticism of this period was published 
contemporaneously with important progressions in publishing practices and 
copyright law. By tracing the history of contemporary “alluding poet[s]” such as 
Joyce, Halsey, and Howe it is possible to gather alternative interpretations of textual 
borrowing, and thus to suggest new ways of reading the appropriative practices of 
these poets. I will begin this analysis of the changing definition of the alluding poet 
by studying the critical response to Edmund Spenser and William Shakespeare from 
the distance of the 1760s. 
 At the conclusion of Allusion and Intertext, Hinds argues that contemporary 
critics should “grant ... that the self-fashioning, intention-bearing poet is a figure 
whom we ourselves read out from the text,” and yet critics and essayists from the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries adopted a very different approach to the poet 
writing (144). Jay Clayton and Eric Rothstein report that Spenser and Shakespeare 
were “commonly praised as ‘natural geniuses’” by the critics that followed them (5). 
The editors trace this praise to texts such as Edward Young’s Conjectures on 
Original Composition (1759) and William Duff’s An Essay on Original Genius 
(1767) wherein “originality was key to a work of literature and the only true sign of 
an author’s genius” (5). Young’s and Duff’s essays are important documents of the 
espousal of literary genius in criticism, but both of these essays appeared nearly 150 
years after Spenser and Shakespeare had died. Critical tracts and statements in 
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favour of the two authors by their contemporaries are reverent in their praise, but the 
idea of literary genius is a part of a distinct history of literary criticism that was not 
part of critical parlance at the time that Spenser and Shakespeare were writing.
9
 
What does endure from these seventeenth-century tributes through to the later 
eighteenth-century responses is an affiliation between the talent of the author and the 
“images of nature” which Dryden attributes to Shakespeare (par. 1). Clayton and 
Rothstein’s account of literary genius learns from Young and Duff the essential 
quality of the “‘natural’” in these attributions of genius (5). Here, Spenser and 
Shakespeare are commended as “‘geniuses’, who, like the first primitive poets, 
imitated nature rather than art.” Indeed Young’s essay was one of the most important 
texts in the shift from traditional conceptions of genius as “spirit of a place” towards 
more familiar conceptions of the word as organic, celestial, and rigorously opposed 
to imitation (“Genius”).  
 Conjectures on Original Composition outlines a specific trajectory for the 
development of literary genius in reading and criticism of the 1700s. Young’s 
arguments provide important parameters both for the recognition of Spenser and 
Shakespeare as “natural geniuses,” and for the developing critical interpretation of 
the “alluding author” (Hinds 144). Early in his essay, Young makes a clear 
distinction between originality and imitation which serves as a basis for his 
definition of literary genius: 
Originals are, and ought to be, great favourites, for they are great 
benefactors; they extend the republic of letters, and add a new 
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 Examples of these contemporary responses to Shakespeare include Ben Jonson’s commendation of 
him, saying, “I loved the man, and do honour his memory, on this side idolatry as much as any” 
(Dyce xliv). John Dryden acknowledged Shakespeare as having “the largest and most comprehensive 
soul … [with] All the Images of Nature … still present to him” (par. 1), and Samuel Johnson 
described Shakespeare as “the poet that holds up to his readers a faithful mirror of manners and of 
life” (301).   
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province to its dominion: imitators only give us a sort of duplicates of 
what we had, possibly much better, before; increasing the mere drug 
of books, while all that makes them valuable, knowledge and genius, 
are at a stand. (349) 
For Young, the “original” text may be said to be “of a vegetable nature,” emerging 
organically from within the writer as a destined force or power which has no need of 
study or development (349). This prioritization of organicism and nature is directed 
towards the writing of the “primitive poets,” who were fortunate in their primacy of 
having nobody to imitate (Clayton and Rothstein 5). The conflicted relationship 
Young establishes between genius and imitation might appear to deny any possibility 
of the appropriative practices I am studying; however, the author does permit some 
facets of appropriation in his essay. Prefiguring questions from his readers, Young 
asks, “Must we then, you say, not imitate ancient authors?,” to which he replies, 
“Imitate them, by all means” (350). A poet is entitled to imitate, Young explains, so 
long as he imitates “not the composition, but the man.” The question of imitation is 
elaborated later, when the author again voices his critics, saying, “you may reply that 
you must either imitate Homer, or depart from nature.” Young rejects this opposition 
and argues, “suppose you was [sic] to change place, in time, with Homer; then, if 
you write naturally, you might as well charge Homer with an imitation of you.” 
There is a clear sense of the primacy of the first in Young’s essay, so much so that 
imitation is said to “counteract nature” and “thwart her design” (353).  
 Young’s essay predates the individual originality that is often ascribed to 
Romanticism. The essay appeared almost forty years before Lyrical Ballads (1798) 
was published, an event many critics interpret as inaugurating Romantic poetry in 
England, even if the term itself was rarely used or applied before 1820 and is 
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indebted to literary criticism for the longevity is has enjoyed since then.
10
 While 
Young and Duff, together with William Sharpe and Alexander Gerard, were 
beginning “to identify ‘original genius’ as essential to the greatest poetry,” the 
literature and poetry that was appearing coterminously with their essays did not 
reflect these critical reformulations (Stafford 341). Fiona Stafford asserts that the 
writing of this period was still generally “compos[ed] according to critical rules that 
had been commonplace” for some time. The neoclassical concept of genre was a 
prevailing influence on this literature, establishing connections with Roman and 
Greek precursors in an era of Enlightenment rationality. Under neoclassicism, the 
idea that “a certain tone, style, and set of conventions unites poems of demonstrable 
similarity across times, places, and culture” was particularly powerful (Hunter 177). 
If this practice of invocation across poetic styles and eras recalls appropriation’s 
ability to reconcile disparate texts and cultures, then the Romantic era which 
followed would redefine appropriation for its own uses.   
 Returning to Young’s essay, we can see that the author’s idealization of 
genius as natural and divine is complicated by his invocation of the laws of 
inheritance and economic exchange in defining the original unindebted energy of 
literary genius. In order to absolve the “Latin classics, and all the Greek” who are 
“imitators, [and] yet receive our highest applause,” Young compares them to “lawful 
heirs” who, “on their father’s decease,” “enter … on their estates of fame” (350). 
This explanation and justification of literary genius via the social institutions of law 
and finance is elaborated later in the essay when Young encourages writers to 
“prefer the native growth of thy own mind to the richest import from abroad,” saying 
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 Duncan Wu begins his introduction to Romanticism: An Anthology with a quotation from Byron 
reflecting on the importance of Lyrical Ballads to the emergence of the term “romanticism.” 
However, he is conscious that the negative connotations of the word in the 1790s means that 
“Wordsworth and Coleridge would have resisted its application” (xxxii).   
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“such borrowed riches make us poor” (355). The progressive conflation of literary 
creation, authorship, and property which recalls appropriation’s etymological roots 
would be enshrined as copyright law over the course of the following century and is 
suggested by Young’s assertion that an author’s works “will stand distinguished: his 
the sole property of them: which property alone can confer the noble title of author” 
(346). The alignment of the author with the imagery and concepts of property and 
inheritance law in Young’s 1759 essay sets the tone for the dramatic changes in the 
conception of the author, and of copyright law in the following century. Young’s 
essay consolidates the idea of the “alluding poet” as the authoritative figure at the 
centre of the poem [as against Kristeva’s intertextuality which prioritizes the text 
over the author], while also undermining the practice of appropriation as a symptom 
of imitation rather than original genius. If the eighteenth century introduced the idea 
of literary genius as the antithesis of imitation, the nineteenth century was 
responsible for establishing the author in law, and affirming relations between 
literature and property. Before elaborating on the impact of copyright law on 
Romantic conceptions of authorship, it is worth considering the contrast between 
Young’s definition of authorship and the poetry written coterminously with it which 
retains a close relationship with appropriation. Christopher Ricks’s investigation of 
allusive practices in British poetry during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth 
centuries offers one perspective on the manifestation of textual borrowing during the 
development of copyright. Ricks retains an author-centred approach to appropriation 
but his analysis is useful as a record of the endurance of textual borrowing at a time 
when the concept of original genius dominated critical conceptions of authorship.  
 Ricks begins his first chapter by invoking Walter Jackson Bate’s theory of 
literary history in his reading of the allusive practices of John Dryden and Alexander 
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Pope, and Bate’s comments are useful for the analysis of Romantic appropriation. In 
a passage discussing Restoration England’s “‘embrace of the neoclassical mode,’” 
Bate reflects on the pleasure that arises from asserting or appropriating the authority 
of ancient tradition rather than “‘the immediate past’” (Ricks 13). Bates attributes 
this pleasure to the fact that ancient tradition “‘is not an authority looming over you 
but ... is remote enough to be more manageable in the quest for your own identity.’” 
11
 The critic regards this era as “‘the first large-scale example in the modern history 
of the arts, of the leapfrog use of the past for authority.’” Dryden and Pope are both 
indebted to a model of allusion and literary influence which mirrors the paternal 
lineage that Young identified as justified imitations of the poetry of Homer, Pindar, 
and Anacreon. Here, poetic appropriation is oriented directly to the establishment of 
patrilineal lines of descent and Ricks’s allusion is explicitly intended as a means for 
the poet to “create his own meanings by bringing into play the meanings of other 
English poets” (33). This poetic invocation proceeds “without malignancy or 
belittling” but still neatly absolves the poet of “the crippling burden” of the past 
whereby allusion is also “a form of benign appropriation.” 
12
 As his title suggests, 
Ricks’s definition of allusion pertains solely to allusion to other poets, which 
provokes a different set of questions to those raised by appropriation. Bearing in 
mind this difference, Ricks’s account of poetic referencing is revealing of the 
imperatives and anxieties that characterize different eras of English poetry and thus 
the changing definition of the author from Dryden and Pope in the 1600s to Keats 
and Byron in the 1800s.  
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 Here, Bate introduces the idea that a writer might find his or her identity through appropriation. 
 
12
 Appropriation is represented as a feature or facet of allusion; however, Ricks generally eschews the 
term in favour of allusion. Nevertheless, his account of appropriation, saying, “what was so well said 
has now become part of my way of saying, and in advancing the claims of a predecessor ... the poet is 
advancing his own claims, his own poetry, and even poetry,” compounds my proposal regarding the 
enduring relation between poetic appropriation and legal history and property (33).  
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 After a first chapter on Dryden and Pope, Ricks moves to a discussion of the 
Scottish poet Robert Burns. Burns transforms the patrilineal lineage that Ricks 
identifies in Dryden’s and Pope’s poetries into a community of brothers, and while 
the Scottish poet may not acknowledge his debt to “Young, Thomas, Shenstone, or 
Shakespeare,” Ricks argues that there is “much of these other poets about him” (48). 
In the third chapter on Wordsworth, we are presented with a poet who prided himself 
on choosing “incidents and situations from common life” as the subject of his poems 
(Wordsworth 7). The poet committed himself to “relat[ing] or describ[ing]” these 
scenarios “in a selection of language really used by men,” and yet this does not 
release him or his poetry from the bonds of allusion or appropriation. Wordsworth’s 
appropriations are prone to “redemption,” Ricks says, and these “feats of rescue and 
renovation are characteristic of how his mind works with allusions, and not his mind 
only but his heart” (88). This mention of the heart reflects Ricks’s construction of 
Wordsworth’s allusions, and of allusion more generally, as an act or display of 
gratitude to one’s forebears. Wordsworth is concerned to restore the authority of the 
originals he borrows in accordance with his commitment to retaining the meaning of 
the original text. In “An Evening Walk,” Wordsworth incorporates the line “Where, 
undisturbed by moons, Winander sleeps” from Abraham Cowley, and, paradoxically, 
alters the line in order to remain faithful to Cowley’s original (Ricks 94). By 
changing “moons” to “winds,” Wordsworth borrows from Cowley without 
“disturb[ing] the rhythm of the original line” (95). Ricks reads Wordsworth’s poem 
as “restoring something of Cowley’s gravity” after Dryden whose allusions were 
often “charmingly aware of allusiveness,” albeit a charm and levity “that 
Wordsworth deprecated” (10, 95).  
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Despite Wordsworth’s aversion to Dryden’s self-annotative appropriations, 
critics such as Hartman have argued that his poems reveal a play of overt and covert 
references that belie Ricks’s affirmation of allusion and the authorial self-awareness 
it supports. In The Unremarkable Wordsworth, Hartman reads Wordsworth’s 1816 
poem, “To Dora,” as the “working through of … [inner]’ voices’, wherein the “inner 
voice” of Wordsworth’s poem “also proves to be a text” (100, 98). These voices 
manifest themselves in Wordsworth’s poem not just through the “intrusion” of the 
voices of different texts in his mind that prompt the poem, but also in the overt and 
covert references which constitute the poem (120). Hartman’s analysis contravenes 
Ricks’s, and Wordsworth’s, belief in the appropriation or “intrusion” of texts in a 
poem as a conscious decision on the part of the author. Wordsworth’s poem begins 
with a quotation, “A little onward lend thy guiding hand / To these dark steps, a little 
further on!” which is taken from the opening lines of Milton’s Samson Agonistes 
(Hartman 120). After this opening line, the first two lines of the poem proper 
“embod[y] a further quotation,” Hartman says, a quotation “more covert than the 
first, yet raising with equal force the issue of beginnings” (125). These lines, “What 
trick of memory to my voice hath brought / This mournful iteration,” constitute a 
“far-reaching echo of Shakespeare’s King’s Lear,” Hartman says. Wordsworth’s 
“eyesight [was] troubling him” as he was writing the poem, so perhaps it is not 
surprising that the poet “dislocate[s] the words of another blinded man, Gloucester,” 
in “To Dora” (120, 125). Wordsworth’s lines recall Gloucester’s comments on 
meeting Lear, “now driven mad by the cruelty of his elder daughters as well as by 
the memory of his own cruelty to his youngest daughter,” and his statement “‘The 
trick of that voice I do well remember’” (125). Hartman describes this opposition 
between overt and covert allusion in Wordsworth’s references as evidence of the 
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“defensive” character of allusions where the “overt presence” of Milton offsets the 
more “dangerous” presence of Shakespeare (127). Hartman’s assertion of explicit 
and implicit references in Wordsworth’s poetry undermines the individual authorship 
attributed to the Romantics and the perception of allusion as reflecting a culture of 
gratitude among poets. Ricks’s study of allusion reflects his preference for a poet-
centred tradition, where the invocation of one poem by another is always a self-
conscious gesture that supports a culture of gratitude within the arts. Each new poet 
is indebted to his predecessors and he demonstrates his gratitude to them through 
allusion.
13
 Ricks also situates his study in relation to theoretical parameters, and this 
situating of allusion contributes to the broader historical analysis of the “alluding 
poet” undertaken here.  
1.3 From Appropriation to Individualism  
The appropriative practices that manifest themselves in the poetry of Dryden, Pope, 
Burns, and Wordsworth do not preclude the idea that these poets might have been 
anxious about legitimacy and authority in their writing. Prickett’s study of “the two 
meanings of the word ‘appropriation’” articulates the positive, legitimizing potential 
of the practice (47). This does not displace the broader critical investigation into the 
anxiety surrounding legitimacy and authority in Romantic poetry. Prickett 
investigates the dual ideas of “quasi-legal ‘theft’ that lies just below the surface of 
the Latinate Anglo-French word” “appropre” and “the connotations of biological 
growth behind the German aneignen.” 
14
 For Prickett, these two definitions of 
appropriation are not opposed, but actually “appear to be structurally part of the 
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 In Ricks’s book, poetic tradition is a male tradition. 
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 Prickett explains that “aneignen” is the German word for “‘appropriation’” which is elaborated by 
Paul Ricoeur and becomes particularly important in his 1981 study, Hermeneutics and the Human 




same phenomenon” (47). In this way, appropriation “is a tradition not just of 
legitimation,” whereby new literature is validated by its borrowings from older 
classic texts, but also of “a growing consciousness of the process by which such 
legitimation is achieved.” The dual imperatives Prickett finds in appropriation are 
manifested in a quotation from Francois-Rene de Chateaubriand’s 1802 review of 
Milton. This review serves as evidence of the problem of contemporary descriptions 
of Romanticism as propagating poetic individualism and original genius. 
Chateaubriand praises Milton as “‘acquir[ing] originality in appropriating to himself 
the riches of others’” (42). According to the critic, “‘the art of imitation, known to all 
great writers, consists in a certain delicacy of taste which seizes the beauties of other 
times and accommodates them to the present age and manners.’” Prickett reads 
Chateaubriand’s review as evidence that “for the Romantics, ... appropriation is 
immediately linked with its seeming opposite, originality, in such a way that it can 
be read back into a new interpretation of the past.” For the Romantics, then, 
appropriation did not exacerbate the anxiety concerning legitimacy and authority but 
actually serves as a support to these poets by imbuing their poems with historical 
authority. Prickett’s book was published in 1996, but his arguments concerning the 
closeness of originality and appropriation in Romantic poetics have been slow to 
filter into the conceptual rhetoric of contemporary criticism about poetic 
appropriation.
15
 By returning to Bate’s 1970 book it is possible to gain a clearer 
picture of the anxiety concerning legitimacy and authority in Romantic poetry. This 
anxiety is not opposed to Chateaubriand’s ‘originality through appropriation’ but 
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instead reflects the important role that appropriation played at the heights of the 
Romantic period.  
 Bate’s study of The Burden of the Past and the English Poet is an important 
reference point in the investigation of traditions of authorship, not just as an 
influence on Ricks’s Allusion to the Poets, but also in its articulation of the literary 
and cultural past as a “‘burden’” for the English poet (Bate 13).
16
 “‘What is there left 
to do?’” is the “cry” that “animates Bate’s book,” says Ricks, as it has “animated 
most poetry for the last three centuries” (Ricks 13). Bate’s interest in the eighteenth 
century is motivated by his belief that it is “the first period in modern history to face 
the problem of what it means to come immediately after a great creative 
achievement” (Bate 12). There is an anxiety concerning authority and legitimacy 
which both Bloom’s and Ricks’s texts retain in their analyses of textual borrowing or 
influence which is not unique to the Romantic era but which does belie 
contemporary conflations of “late-romantic[ism]” and “heroic individualism” 
(Drucker n. pag.).
17
 Bate sources this anxiety to a “remorseless deepening of self-
consciousness” of the poet “before the rich and intimidating legacy of the past” 
which he says has become “the greatest single problem that modern art ... has had to 
face” (4). Bate’s analysis of this “deepening self-consciousness” as a disabling force 
was not roundly accepted. Donald Greene’s criticism of the book counteracts this 
analysis by arguing that “‘the burden of the past,’ far from inhibiting literary 
creativity, stimulates and enhances it” (260). Greene’s assertion of literary tradition 
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 Halsey articulates this same precise experience of “the burden of the past” in a 2010 interview 
(Bate 13), in which he distinguishes the experience of the English poet from that of American poets, 
such that “an English poet has to be busier picking through local wreckage to find whatever’s worth 
either salvage or creative demolition” (St. Thomasino n. pag.).  
 
17
 In an essay in support of Conceptualist poets, Johanna Drucker justifies their self-effacing poetics 
by opposing it to “late-romantic heroic individualism” (n. pag.).  
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as fostering literary creativity depends upon the poet’s capacity to admit that past 
into his or her writing and use it to “stimulate[ ] or enhance[ ]” his or her writing.  
Greene’s criticism recalls T.S. Eliot’s arguments about the capacity of “the really 
new ... work of art” to modify the “existing order” of tradition (153). Eliot argues 
that “the relations, proportions, [and] values of each work of art toward the whole are 
readjusted” by the introduction of the new work of art, and this readjustment reflects 
“conformity between the old and the new.” 
18
 Prickett extends Bate’s account of the 
anxiety that characterized this period beyond the immediate influence of literary 
tradition to a broader shift in social and cultural patterns of reading and 
interpretation. By aligning these two analyses, it is possible to arrive at a more 
expansive understanding of the local permutations in authorship and the 
consequences for appropriation during this time. 
 Prickett diagnoses a “sense of loss” and “corresponding need for new kinds 
of legitimation” in Romantic self-consciousness which he says reflects the 
“widespread shift away from older, more collective ways of reading” (267). Hegel 
describes this shift as “the failure of the traditional religious underpinning of 
objective meaning in the world” which he said “was creating a new subjectivity that 
spelt ‘the end of art’” (151). This failure regards the dissipation of the long-held 
belief that “there was a meaning to the whole cycle of human existence” such that 
“every event described in the Bible, however trivial it might seem, had a figurative, 
typological, or ... symbolic relation to the whole” (4). Bible stories which had long 
been interpreted as presenting readers with types of people and situations, changed 
with the emergence of the novel in the eighteenth century towards a more 
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 Bloom breaks with Eliot on this question of conformity between old and new in tradition in The 
Anxiety of Influence (51), and specifically with Eliot’s argument in “Tradition and the Individual 




individualist reading as reflecting the morality and decisions of individual agents. 
With this shift, a literary text comes to be legitimated not by its typological 
representation, but rather by “transcendent powers of the self, the possession (even 
by theft) of a divine blessing, or simply a literary tradition” (265). In all cases, 
literary legitimacy depends upon a “sequence or line” of tradition. The “heroic 
individualism” that Drucker, speaking on behalf of the conceptualists, attributes to 
the “late-romantic” period, can be read as a contemporary response to this concern 
with legitimacy effacing that figure of the author who offered to shore up Romantic 
poetry (n. pag.). And yet, modern conceptions of Romantic individualism tend to 
neglect the extent to which the Romantic poet was indebted, both through the 
practice of appropriation and in his or her affiliation to the “sequence or line” of 
tradition, to what came before (Prickett 265). Attributions of “heroic individualism” 
to the Romantic author are problematized by the fact that legitimacy in Romantic 
poetry is not solely the product of individual genius but also depends upon 
appropriation from earlier times, both in the composition of the poem and in the 
poet’s individual sense of place in the broader history of English literature (Drucker 
n. pag.). Prickett cites Byron’s borrowing of the Bible story of Cain and Abel as 
evidence of the Romantic poet’s indebtedness to earlier periods, with his Cain “one 
of the first of a whole series of nineteenth-century dramatisations” of biblical stories 
(128-29). Here, the Romantic author responds to the problem of “com[ing] 
immediately after a [period of] great creative achievement” by borrowing or 
appropriating from the past (Bate 12), and thus establishing their own legitimacy by 
fitting in to the “sequence or line” of tradition (Prickett 265). Literary historical 
indebtedness might be a problem of the Romantics as Bate argues, but there is a 
much broader tradition of appropriation of the Bible and classical myth that frames 
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Byron’s Cain. Prickett’s acknowledgement of the Bible as “the most important 
single book in the history of Western civilisation” to which we “owe ... even our idea 
of a book itself,” serves as evidence of the pre-eminence of these literary and cultural 
sources, and the longer, unbroken tradition of cultural appropriation they bestow (2).   
 Contemporary critics such as Drucker are confident in attributing self-
assurance and authority to the Romantic concept of the author, and yet Bate’s 
assertion regarding the anxiety about the “great creative achievement” that went 
before, and Prickett’s account of the shift in religious reading, are not the only forces 
which problematize this interpretation (Bate 12). Martha Woodmansee and Peter 
Jaszi’s argument that the modern concept of the author “culminated less than 200 
years ago in the heroic self-presentation of Romantic poets” overlooks the endurance 
of textual borrowing during this time and the challenge it presents to the image of the 
individual genius (3). Their investigation of the construction of authorship is 
important as an acknowledgement of the impact of the progressive legalization of 
authorship in the Romantic period. By distinguishing the Romantic concept of 
authorship from the progressive legal protection of publishing rights, it is possible to 
gain a clearer picture of authorship at this time. Woodmansee and Jaszi discuss the 
legal protections against unauthorized republication of books in the eighteenth 
century which protected the bookseller who bought the rights from the author. As 
literary culture developed a more “proprietary” approach to authorship, these laws 
came to protect the author as originator and creator of the text more than the 
bookseller. For the editors, Wordsworth stands as the pre-eminent example of the 
“proprietary nature of authorship” in this era (2). The poet enjoyed productive 
working relationships with Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and his sister, Dorothy 
Wordsworth, and both contributed to his compositional process, however this 
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contribution is “occluded” by the poet’s “authorial persona” (3). Wordsworth’s 
“authorial persona” is that of the “secular prophet with privileged access to 
experience of the numinous and a unique ability to translate that experience.” In his 
essay on the poet from their collection, Thomas Pfau asserts that Wordsworth’s 
persona reflects a “crisis of the subject,” and this adds weight to Bate’s and 
Prickett’s assessment of the anxiety within Romantic selfhood (142). 
 Michael Gamer puts the case clearly when he argues that “Accepting the 
author of Wordsworth’s 1800 Preface and 1815 “Essay” as the ‘Romantic author’ ... 
not only reproduces many features of the Romantic canon, but also narrows our 
inquiries into the history of authorship by allowing them to become dominated by 
another history—that of copyright reform” (833). Accepting Wordsworth as “the 
‘Romantic author’” is also problematic because of the differences that emerge 
between his model of authorship and those which emerged after him in the second 
generation of Romantic poets. Relations between Wordsworth and the younger poets 
are notoriously complicated. Byron complained that Shelley “‘used to dose [him] 
with Wordsworth physic’” in the early months of their friendship in 1816, and Byron 
would incorporate a “Wordsworthian flavour” to several passages of Canto III of 
“Childe Harold” written later that summer (Harson 113). Keats took the opposite 
approach, trying, but never quite succeeding, to separate himself and his poetry from 
Wordsworth’s and Milton’s influences. Keats’s effort to diverge from Wordsworth is 
made clear in his account of “the poetical Character” in a letter to Richard 
Woodhouse from 1818 (Keats 194): 
As to the poetical Character itself (I mean that sort of which, if I am 
anything, I am a Member; that sort distinguished from the 
wordsworthian or egotistical sublime, which is a thing per se and 
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stands alone), it is not itself—it has no self—it is everything and 
nothing—It has no character ... A Poet is the most unpoetical of 
anything in existence because he has no Identity—he is continually in 
for and filling some other Body. (195) 
Keats situates his definition of poetic authorship at a strict remove from “the 
wordsworthian or egotistical sublime,” and yet the poet’s failure to complete the two 
Hyperion poems indicate that, like Wordsworth, Keats retained a commitment to his 
poetic forebears. In her reading of Keats’s poem, Marjorie Levinson acknowledges 
the poet’s efforts to transcend this influence, interpreting “The Fall” as 
“demonstrat[ing] on every level Keats’s autonomy” (181). Keats may have “escaped 
the influence of his great precursors,” but “‘The Fall’ maintains a posture of 
dependence, dependence on Hyperion, [and] hence on Keats’s earlier loves and 
selves.” In this way, even Keats’s turn away from Wordsworth and Milton suggests 
their influence on him. Keats’s experience serves as evidence of the conflicted nature 
of Romantic authorship, and this before the critical conflation of authorship and 
copyright law comes into play. Irrespective of these differences in Romantic 
conceptions of the author, and thus the relation to appropriation, Wordsworth’s 
poetry and criticism are often presented as symptomatic of the “late-romantic heroic 
individualism” that contemporary critics reflect on, and his contribution to the 
legalization of copyright only compounds this reading (Drucker n. pag.).    
 Wordsworth and William Hazlitt were two “major proponents ... of the 
Romantic ideology of cultural production as original creation” and they made 
important contributions to the progressive legalization of literature and publishing 
(McCutcheon 72). Both authors would have supported the 1842 Copyright Act 
which “significantly extended the term of copyright protection to forty-two years 
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from publication or, if the author was still alive thereafter, to seven years after the 
author’s death” (74).
19
 Wordsworth was integral both as author and activist in the 
progressive development of copyright law in the nineteenth century, and by 1860 
copyright was firmly enshrined in English law. That said, copyright law is not and 
should not be exchangeable with literary and critical conceptions of authorship, even 
for Wordsworth, just as contemporary definitions of copyright law and authorship do 
not determine poetic innovation and appropriative practices. By calling attention to 
Wordsworth’s individual notion of authorial persona, the divergence of his 
contemporaries, and the progressive legalization of the author, I am arguing that the 
Romantic definition of authorship which contemporary poets and critics inherit does 
not represent the full extent of the intentions and the anxieties of poets writing at the 
time. 
 Gamer describes the Romantic era as “a convenient high-water mark” for the 
“recent explosion of historical studies on authorship and copyright” which 
contemporary conceptualists reflect on as the source of conservative notions of 
lyricism and poetic expression (831).
20
 This historical investigation of authorship 
works against contemporary critics’ proclivity to invoke historical constructions of 
authorship as evidence of the ancient roots of appropriation, or, alternatively, of the 
innovation of contemporary redefinitions of authorship. These invocations of 
historical authorship rarely acknowledge the local permutations and ideologies 
motivating particular models of authorship, whether they reflect the ancient 
rhetorical notion of topos or the 1760s concern with nature. Rachel Galvin cites the 
Latin cento as an early precursor for conceptualist appropriation (25), and Drucker 
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 I am using the conditional here because Hazlitt died in 1830. 
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 Gamer also rejects the conflation of Romantic authorship with concurrent developments in 
copyright law in his essay, and indeed he reads gothic fiction and stage drama as “destabiliz[ing] 
notions of authorship and originality in the Romantic period” (833).  
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rejects “late-romantic heroic individualism” in her assertion of conceptualism, but 
neither critic thoroughly interrogates her historical reference point (n. pag.). This 
analysis reveals a history of authorship much more complex and varied than 
contemporary critics of conceptual poetry tend to acknowledge. The Romantic 
concept of authorship becomes particularly complicated when aligned with the 
practices of appropriation which endure through the Romantic period and which 
provide such a powerful antecedent to modernists in the twentieth century, an era 
which from today’s perspective represents a highpoint in the aesthetic engagement 
with appropriation. The Romantic period provided the poetic and critical parameters 
that later modernist and postmodernist poets would respond to and react against, and 
thus are important to poets such as Joyce, Halsey, and Howe writing out of a late-
modernist tradition.  
1.4 Reconciling Authorship and Appropriation. 
Before moving on, it will be helpful to take account of the historical development of 
authorship so far and the consequences for appropriation in the poetry of Joyce, 
Halsey, and Howe. This history began with Latin poetry from Roman times which 
tends to invoke its “intertextual tradition as a collectivity” and is “mobilized by the 
poet in full self-awareness” (Hinds 34). Critics such as Hinds, Thomas, Brooks, and 
Martindale apply author-centred concepts such as allusion, reference, and topos in 
their analysis of intertextual referencing in Latin poetry. This proclivity towards 
author-centred concepts supports the critical analysis of Latin poets as self-conscious 
and authoritative authors whose appropriations reflect the parameters of poetic 
intentionality. Thomas’s concept of “accidental confluence” admits and 
acknowledges the modicum of intertextuality independent of the author (Hinds 34), 
but this concept, like Ricks’s later attribution of “unconscious intentions” to the 
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Romantic poets, does little to challenge the self-awareness and intentionality 
attributed to the author in Roman times (Ricks 314). If the clear parameters of the 
author as arbiter of the poem meant that Latin poets were content to admit and even 
“annotate” references to earlier authors in their poems, the critical approach to 
authorship would look very different at the end of the Renaissance period (Hinds 
57). By this time, critical accounts of the “self-annotati[ve]” references of the Latin 
“alluding poet” had faded, and “the openness of the borrowing” no longer served as 
a “guarantee of the author’s integrity” (1, 22). The concept of authorship undergoes 
significant changes between the celebrations of Shakespeare by Jonson, Dryden, and 
Johnson in the 1600s and the critical demarcation of the author in scholarly essays of 
the 1700s. Young’s 1759 essay makes it clear that a good author “shew[s] an 
original, unindebted energy; the vigor igneus, and caelestis origo,” such that 
inspiration is part organic, part divine, and imitation is best avoided (Young 352).
21
 
Critics such as Bate, McFarland, Pfau, and Prickett have articulated the “sense of 
loss” in Romantic self-consciousness and the “corresponding need for new kinds of 
legitimation” as variously contributing to this conflation of Romantic authorship and 
heroic individualism (Prickett 267). It is worth remembering, however, that the 
Romantics and pre-Romantics invoke a tradition of poetry and culture wholly 
distinct from that shaping later modernist poetry and poetics.  
 The poetics of Romanticism take the Judaeo-Christian prophetic tradition as 
its source, while the Greco-Roman Latinate tradition dominates the later modernist 
era. William Blake’s The Marriage of Heaven and Hell (1790) exemplifies the 
difference between these two modes. Here, Blake articulates his personal perspective 
on contemporary poetry, ideology, and religion, while the form of his poem recalls 
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 Hazard Adams’s edition of the essay footnotes these Latin phrases as meaning “‘glowing energy’ 
and ‘heavenly origin’” respectively (343). 
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the wilder, prophetic example of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. The individuality of 
Blake’s Marriage of Heaven and Hell emerges with his reassessment of the binaries 
of “Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate” that define 
Christianity and shape religious thought (pl. 3). Blake’s poem questions the Christian 
affirmation of “attraction,” “reason,” and “love” over their opposites, recognizing the 
necessity of these conceptual oppositions because “Without Contraries is no 
progression” (pl. 3). In arguing for the primacy of “the ancient Poets” over the 
“Priesthood” in “animat[ing] all sensible objects with Gods or Geniuses,” Blake 
demonstrates his belief in the Biblical origins of poetry as prophecy, a belief that 
modernists such as Eliot replace with a Latinate tradition. In The Anxiety of 
Influence, Bloom takes Blake’s “Priesthood” as a conceptual model for his critical 
analysis of literary influence on the basis that it too is “a system … which took some 
advantage of & enslav’d the vulgar by attempting to realize or abstract the mental 
deities from their objects” (pl. 11) (Bloom 29). Bloom’s “anxiety of influence” 
regards the “inhibit[ion] from creativity by an obsessive reasoning and comparing … 
of one’s own works to the precursor’s” (29). The problem of originality is clearly a 
significant one for the poet writing and is heightened by the enduring nature of 
appropriative practices, and yet the topic received no attention among essayists such 
as Young.  
 Bloom was not alone in recognizing the association between literature and 
the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Erich Auerbach outlines the concept of “figure” in a 
1959 essay in terms which illuminate the relation to influence and tradition in 
literature. Auerbach takes figure as his subject in this essay, outlining the 
etymological and tropological history of the concept as it informs ideas of tradition 
and literary inheritance in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. The critic proposes a 
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conceptual approach to figuration, taking as his example the manner in which the 
various books of the Bible tropologically allude to each other. This model not only 
provides a parallel to critical analysis of literary influence, it also provides an 
alternative to the modernist Latinate model of tradition which denies the affiliation 
between poetry and the Bible. Auerbach traces the changing definition of figure from 
“pagan antiquity,” where it was exemplified by Quintillian’s differentiation between 
tropes and figures, to the later Christian interpretation of it as a “prophetic event” in 
the Bible where it “foreshadow[s] things to come” (27, 29). In biblical studies, 
“figura” describes the “creative, formative principle, change amid the enduring 
essence, [or again] the shades of meaning between copy and archetype” (49). 
Auerbach includes examples of biblical figuration, such as Moses’s naming of Nun’s 
son “Jehoshua (Joshua),” as “a phenomenal prophecy or prefiguration of the future 
Saviour,” to demonstrate that “figura is something real and historical which 
announces something else that is also real and historical” and this extends to the dual 
structure of the Bible with the Old Testament prophecying or providing a figure for 
the New Testament (29).   
The relevance of Auerbach’s “figura” to Bloom, and to the broader issue of 
Romantic authorial individualism under question becomes clear in the third section 
of his essay. Having outlined the pagan and Christian histories of the concept, 
Auerbach moves in this third section to discuss “figural interpretation” (49). Here, 
“figural prophecy” is presented as “impl[ying] the interpretation of one worldly 
event through another” such that “the first signifies the second, [and] the second 
fulfills [sic] the first” (58). If the “modern view” sees “the provisional event … as a 
step in an unbroken horizontal process,” then the “figural system” of interpretation is 
“always sought from above … torn apart, individually, each in relation to something 
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other that is promised and not yet present” (59). Given Romanticism’s belief in the 
dual sources of Western poetry and culture, Bloom reads this “figural system” of 
interpretation as part of the “Hebrew temporal Sublime agon” (Bloom “Wrestling” 
88). This approach to the “figural system” situates it at odds with “the Greek spatial 
striving for the foremost place” that characterizes modernist Eliotic tradition. 
Auerbach and Bloom both offer more comprehensive accounts of the traditions of 
Western culture and poetry by incorporating the Judaeo-Christian source so often 
relegated in modernist and post-Romantic poetry. Bloom is attentive to this duality, 
however Ricks promotes the Latinate understanding of tradition in Allusion to the 
Poets, and this preference is manifested in his negotiation of the opposition of the 
critical concept of original genius and the enduring nature of appropriative practices. 
 Ricks’s study of allusion in British poetry from the 1700s to the 1900s serves 
as evidence of the enduring nature of appropriative practices throughout this period. 
The critic prefers the author-centred concept of allusion which works against the 
more independently intertextual approaches that dominated literary criticism in the 
closing decades of the twentieth century and are recorded in John Hollander’s 1981 
book, The Figure of Echo. Hollander’s “figure of echo” offers a critical approach to 
textual borrowing or referencing which “does not depend on [the] conscious 
intention” of the author, and Hollander applies the concept to Milton in the 1600s all 
the way up to T.S. Eliot in the 1900s (64). Books such as Hollander’s work against 
the idea of original genius and the progressive legalization of the author as sole 
authority and owner of the text through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
During this period, the figure of the author gained legal definition and the author 
rather than the bookseller was progressively granted ownership of his or her text 
under the law. The anxiety within Romantic self-consciousness and the gradual 
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legalization of authorship which devalues the use of appropriative practices in 
Romantic criticism did not continue through to the modernist period. If twentieth-
century poetry and art represent a high point in the aesthetic engagement with 
appropriation, this era also reflected several corresponding developments in the 
critical approach to authorship. By studying the opposition between Ricks and 
Bloom and their contemporary re-readings of Romantic authorship and 
appropriation, we can learn more both about Romantic authorship and about the 
poetic and theoretical parameters of appropriation for Joyce, Halsey, and Howe. 
 In the preface to his book, Ricks situates Allusion to the Poets in opposition 
to Bloom’s Anxiety of Influence. Ricks lists Bloom as one of four critics important in 
the study of literary allusion. Unlike Bate, Hollander, and Eleanor Cook, Bloom does 
not receive the “due gratitude” the author attributes to these other critical precursors 
(41). Bloom’s Anxiety of Influence has made “beneficiaries and victims” of its 
readers, Ricks says, and the victimizing he attributes to Bloom’s text outweighs the 
insight and close analysis of influence that The Anxiety of Influence brings to 
criticism (5). In Bloom’s text, Ricks diagnoses a “melodramatic sub-Freudian 
parricidal scenario,” a “sentimental discrediting of gratitude,” and an “explicit 
repudiation of all interest in allusion” (6). Bloom writes insightfully about the 
conflicted relationship of the younger poet to his or her predecessor, and he is aware 
that “the poet in a poet” is motivated to write by the work of these earlier poets, 
insisting that the struggle to supersede one’s elders is what generates new and 
innovative poetry (Anxiety 11). In the opening lines of his book, Bloom outlines his 
interest in “strong poets, major figures with the persistence to wrestle with their 
strong precursors, even to the death” (5). Strong poets are not bound to 
“idealiz[ing],” like their weaker peers, choosing instead to “appropriate for 
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themselves”; however, “nothing is got for nothing, and self-appropriation involves 
the immense anxieties of indebtedness.” Where Bloom identifies an “anxiety of 
influence” between poets, Ricks sees a culture of gratitude and generosity, and where 
Bloom proposes the failure of poetic intention and the inevitability of allusion, Ricks 
is convinced of poetic intention and agency as the determining force in poetic 
allusion (xx).
22
 Ricks’s poetics of gratitude are linked not only to the work of T.S. 
Eliot, but also to that of Northrop Frye. Frye’s crucially influential work on tradition 
and influence in essays such as “Tradition and Change in the Theory of Criticism” 
and “Elementary Teaching and Elementary Scholarship,” as well as more canonical 
works such as Fearful Symmetry and The Secular Scripture, emphasize the alternate 
Biblical roots of poetry. Despite the differences between Ricks and Bloom, Fearful 
Symmetry was also important to Bloom’s concept of tradition and his work on Blake. 
Rather than reinforcing Frye’s arguments as Ricks does, Bloom rebels against Frye’s 
Anglican poetics of accommodation, and argues instead for the Romantic Hebraic 
poetics of conflict.  
Despite their shared inheritance from Frye, there are significant differences 
between Ricks’s and Bloom’s concepts of tradition. Laura Quinney makes the 
peculiarities of Ricks’s text clear when she argues that “None of the odd, 
contradictory, provocative, inexplicable, troubling features of literary experience–or 
of allusion–features in his [Ricks’s] analysis,” and “nothing unnerving makes its way 
into his account” (n. pag.). The difference between the two critics is that “Ricks 
appears to regard poetry as a place of perfection,” Quinney says, “and he resents 
Bloom for attempting to insinuate into it some of the squalor of ordinary life” (n. 
                                                 
22
 Laura Quinney draws attention to one moment in Ricks’s text, “in his essay on Winters, [where] he 
writes of ‘unconscious intentions,’” which would appear to lead away from his preoccupation with 
author-centred poetic intentionality; however Quinney is clear that “the concept of ‘unconsciousness’ 
does not mean much so long as it is still paired with ‘intention’” (n. pag.).  
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pag.). This difference becomes particularly pronounced with Bloom’s negative 
account of the imagination in The Anxiety of Influence which David Fite 
characterizes as a “malignity” or “alienation, profound and irreducible, [which] 
devours us from within” (187). These differences are important in gaining a clearer 
perspective on historical understandings of Romantic authorship and on the 
difficulty of depending on critical approaches to authorship through history.  
 Ricks and Bloom diverge in their interpretations of textual borrowing, and 
yet the two critics write relatively coterminously when compared with Young whose 
essay was published in 1759. This divergence indicates that appropriation is a highly 
contested concept and that conflicting accounts of the practice can exist in society 
simultaneously. This divergence reflects the dual sources of poetry—the Greco-
Roman and the Judaeo-Christian or Biblical tradition—and the critical proclivity to 
emphasize the Greco-Roman and elide the Biblical. In Ruin the Sacred Truths, 
Bloom acknowledges that “the two modes themselves seem irreconcilable,” and thus 
critical “attempts to explain this opposition on a linguistic basis have failed” (27). 
Such “reductiveness must fail when two … antithetical visions of life are contrasted” 
Bloom says, and instead the dual Greco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian sources of 
tradition should ensue in contested agency (27). Bearing in mind the problematically 
patriarchal nature of these two sources of culture, Carolyn Burke complicates matters 
further in her 1985 review essay on the female subject in modernist poetry when she 
warns against ethical judgements of poetic practices in retrospective analysis. 
Reviewing a number of books on female modernist poets such as Laura Riding, 
Mina Loy, and Marianne Moore, Burke articulates the danger of applying 
contemporary principles to the poetry of earlier times, and her analysis has 
consequences for Ricks and Bloom and the present investigation of historical 
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authorship. Reflecting on contemporary critics’ judgements on the work of these 
female modernists, Burke warns that “It would not do to lament the female poet’s 
self-effacement, her lack of self-assertion, or even her failure to speak in an 
identifiably female voice” (133). The problem with such approaches, according to 
Burke, is that they are “projections of our own concerns back onto the writing of an 
earlier period” which tells us little about the intentions of the poet in writing or the 
social, cultural, and political context within which the poetry emerged. Burke’s 
caution to critics problematizes Young’s attribution of genius to the literature of 
“Chaucer, Raleigh, Bacon, Milton, [and] Clarendon” who were writing at a time 
when his divinely natural model of genius did not exist (339). Burke’s warning also 
has relevance for Bloom because his critical model of the anxiety of influence cannot 
accommodate the power and strength that self-renunciation makes available to some 
poets.  
The poetics of renunciation is elaborated in The Madwoman in the Attic with 
Emily Dickinson’s reading of Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s Aurora Leigh is said to 
manifest “the Romantic rage for social transformation concealed behind the veil of 
self-abnegating servitude” (Gilbert and Gubar 580). Here, poetic self-abnegation 
contravenes the “essential process of self-definition [which] is complicated by all 
those patriarchal definitions that intervene between herself and herself [as poet]” 
(17). This poetics of renunciation also contravenes Bloom’s conception of poetic 
influence as a wholly male phenomenon which Gilbert and Gubar reveal in their 
quotation from The Anxiety of Influence, “‘from the sons of Homer to the sons of 
Ben Jonson, poetic influence [has] been described as a filial relationship,’ a 
relationship of ‘sonship’” (6). Burke’s criticism is also instructive for my analysis, in 
that even a supposedly objective attempt to trace the changing history of the 
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“alluding author” is motivated by and will reflect the scholarly forms and social 
ideologies of a particular period. That said, Bloom’s and Ricks’s critical analyses of 
textual borrowing by the Romantics affords some insight into earlier conceptions of 
the author, not least of the instabilities and contingencies that define that figure and 
the consequences for contemporary understandings of poetic appropriation.  
 Ricks and Bloom are important in providing two diverse critical negotiations 
of authorship and appropriation through the figure of the Romantic “alluding poet.” 
Their analyses demonstrate that authorship and appropriation are not opposed but 
actually manifest a potent and productive duality, whether as a culture of gratitude as 
in Ricks’s study or as an anxiety of influence as per Bloom. This investigation of the 
historical development of the author demonstrates the changing definition of the poet 
writing and the social, cultural, and legal forces which shape our understanding of 
authorship. The purpose here is to demonstrate the reactionary nature of Drucker’s 
problematic assertion of “late-romantic heroic individualism” which is itself a 
response to contemporary anxieties about legitimacy and authority and the long, rich 
history of authorial appropriation (n. pag.). The significance of this history of 
authorial appropriation manifests itself most clearly when we turn to the 
contemporary school of conceptual poetry which asserts as one of its guiding 
principles the opposition of authorship and appropriation. Irrespective of the critical 
literature emphasizing the long and productive relation between authorial originality 
and appropriative practices, the conceptualists are vehement about the failure of 
original expression and the necessity of understanding appropriation as a means of 
effacing the poet writing.  
Conceptual poetry is an early-twenty-first-century literary movement which 
tends to dominate contemporary discussion of the practices of appropriation, 
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adaptation, and textual borrowing that also distinguish Joyce’s, Halsey’s, and 
Howe’s poetry. The main point of contrast between the conceptualists and these 
three poets is conceptualism’s propensity to position itself in opposition to a 
definition of Romantic lyricism, a definition which does not reflect the endurance of 
appropriation through the Romantic era, and is nowhere evident in these three poets’ 
appropriative practices. Kenneth Goldsmith expresses conceptualism’s positioning of 
itself in contrast to this concept of Romantic individualism in a 2007 essay for 
Poetry Foundation in which he rejects the possibility of authorial originality. 
Reflecting on the question of the possibility of “non-expressive poetry,” Goldsmith 
offers this response which consolidates conceptualism’s oppositional approach and 
indicates its failure to account for the expressive appropriative practices of the three 
poets preoccupying this study (“Journal” n. pag.). Goldsmith explains the “non-
expressive” quality of conceptualist writing as follows:   
Conceptual writing obstinately makes no claims on originality. On 
the contrary, it employs intentionally self and ego effacing tactics 
using uncreativity, unoriginality, illegibility, appropriation, 
plagiarism, fraud, theft, and falsification as its precepts. (n. pag.) 
Conceptualism’s explicit opposition to originality reflects the issues and debates that 
shape this chapter, but Goldsmith also takes a highly adversarial approach to 
language as the substance of the poetry. Under conceptualism, language is “junk,” 
“detritus,” “something to be shovelled into a machine and spread across pages, only 
to be discarded and recycled once again” (n. pag.). This poetry, “more concerned 
with quantity than quality,” situates poetic forms and styles which retain a concern 
with language as meaningful within a conservative standpoint, and yet this is not the 
most powerful imperative in Goldsmith’s definition. Conceptualist anti-subjectivity 
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is the most contemporary expression of the opposition of the author and 
appropriation and it takes this opposition to the fullest extent. Conceptualism also 
dominates contemporary conversations surrounding poetic appropriation, but it 
stands at a strict remove from the poetries of Joyce, Halsey, and Howe which use 
appropriation to uniquely declarative effects. By tracing the changing definitions of 
authorship from era to era and demonstrating the enduring nature of textual 
borrowing, it is possible to escape the opposition between poetic expression and 
poetic appropriation which manifests itself most clearly in contemporary 
conceptualism. From the self-assured Roman poets so confident of their status as 
author that they annotated their own appropriations, to the sixteenth-century critical 
admiration for Shakespeare and Spenser who retain those “images of nature,” and 
the later seventeenth-century attributions of literary genius, poetry has witnessed 
some rather significant changes in the meaning and definition of authorship and 
appropriation (Dryden par. 1). The changing definition of authorship need not 
preclude appropriation from contributing to the declarative, expressive force of a 
poem. Much has been written about conceptualism’s denigration of the author and its 
corresponding celebration of appropriative practices. It will be helpful to consider 
these criticisms in the analysis of the appropriations of Joyce, Halsey, and Howe and 
the importance of these practices in the development of three distinctly declarative 
poetries and poetics.  
1.5 Advancing Appropriation in Contemporary Poetry 
The practice of appropriation could be said to be in the ascendant again, nearly 
thirty-five years after the highpoint of postmodernism which relished the anti-
subjective and sociopolitical imperatives of the practice. The current vogue is 
attributable to the strengthening of conceptual poetry in recent years, however 
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conceptualism has not been commended in all quarters. Critics such as Brady have 
been forthright in challenging conceptual poetry by suggesting that such writing is 
far more indebted to the lyric form it resists than those involved would like to admit. 
Conceptualism echoes twentieth-century experimentalism in its language and formal 
procedures, and yet the force with which the many essays surrounding the poetry 
attempt to eliminate the human from the poem is unique. The conceptualist approach 
to appropriation infers a rupturing of poetic voice and expression, and this violence 
is one of the most unsettling aspects of conceptualism for Brady. In studying the 
relationship between the poetries of Joyce, Halsey, and Howe and the conceptualist 
poetics of Goldsmith and Dworkin, a number of issues arise which distinguish these 
three poets from the contemporary conceptualist vogue. One of the prevailing 
differences between Dworkin and Goldsmith’s articulation of conceptualist 
principles in Against Expression and these three poets emerges with the 
conceptualist poet’s rejection of his or her own subjectivity in the poem. Brady takes 
up this question of subjective expression in conceptualist poetics, identifying a series 
of problems for the desubjective epithet that are particularly revealing of the 
innovation of the appropriative poetries under scrutiny here.  
Critiquing Conceptualism 
Brady’s interrogation of the formal, aesthetic, and political implications of 
conceptualist poetics provides a useful comparison and contrast for Joyce’s, 
Halsey’s, and Howe’s writing, and for the interpretation of their appropriative 
poetics. In her analysis, Brady contrasts conceptualism with the lyric tradition it 
opposes, and while this thesis does not go so far as to reclaim these three poetries for 
the lyric tradition, her arguments are helpful in recognizing the limitations of the 
conceptualist definition of appropriation. In an unpublished conference paper entitled 
77 
 
“Poetry and Bondage,” Brady aligns the panegyrics bolstering conceptualism with 
the poetry and delineates the theoretical and aesthetic limitations of the poetics of 
conceptualism. Brady begins by demonstrating the difficulty of defining conceptual 
poetry among the plethora of critical statements and poetic examples, a situation she 
resolves through two distinct explanations: first, conceptualism is the name given to 
a vast range of experimental forms and practices which counteract the lyricism that 
has come to define the MFA workshop culture that pervades contemporary 
American poetry, thereby producing a very expansive definition. The second 
explanation, and one which has more serious ramifications for the conceptualists, is 
that there is no specific category of conceptual poetry, because there is nothing 
specific about the school other than the conceptualist appellation. 
Brady’s critique leans towards this second scenario of a lack of any “specific 
category of conceptual poetry,” and yet this lack has not prevented conceptualism 
from situating itself as the sole alternative to the perceived individualism of the lyric 
(n. pag.). The emphatic nature of Dworkin’s denigration of lyricism in Against 
Expression clashes with the more ambiguous definitions of conceptualism by Laura 
Mullen and Sarah Dowling in the anthology of women’s conceptual writing, I’ll 
Drown My Book. Brady reads this anthology as veering very close to lyric modes of 
expression inherited from the critical construction of Romantic “heroic 
individualism” (Drucker n. pag.) According to Brady, the “caricatured notion of lyric 
authority” which conceptualism positions itself against emerges again in individual 
poems and series by some of the movement’s leading figures (n. pag.). Vanessa 
Place’s “Factory Series” “glamorizes the author [-function],” Brady says, as does 
Goldsmith’s Soliloquy and Fidget which “are fabricated out of a distinctively 
personal vantage within the New York art scene.” Convinced by their own 
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redefinition of poetic practice as the “manage[ment] of language in the digital age,” 
poets and artists in the conceptual tradition follow Sol LeWitt in belittling the act of 
composition as “a perfunctory affair” (Goldsmith Uncreative Writing 4). The 
conceptualists’ anti-subjectivist take on form and practice reduces the poem to the 
status of a machine, Brady argues. Like the machine in Marx’s Grundrisse, the poem 
“possesses skill and strength in place of the worker[/poet]”: The poem “is itself the 
virtuoso, with a soul of its own, while the worker operating it ‘is reduced to a mere 
abstraction of activity’” (n. pag.). Brady’s comparison of the conceptualist poem 
with Marx’s machine completes the conceptualist effacement of the poet writing, 
such that appropriation comes to dominate the writing scene and the poet is written 
out by each phrase he or she takes in from elsewhere. Brady’s interrogation of 
conceptualist appropriation is heightened by the fact that she incorporates 
appropriation into her own poetry. Before elaborating on her divergence from 
conceptualist practice, it will be helpful to learn more about conceptualist anti-
subjectivity and its consequences for contemporary understandings of appropriation.   
The evacuation of the subject in conceptualism is described in the essays that 
surround the poetry using machine rhetoric and imagery. Brady references Perloff 
and LeWitt and their invocations of the machine in conceptual poetry, but most of 
her quotations come from Goldsmith’s essay, “Flarf is Dionysus. Conceptual 
Writing is Apollo,” and from his 2011 monograph, Uncreative Writing. In the first 
text, Goldsmith reflects on appropriative practices and the difficulty of conceiving of 
the poem as an originally-authored piece of writing. In an essay which variously 
affirms and rejects poetic subjectivity, Goldsmith acknowledges the deconstitution of 
the poet writing: “Come to think of it, no one’s really written a word of it. It’s been 
grabbed, cut, pasted, processed, machined, ... and reframed from the great mass of 
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free-floating language out there” (n. pag.). Perloff’s work on conceptualism is related 
to Goldsmith’s attempts to historicize conceptual poetry as the teleological 
consequence of twentieth-century modernism. Brady cites Goldsmith’s response to 
Walter Benjamin’s Passagenwerk as indicative of this historicizing effort. Goldsmith 
accounts for Benjamin’s text by saying that “the machine that makes the work is set 
up in advance, and it’s just a matter of filling up those categories with the right 
words” (Uncreative Writing 114). This description is representative of the way 
Goldsmith historicizes conceptual poetry, and of his conscious effort to inculcate 
conceptualism as the necessary outcome of modernist impersonality and the 
appropriative practices of Cubism, Surrealism, and Dada. 
To some extent, Goldsmith is correct in asserting that conceptual poetics 
develops appropriative practices from the modernist period, and extends the 
modernist propensity to interrogate poetic subjectivity. His statement that “On the 
conceptual side, what matters is the machine that drives the poem’s construction” is 
the latest manifestation of a long trajectory of modernist definitions and explanations 
of poetry (“Journal” n. pag.). From Valéry’s “a poem is a kind of machine for 
producing the poetic state of mind by means of words” (79), through Marinetti’s 
commitment to literature which “render[s] the life of a motor’” (18), and on to 
Pound’s affinity for “machine art,” there is a long and rich history of the poem as 
machine in modernist poetry (57). As pervasive as this history is within modernist 
poetics, for Brady it does not absolve Goldsmith of his wilful “mechanising [of] the 
producer of language” (n. pag.). Such “mechanising ... depoliticiz[es] autonomy,” 
she says, and “ridicule[s] [the] identity and authenticity” of both reader and writer. 
The freedom on offer conceals a broader delimitation which conceptualism enforces 
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not just on traditional lyrical modes of expression but for the very possibility of 
expression in poetry. 
 For Brady, the chief problem with recent conceptualist rhetoric is the “decay 
of poetic form as social mediation” which it promotes, and thus the decay of 
“‘mediating elements within the individual himself’” that Adorno says makes the 
individual part of a social subject (n. pag.). This might seem an unusual critique 
given the poetry’s propensity to appropriate fragments from texts and contexts that 
are already a part of society, and yet conceptualism represents only the most 
restricted account of appropriation in contemporary poetry. Other accounts emerge 
through texts such as Galvin’s 2014 essay, “Poetry is Theft,” in which she argues 
that “intellectual and artistic theft are not transhistorical concepts, but are construed 
differently at different times and in different places” (25). Conceptual poetry may be 
the most prominent example of textual borrowing in contemporary poetry, but it is 
not the only site of appropriation. Extending Galvin’s argument that artistic theft is 
“construed differently at different times and in different places,” I would argue that 
the examples of Joyce, Halsey, and Howe demonstrate that appropriation can also 
mean different things for poets writing in diverse social and cultural contexts. 
Brady’s 2010 poem Wildfire serves as evidence of appropriation’s multiple meanings 
and interpretations and indicates the necessity of redefining appropriation.  
 Brady’s critique of appropriative poetry in her analysis of Goldsmith’s 
poetics is helpful in distinguishing the poetry and practices of Joyce, Halsey, and 
Howe; however, she is not adverse to the practice of appropriation in her own poetry. 
Brady’s criticism of conceptualism as “mechanising … the producer of language” is 
specifically addressed to the conceptualist negotiation of appropriation, and not to 
the practice itself. Brady’s 2010 poem, Wildfire, incorporates appropriation and is 
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indicative of the complexity of the practice and the divergence of an individual 
poet’s engagements with it. Wildfire is subtitled a “Verse Essay on Obscurity and 
Illumination” and the poem appropriates material from a vast range of texts. The 
sources of Wildfire include Ancient Greek works such as Theophrastus’s De Igne 
and Marcus Graecus’s Liber Ignium, and contemporary texts including Richard E. 
Threlfall’s The Story of 100 Years of Phosphorus Making, 1851-1951 (1951) and 
Ernest Volkman’s Science Goes to War (2010). Brady’s negotiation of appropriation 
must diverge significantly from the conceptualist approach to avoid replacing 
subjective expression with a “mass of free-floating language” as conceptualism aims 
to do (Goldsmith “Flarf” n. pag.). In her “note on the text” which accompanies the 
poem, Brady details her intentions and motivations in writing Wildfire. The poet 
describes her difficulty appropriating text in an earlier poem entitled Sweatbox which 
she later abandoned, and this experience provides the impetus for Wildfire:  
The failure of my first effort to write such a poem, Sweatbox, showed 
me unable to cope with a rapidly unravelling history … Epic 
fragments were transported by Penguin Classics to a nook in London 
then back out to a pixellated field sewn with cluster bomblets and the 
shards of the Nemean lion. I busied myself at the British Museum, 
reading the blurbs, constellating fragments as a melancholic formal 
reminder of the fractures and losses in real-time reporting and in the 
dispersal of a living culture. But I couldn’t keep up with the news, 
couldn’t fit that fast degeneration to an epic impasto worth thousands 
of years. (70-1) 
The note describes Brady’s engagement with appropriation and her intimate 
knowledge of the dangers implicit in borrowing texts. Brady differs from the 
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conceptualists in the extent to which she acknowledges her own role in the selection 
of text and materials. Her reflection on the failed poem entitled Sweatbox shows the 
poet positioning herself as mediator of materials and text which are “transported ... to 
a nook in London” where she lives or works, and then transferred out again “to a 
pixellated field” (70). Responsibility for the poem rests solely with the poet and this 
is reflected in the acutely personal nature of her note on the text: “my first effort ... 
showed me unable,”  “I busied myself at the British Museum,” “But I couldn’t keep 
up with the news” (emphasis added) (70-1). Her sense of responsibility to and for the 
poem is entirely at odds with Goldsmith’s orientation to composition as “a 
perfunctory affair” (Paragraphs n. pag.). Brady’s account of the difficulties she 
experienced with Sweatbox serve as evidence both of her appreciation of 
appropriation as a uniquely declarative practice and of her awareness of the problems 
that surround it, problems which recur in Joyce’s, Halsey’s, and Howe’s poetries and 
practices.  
 One of the major problems in writing Sweatbox, which Brady sought to 
resolve in Wildfire, was that of authority, both her own authority to recount and 
respond to the atrocities of the Iraq War and the authority of her representations 
developed through the poem. In her note to Wildfire, Brady describes her struggle to 
overcome these difficulties in the earlier attempted poem:  
My appropriations showed through: the desire for wholeness implicit 
in the phrases  airlifted from news bulletins; the desire for the right 
and the position to speak, for  consensus and legitimacy of 
representation. The absence of those rights and places, the mourning 
echoes of the epic voice, turned the poem all tawdry ironic—better 
than a barbaric silence, but only just. (70-1) 
83 
 
Brady’s notes reflect the complex nature of poetic appropriation and issues of ethics 
and authority both in the appropriation of another author’s text and in the viability of 
representation. These issues recall the earlier questions of “moral … dubious[ness]” 
and dispossession that emerged in the definition of appropriation and which recur in 
the poetries of Joyce, Halsey, and Howe. Brady seeks to resolve some of these 
problems in Wildfire, or at least to become more acquainted with them. The fact that 
her 2010 poem was published coterminously with Place’s The Guilt Project and 
Statement of Facts, and within years of defining conceptualist texts by Goldsmith, 
Caroline Bergvall, and Robert Fitterman, demonstrates that multiple meanings and 
interpretations of appropriation do exist simultaneously in poetry.
23
  
 Brady is not alone in asserting the declarative and expressive force of 
appropriation, and the number of poets and critics making similar statements about 
the closeness of authorial expression and poetic appropriation reflect the progressive 
redefinition of appropriation that is underway. Another of Galvin’s 2014 essays, 
“Lyric Backlash,” responds to Calvin Bedient’s essay which argues for a recovery of 
lyric expression from conceptualist anti-subjectivity. Galvin asserts that César 
Vallejo and M. NourbeSe Philip, two poets whom Bedient situates at opposite ends 
of the lyric/conceptualist spectrum, “both compose poetry according to formal 
concepts or constraints” such as appropriation, and yet both poets “strongly 
communicate affect” (n. pag.). Keston Sutherland makes a similar argument for 
deconstituting the opposition of authorial expression and appropriation in a blog 
statement for the “Revolution and/or Poetry” conference at the University of 
California in 2013. Here, Sutherland argues that “‘Lyrical confession’ versus ‘formal 
complexity’ is a false contest whose function in literary critical culture is to 
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 Goldsmith published Traffic in 2007 and Sports in 2008. Bergvall’s “Via” was published in Fig in 
2005 and Fitterman published “Notes to Conceptualism” with Place in 2011.      
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blackmail poets and readers out of the formal complexities of subjectivity: the formal 
complexities of life itself” (n. pag.). Brady, Galvin, and Sutherland each articulate 
their arguments differently, and these differences reflect a broader divergence in 
critical opinions. Some critics emphasize a return to lyric poetry and others 
encourage a more expansive definition of conceptualist poetics, and yet Brady, 
Galvin, and Sutherland are united in absolving appropriation of the critical 
accusation of meaninglessness in poetry, and as being anti-subjective and anti-lyrical 
in its relation to both poet and reader. These critics provide support for my 
reinterpretation of appropriation as a uniquely expressive practice which is not 
opposed to authorial originality or declarative poetry.  
Conclusion 
Appropriation might be a conflicted term to apply to the appropriative practices of 
Joyce, Halsey, and Howe, enmired as it is in questions of “moral … dubious[ness],” 
the historical “annexation of land,” and issues of “property law”; however these 
moral conflicts feature in their poems which deal with narratives of national history 
and dispossession, questions of literary tradition, and authorial authority and 
authorship (Prickett 27). From Joyce’s preoccupation with “recoup[ing] ... the 
history” of Irish colonialism and dispossession from the prevailing narratives and 
rhetoric of national history (Why I Write” n. pag.), to Halsey’s redefinition of 
literary tradition from Eliot’s modernist ideal, and Howe’s affirmation of a feminist 
alternative to traditional patriarchal models of authorship, appropriation manifests 
itself in diverse ways and to different effects across these poetries. 
This proposed redefinition of appropriation is uniquely suited to the poetries 
of Joyce, Halsey, and Howe because it acknowledges the aggregative nature of their 
poems without presuming, the way allusion does, that the constitutive texts will 
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explain or elucidate the poem. Appropriation remembers the poet who does the 
appropriating, and recognizes the collage nature of the poems which is often more 
explicit and literal than intertextuality permits. Finally, appropriation is the most 
suitable term for the analysis of these three poets because it provides a potent 
reference point for comparing their individual practices and the questions of 
authorship, literary tradition, and histories of land ownership which impact their 
writing. By bringing the word appropriation to the poetries of Joyce, Halsey, and 
Howe, it is possible to present a more expansive and insightful definition of the 
concept which acknowledges its declarative power beyond the author-centred 
referencing of literary allusion and the textual independence of intertextuality. 
Aligning appropriation with these three poetries expands contemporary 
interpretations of textual borrowing such that the incorporation of a phrase, a line, or 
a paragraph from another author can be read not as effacing or replacing the words 
of the individual poet, but rather as articulating more fully the experience of the 
individual author and of the reader. Having defined appropriation and delineated the 
restrictions of contemporary applications of the term in poetry and criticism, I will 
move now to close readings of Joyce’s, Halsey’s, and Howe’s poetries for evidence 
of the multiple and diverse practices of appropriation that demand an extension and 
development of the contemporary definition of the practice. The second chapter 
studies Joyce’s appropriative practice as a means of renegotiating the lyrical styles 




Chapter Two: “Releasing the chaos of energies”: Communicating 
the Concurrences in Trevor Joyce’s Appropriative Poems 
In a 1934 review of Herbert Read’s book, Art Now, Roger Fry criticizes Max Ernst’s 
collages as singularly failing to manifest the “unconscious urge which governs a 
genuine artistic sensibility” (245). Close attention to Ernst’s art reveals his practice 
as a process of “deliberate and conscious invention or adaptation,” Fry says. This 
“deliberate[ness] and conscious[ness]” stands in opposition to the psychoanalytic 
unconscious and “intuitive unreason” which characterizes art and criticism in the 
Surrealist tradition. Ernst’s work might reflect the “required suggestion” of 
“mystery” and “profundity,” Fry says, but it lacks the “constant quality of [the 
artist’s] own unconscious rhythmic feeling.” “[R]hythmic feeling” requires 
“concentrating on some external problem” in order to engage “the higher levels of 
our unconscious cerebration” and thus to provide art with “significant synthetical 
results.” The intentionality that Fry finds in Ernst’s practice undermines the 
“unconscious elements which govern the art of a Rembrandt” that he says are “far 
more mysterious and significant” than Surrealist art. Ernst’s “invention or 
adaptation” fails to engage any “external problem” that would enable the “fruitful 
synthesis both of science and art.” According to Fry, Surrealist intentionality also 
“worship[s]” the “lowest, most unreasonable levels of the unconscious life” which he 
says “underlie … so many of the methods of modern art” and are “absurd.” This 
question of intentionality is a potent one for an artist such as Ernst who celebrates 
Surrealism for “turning topsy-turvy the appearances and relationships of reality” and 
thus “‘hasten[ing] the general crisis of consciousness which must perforce take place 
in our time’” (Krstovic 314). The purpose of Surrealism was to engage the 
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unconscious and give aesthetic shape to the dream-life of the individual, thus 
escaping the violence and restrictions of rationality in the inter-war period. 
According to Fry’s review, Surrealism fails not only to meet the standards of 
traditional art, but also to realize its own principles of aesthetic unconsciousness by 
acceding to the “deliberate and conscious” design of the artist (245). 
 The Surrealist affirmation of collage and other appropriative forms as 
abstruse and abstracted still characterize definitions of collage today, even as 
contemporary poets put these practices to different uses. Fry’s interrogation of the 
“unconscious” nature of Ernst’s collages undermines the essential tenets of 
Surrealism and the artist’s capacity to realize them in art. This criticism also reflects 
on the Surrealist influence on contemporary poets such as Trevor Joyce and his 
inheritance and innovation in developing the aesthetics of the 1920s and ‘30s. This 
chapter addresses Joyce’s declarative appropriative practices in his recent poetry as a 
contemporary response to this Surrealist inheritance. Joyce’s appropriative practice 
is indebted to Surrealist collage, and the art of Ernst and Joseph Cornell is 
particularly influential. Over the course of this chapter, I will demonstrate Joyce’s 
divergence from the Surrealist celebration of the unconscious by focusing on the 
concurrences which make his appropriative poems uniquely expressive and 
meaningful. My purpose in addressing the declarative force of Joyce’s appropriative 
practice is not to situate him in opposition to the Surrealist tradition, but rather to 
articulate his contemporary development of that aesthetic. Before addressing Joyce’s 
declarative appropriations, it will be helpful to indicate the trajectory of this chapter 
and the arguments that arise concerning Joyce’s declarative collages.  
 The chapter begins with a definition of the word ‘declarative’ as it is applied 
to Joyce’s appropriative practice, and the arguments for using this word in the 
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analysis of his poetry. This question of what declarative means extends from 
dictionary definitions to rhetorical and scholarly uses of the word so as to emphasize 
the articulate and expressive power of appropriation. Having outlined the meaning 
and relevance of the declarative to this analysis of Joyce’s appropriative poetry, I 
will then turn to the practice of appropriation itself. The collage approach that 
distinguishes much of Joyce’s recent poetry reflects specific modernist traditions, 
and it is incumbent upon an analysis of his appropriative practice to ask how the poet 
came to write this way. Ernst and Cornell present particularly compelling examples 
for Joyce’s practice, and this analysis of the poet’s inheritance is oriented around 
their art. After indicating some artistic examples to Joyce’s poetics, attention will 
turn to the techniques and effects of Joyce’s appropriations which make his poems 
uniquely declarative. Through an alignment of four of Joyce’s appropriative poems 
from with the first dream of fire they hunt the cold (2001) and What’s in Store 
(2007), I will offer an account of the particular features of his poetry which 
contribute to this declarative effect.
1
 With some sense of how Joyce’s appropriative 
poems achieve their declarative effects, the next question for this chapter is what do 
Joyce’s appropriative poems declare? To answer this question, I will undertake a 
close reading of two of the poems already discussed. Through this critique of “De 
Iron Trote” and “Trem Neul,” I will identify the major themes of both poems and ask 
how Joyce’s appropriative practice helps to articulate and interrogate these themes in 
new and innovative ways. The growing body of criticism on Joyce’s oeuvre attests to 
his poetry’s reinvigoration of the lyrical modes of expression which have long 
characterized Irish poetry. This chapter concludes by aligning the declarative nature 
of Joyce’s appropriative poetry with lyric expression, thus reconciling the restrictive 
                                                 
1
 Hereafter, first dream of fire. 
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and residual opposition in contemporary criticism between formal complexity and 
lyric expression.  
2.1 Sourcing Joyce’s Appropriative Practice  
Defining the Declarative  
Before addressing the declarative force of Joyce’s appropriative poetry, it will be 
helpful to offer a definition of the declarative as applied to his appropriative practice, 
and to Halsey’s and Howe’s poetry more broadly. The word declarative has meaning 
across a variety of different contexts and disciplines. The OED begins by defining 
the word as “characterized by declaring,” “making clear, manifest, or evident,” or as 
that which “manifests itself or is capable of manifestation” (“Declarative”). As an 
adjective, “declarative” retains the action of its root verb, “declare,” such that a 
“declarative” sentence makes “clear or plain (anything that is obscure or imperfectly 
understood)” (“Declare”). To describe a poetic practice such as appropriation as 
declarative, then, is to attribute to it the capacity to articulate something, to make 
assertions, or to make something evident through the poem. The rhetorical function 
of the declarative, to “clear up, explain, ... [or] interpret,” indicates the performative 
power of the word, hence the subsequent definitions of declarative as “a 
proclamation” or public statement which announces a real-life change of policy or 
law (“Declare”). This performative quality is also important to the grammatical 
classification of declarative sentences as sentences that “make statements which 
convey information directly about some state of affairs” (Cann 13). Ascribing 
performative characteristics to the declarative is important to the critical analysis of 
the role of the poet in appropriative poetry, but it also raises questions about the 
conceptual framework of some varieties of speech-act theory and particularly the 
opposition of performative and constative. For the Surrealists, the artistic escape into 
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the unconscious was expressly an attempt to escape the rationality and enlightened 
subjectivity of the individual. André Breton pushed the issue further in his preface to 
a 1920 exhibition by Ernst when he asked, “‘Who knows if we are not somehow 
preparing ourselves to escape the principle of identity?’” (Matheson 539). The 
declarative’s performative nature insists that there is somebody present to do the 
performing. This reinforces appropriation’s commitment to retaining that figure of 
the author which other concepts of textual borrowing deny or suppress.  
 The proposed attribution of a performative quality to the declarative calls into 
question the conceptual opposition of performative and constative. The truth-value 
of declarative statements aligns the term declarative with the constative, but by 
drawing attention to the subjective agency of the performative, this opposition begins 
to break down. The declarative nature of these appropriative poems actively 
deconstructs the constative/performative binary. The performative meaning of 
declarative is also reflected in the more colloquial applications of the adjective. 
When a person is criticized as declarative it usually means that he or she is overly 
self-assertive and demonstrative. The word declarative also has meaning in 
pedagogy and memory studies, both of which provoke parallels with Joyce’s 
appropriative poems. Declarative learning refers to that which we know, as against 
procedural learning which regards that which we can do. In her essay on social 
transmission in humans, Kathleen R. Gibson states that “Humans transmit factual 
information primarily via spoken, gestural, and written languages,” which also 
includes poetry (354). This relation between declarative learning and language is 
such that “the declarative learning system can be said to have expanded into a 
declarative learning-language system,” even if procedural language skills enable this 
communication. The alignment of declarative learning and language, and thus 
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poetry, supports the description of Joyce’s appropriative poetry as declarative. 
Gibson’s essay also promotes the relation between poetry and physicality which 
becomes particularly potent in Joyce’s “De Iron Trote” in that both reading and 
writing are physical as much as mental skills. With declarative learning defined as 
acquiring knowledge that one can talk about, we might read the declarative 
concurrences of Joyce’s poems as encouraging readers to reconsider their knowledge 
of specific texts and ideas. The study of memory also includes a concept of the 
declarative to describe one type of long-term human memory, a concept which 
provokes a range of concurrences with Joyce’s appropriative practices, and with 
Halsey’s and Howe’s poetries. 
 The purpose of describing Joyce’s appropriative practices as declarative is to 
assert the articulate nature of his appropriations which interact with and respond to 
each other through rhyme, imagery, and the near-imperceptible changes Joyce makes 
to the text he appropriates. The word declarative also supports the concept of the 
poet which appropriation retains but that is denied by more intertextual approaches 
to textual borrowing. The performative nature of the declarative presents Joyce’s 
appropriations as articulate and meaningful, and sustains rather than effaces the 
individual poet writing. My purpose in selecting this word to describe Joyce’s 
appropriative practice is not to suggest that the aggregation of text in his poems 
achieves an expository or didactic force. Instead I am using the word to assert the 
articulate nature of his appropriations; that is, to assert the potential for a phrase or 
line from one source to speak to a phrase or line from another. Joyce’s 
appropriations respond to each other and, in doing so, establish concurrences across 
wildly diverse social, cultural, and literary contexts. As well as establishing a 
conversation or exchange across different ideological belief systems, these poems 
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also illuminate the commonalities among disparate texts and contexts. The value of 
the declarative to the description of Joyce’s appropriative practice arises from the 
possibility it affords of recognizing his innovative development of the abstract and 
aleatory forms he inherits from modernism. In Joyce’s poetry, the word declarative 
describes the new processes of meaning-making, and new meanings, which arise 
through the poems. Before undertaking a critical investigation into the declarative 
techniques and effects through which Joyce’s appropriative poems gain their 
expressive force, it will be helpful to trace the history of his appropriative practice 
and the influences that shape his poetics.   
Modernist Influences on Joyce’s Appropriations 
In his discussion of the importance of the 1996 conference Assembling Alternatives 
to Joyce and his poetry, Fergal Gaynor is careful to acknowledge the longer history 
of appropriative practices in the poet’s work. The conference brought Joyce into 
contact with his Irish peers, Billy Mills, Catherine Smith, Randolph Healy, Maurice 
Scully, and Geoff Squires, and these meetings, and others, “inspire[d] him to devise 
his own collages and assemblages” (64); however the “sensibility behind these new 
forms had already been cultivated” by Joyce’s interest in art, specifically “late and 
fringe Dada, surrealist, and absurdist modes” (65). Joyce’s influences include “Klee, 
Schwitters (as poet and collagist), Lorca, Ernst (particularly of the Une Semaine de 
Bonté), Kafka, Finnegans Wake, Borges, Beckett, [and] Joseph Cornell.” Each of 
these artists can be productively aligned with Joyce’s appropriations, and Ernst and 
Cornell offer particularly compelling parallels.  
 The readings of Joyce’s poems in this chapter will present a variety of 
motivations both for Joyce’s appropriation of particular texts in the poem, and for his 
appropriative practice. Joyce seeks the same eclecticism in his selection of materials 
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as Cornell, for, as the artist says, “‘how does one know what a certain object will tell 
another?’” (Bourdon 66a). The American artist became interested in collage after 
visiting a Surrealist exhibition at the Julien Levy Gallery in New York in 1931. 
Cornell returned to the gallery several weeks later to deliver his own 
uncommissioned collages to Levy, and by 1932 the earliest examples of Cornell’s art 
were exhibited in the “Surrealism: Paintings, Drawings, and Photographs” show at 
the gallery. In his interview with the artist from 1967, David Bourdon reports that 
Cornell “resents any deep reading of his boxes for symbolic interpretation.” Bourdon 
suggests instead that the “objects in these carefully staged dramas seem to 
communicate with each other in an eloquent sign language.” This suggestion of the 
communicative relation between materials anticipates the declarative force of 
Joyce’s appropriative poems. Cornell’s combination of materials and images in his 
collages and boxes are important as a reference point for Joyce’s declarative 
appropriations, though there are also important differences between the two. Juan 
Antonio Suárez explains that the elements incorporated into Cornell’s boxes are 
“fastidiously chosen and combined to evoke and withhold meaning” (162). Many of 
Joyce’s source texts in his poems have historical and political value, but it is 
important to retain the possibility of spontaneity in Joyce’s selections. Another of 
Joyce’s modernist antecedents is discussed in Werner Spies’s 1988 study, Max 
Ernst, Collages.  
 The example of Ernst offers a more critically attuned analysis for 
comparison with Joyce’s practice. Critical analysis of modernist collages are helpful 
because they articulate the primary questions for spectators reading and viewing 
these works. These questions are harder to ask from a contemporary critical 
perspective because, as Spies says, the original imperatives in collage practices 
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“seem speculative from today’s point of view” (25). When it comes to collage, “the 
burden of interpretation is definitely on the spectator” the author argues, and a 
spectator’s “first reaction” is invariably “to ask where these images came from” (24). 
The spectator “entangles himself in an attempt to make secondary knowledge of the 
original context ... stand in for primary knowledge.” For Spies, the questions that 
Ernst’s collages provoke in the viewer differentiate collage from the Cubists’ papier 
collé, in that Cubists practices “awaken no such disquieting need to find references.” 
Spies’s articulation of the “disquieting need to find references” in Surrealist collage 
will also be recognizable to readers of Joyce’s appropriative poems. The critic offers 
an insightful breakdown of this “disquieting need” and the questions it provokes in 
his analysis of Ernst’s work. According to Spies, the major issue for spectators of 
Ernst’s collages is the extent to which “a knowledge of his source material—a 
knowledge that can never be as complete as the artist’s—should be taken into 
account when investigating the collages.” By following Spies’s response to this 
question, it is possible to gain a clearer picture of Joyce’s development of modernist 
collage and his divergence from its example. 
 Spies begins his analysis of Ernst’s collage practice by articulating several 
assumptions which applied to the 1930s, the artists, and the spectators of the 
Surrealist collages. First, Spies says that Ernst “does not assume that the spectator 
needs to know his sources,” and “We may conclude that the collages expressly deny 
their relation to their sources.” The second assumption Spies articulates regards the 
spectator who “sees the combinations in ... Ernst’s collage as the result of an aleatory 
procedure.” This belief in the “aleatory” nature of collage regards the “elements 
juxtaposed in the collages as being random and fully interchangeable with any 
others.” Joyce occupies an ambiguous position towards both assumptions. The poet 
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includes lengthy notes regarding his sources and influences in the poems from stone 
floods, Syzygy, and the selection of “Shorter Poems” in first dream of fire. 
Meanwhile, the poet limits himself to a few clues as to the constitutive texts of the 
forty-five-page appropriative poem “Trem Neul” in the same collection, stating that 
“it would be pointless to give a complete list” of source texts (240). In naming the 
authors and not the texts who contribute to “Trem Neul,” Joyce may be 
acknowledging those authors who granted permission for their texts to be used rather 
than offering any direction for curious readers.
2
 That said, Joyce has been quite 
willing to confirm the bibliographies of various appropriative poems I have sent to 
him, and often specifies the particular edition of an essay or text he incorporated into 
a poem.  
 These oppositional approaches to acknowledgment do not reflect a 
contradiction in Joyce’s position but rather serve to support his belief that knowledge 
of his source texts offers little to readings of his poems. In a 2005 interview with 
Keith Tuma, Joyce was asked whether he thinks readers should be acquainted with 
his compositional process in appropriative poems. The poet initially answered in the 
negative; however, he revised his position in a later interview I conducted with him 
in 2011. Reflecting on whether readers should be informed of his use of procedural 
constraints or Excel spreadsheets in the composition of the poem, Joyce stated that 
“The poem should be able to function without it, to some degree, and [he] think[s] 
that … [in the case of “The Peacock’s Tale”], it would function, to a large degree” 
(O’Mahony n. pag.). Ernst’s unwillingness to divulge his sources, or more properly, 
his belief that these sources are irrelevant, becomes a point of contrast with Joyce. 
Considering the value that such information could contribute to a reading, Joyce is 
                                                 
2
 This hypothesis excludes P.W. Joyce, A.R. Luria, and Sir Charles Sherrington whose names are 
included in Joyce’s note but who were all long dead at the time of publication.  
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clear that knowledge of his sources and processes should “open it [the poem] up 
more, it should mean more if this is known.” In the case of the procedural poems 
from first dream of fire and What’s in Store which will preoccupy this chapter, Joyce 
now believes that understanding the structure of his poems “probably is more 
desirable” than he originally stated in the interview with Tuma (n. pag.).
3
 Louis 
Aragon described Ernst as “‘a painter of illusions’” because his collages 
“conscious[ly] exchange ... one real thing for another” (Spies 25). Ernst is an 
important precursor to Joyce’s practice of appropriation, and his example of altering 
and reinterpreting his source material becomes an important declarative feature of 
Joyce’s appropriative poems.  
 Spies’s book on Ernst was first published in German in 1974 and the critic 
is conscious of how dated some of his assumptions will seem to contemporary 
readers. We have already heard how Ernst’s ideas “may seem speculative from 
today’s point of view,” and “misinterpretations of this kind have long become 
irrelevant” (25). That said, such “misinterpretations” were “by no means irrelevant to 
… Ernst,” Spies argues, and “the belief that collage was an autonomous, historically 
unprecedented art form was vital to him.” The situation is very different for Joyce, a 
contemporary poet writing more than a century after collage was first introduced.  
Cornell and Ernst are important antecedents to Joyce’s appropriative practice, but 
Joyce’s poetry does not replicate the principles and parameters of their work. Joyce 
diverges from their example by fostering a declarative imperative within his 
appropriative poems, and this declarative force reflects his negotiation with the 
lyrical modes that dominate contemporary Irish poetry. In order to understand 
Joyce’s development of his modernist ancestors, it is necessary to consider the 
                                                 
3
 Hence, Joyce’s publication of “Some notes” on “The Peacock’s Tale” and Syzygy in a special feature 
of Drunken Boat on Oulipean poetry the following year in 2006.  
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features of the declarative quality I am attributing to his poetry. In the following 
pages, I will investigate how Joyce’s appropriative poems achieve their declarative 
effects. 
2.2 Decoding the Declarative in Joyce’s Appropriations    
In the introductory paragraphs of this chapter, I outlined the various interpretations 
of the word declarative and indicated its suitability to the description of Joyce’s 
appropriative practice as both performative and constative. The dictionary definitions 
and etymological history of the word indicate that to describe Joyce’s appropriations 
as declarative is to attribute to them powers of articulation and expression. The word 
also contains within it the presumption of an individual speaker or subject 
performing the action, and in this way, the word declarative supports appropriation’s 
preservation of the poet. Having defined the word and demonstrated its suitability to 
the description of Joyce’s appropriative poetry, it is necessary now to consider how 
Joyce achieves this declarative effect in his poetry.   
 Joyce published his first collection, Sole Glum Trek, in 1967 with New 
Writers’ Press, jointly run by Joyce, Michael and Irene Smith in Dublin. This first 
collection was followed by Watches (1969), Pentahedron (1972), and The Poems of 
Sweeny, Peregrine (1976), at which point Joyce stopped publishing poetry for nearly 
twenty years. The Poems of Sweeny, Peregrine could be read as Joyce’s first 
significant engagement with appropriation. The poem sees Joyce carrying over the 
eighth-century myth of the Irish King Sweeny who was cursed by Saint Ronan to 
wander the woods deranged and alone until his death. Joyce subtitles Sweeny not as a 
translation but rather as a “working of the corrupt Irish text.” This subtitle 
acknowledges Joyce’s reading of the original ancient Irish text alongside English 
translations by J. G. O’Keeffe among others, and calls attention to the many 
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differences and discrepancies across the various manuscripts. Sweeny might be 
Joyce’s first poetic engagement with source texts but it does not reflect the same 
appropriative style that we find in his more recent poetry. The poet’s predilection 
towards appropriating material in his poems has long been an important feature of 
his poetics, and yet the practice becomes much more explicit in first dream of fire 
and What’s in Store. In order to gain a clearer sense of the declarative quality of 
Joyce’s appropriations, it is necessary to take a closer look at individual poems. 
  “De Iron Trote” appears midway through the “Undone” section of What’s 
in Store which is Joyce’s twelfth collection of poems and is still his most substantial 
volume running to more than three hundred pages. The two tables of contents which 
appear in the book, one at the front and a more detailed version to the back, list the 
many translations or workings of European folksong, of Turkic and Finno-Ugric, and 
of the Chinese and the Irish. There are densely procedural poems, many variations 
on constraint, and an enduring negotiation with traditional lyric forms, both as a 
resistance to and a redefinition of that form. The “Undone” section is comprised of 
five poems with dedications to Alison Croggon, Keith Tuma, and Fanny Howe. 
“Causes of Affects,” “De Iron Trote,” and “The Peacock’s Tale” are each 
appropriative in structure, while “Dramatis Personae” mirrors the lyric sections of 
these three poems, and “Elements” is a chiasmus. The title, “Undone,” might be read 
as reflecting the lack of intentional expression and sentiment in these densely 
aggregative texts while also suggesting the processes of unravelling and textual 
unmaking which characterize the poems.
4
  
                                                 
4
 The “Undone” title also recalls Joyce’s twin 2003 chapbooks, Take Over and Undone, Say, 
published by The Gig. According to Jeffrey Twitchell-Waas, the “cover of the chapbook, Undone, 
Say, in which ‘The Peacock’s Tale’ was first published, give[s] a complete listing of the various word 
strings of ‘rhyme chains’ Joyce incorporates into the lyric half of the poem, as well as those for ‘De 
Iron Trote’” (216). It is also notable, Twitchell-Waas says, that “the aural rhyme chains are far more 
prominent in ‘De Iron Trote’ than in ‘The Peacock’s Tale.’” 
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 “De Iron Trote” is an unusual poem with which to begin this analysis of the 
declarative force of appropriation in that the first section of the poem is comprised 
almost entirely of appropriated text while the second section eschews and even 
ridicules the same practice of appropriation. This duality between the incorporation 
and eschewal of appropriative practices in the poem provides a critical lens onto the 
role and function of appropriation, and emphasizes the comparison and contrast 
between the declarative force of appropriative poetry and more traditional lyric 
writing. As well as taking oppositional approaches to appropriation, the two parts of 
“De Iron Trote” are also formally very different. The first part is presented as a prose 
poem of eleven block paragraphs, and the second part is comprised of seven 
sentences divided into stanzas and progressively indented.  
“De Iron Trote” 
Joyce’s use of conceptual rhyme and imagery and his modification of individual 
lines and phrases differentiates his appropriative practice from the Surrealist 
commitment to the unconscious, while also encouraging a more explicitly 
meaningful poetry which breaches the borders of lyricism. The first part of “De Iron 
Trote” is aggregative in form, gathering together a multitude of diverse source texts.
5
 
Part one runs over two and a half pages with paragraphs of varying length and begins 
as follows:  
As man, in deep and level sleep, periodically draws a 
long inspiration, song is learned and figured in the brain. 
Think of the way a musical box, wound up, potentially  
represents a slow or lively air. (233) 
                                                 
5
 A full breakdown of source texts comprising this poem is included in Appendix I at the end of the 
thesis and should be read alongside the chapter in order to follow the contributing authors and texts 
invoked through this analysis of the poem.  
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The opening image of a man inhaling a breath in sleep runs into the description of 
song learnt and manifest in the mind, and the paragraph proceeds with the instruction 
to consider a musical box which “potentially represents” song. The didactic, or 
declarative tone is carried over from the two source texts, particularly Clendening’s 
twentieth-century text-book, and contrasts with the peculiar nature of the proposition. 
The opening paragraph serves as an exposition of the tone, form, and themes of “De 
Iron Trote” and the questions that arise indicate the difficulty of interpreting Joyce’s 
appropriative poetry. Several conceptual rhymes emerge across the first section of the 
poem; the definition and distinction of the human as a cultural being in the first 
paragraph rhymes with the degradation of the human in the third; the Munster 
Plantation which is a primary image in the third paragraph parallels the imperial 
power manifested in the Ancient Chinese hunting parks; and the apprenticeship of 
Ticket writers in the final paragraphs rhymes with Joyce’s own practice as a poet and 
the writing of this poem. Joyce uses prepositions and adverbs to consolidate his 
sentences and sustain the block prose structure of the poem. These grammatical 
interventions help realise the declarative potential of “De Iron Trote” by providing a 
centre-point of a rhyme or compounding the various meanings of a word to multiply 
relations between the lines.  
 The third paragraph of the poem exemplifies Joyce’s declarative techniques 
in “De Iron Trote.” The first seven lines of the paragraph proceed as follows:  
Garments of silk, or thin dry wool, also give rise to a 
noise calculated to cause error, sometimes mitigating 
the production and carefully controlled cropping of live 
creatures for high ends. Else, from every corner of the 
woods and glens see them come creeping on their hands, 
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for their legs cannot make fast, as in humans the larynx 
migrates down the neck since the age of eighteen  
months, from which arises the sound of voices. (233) 
The “garments of silk or thin dry wool” that “give rise to a noise calculated to cause 
error” become a “mitigating” factor, literally “alleviat[ing] or giv[ing] relief from the 
“production and carefully controlled cropping of live creatures for high ends” in 
Zhou Dynasty China (“Mitigate”). The following word, “Else,” “like its synonym 
other admits contextually of two different interpretations: e.g., something else may 
mean ‘something in addition’ to what is mentioned, or ‘something as an alternative 
or a substitute’” (“Else”). Here, the word connects Schafer’s description of the 
Chinese wildlife preserves from the second century B.C.E. with Spenser’s 
description of the Irish “creeping on their hands” “from every corner of the / woods 
and glens” (233). Joyce’s poem permits both interpretations, combining the Chinese 
and the Irish examples while also making them alternatives for one another. In this 
way, the “production and carefully controlled cropping of live / creatures for high 
ends” compounds Spenser’s representation of the Munster Plantation, while also 
becoming exchangeable with it so that the “live animals” of the Chinese leisure 
parks are synonymous with the native population of the Irish colony. Joyce’s use of 
the adverb “else” to ground a conceptual rhyme about imperialism in Ancient China 
and sixteenth-century Munster serves as another example of the effects and 
techniques he uses to encourage the declarative force of his appropriations. It is not 
only the changes that the poet makes to the text he appropriates which contribute to 
the declarative force of this appropriative poem. Joyce, like Howe, also incorporates 
a self-annotative element to his appropriations which informs the aggregative nature 
of these poems.   
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 The comment on speech development which intervenes after the conceptual 
rhyme on imperialism is continued through the remainder of the third paragraph: 
        In time 
these come to speak of a political meeting, of market 
shares. Someone tells of a woman who murdered  
her lover. “A chauffeur kills his wife,” says another. 
All teetotallers like sugar. No nightingale drinks wine. 
Go figure. (233) 
After Ponting’s account of speech in infants, the poem introduces a cacophony of 
voices which itself invokes a longer history of poetic appropriation and aesthetics. 
These voices are drawn from the opening lines of Rosalind Krauss’s 1998 study, The 
Picasso Papers, and refer specifically to Picasso’s newspaper collages from the 
1910s.
6
 In effect, Joyce’s poem directs readers towards its aesthetic influences and 
sources, with the obligatory degree of textual remove and dissociation via Krauss. 
The following lines of Krauss’s description of Picasso’s processes of composition in 
The Picasso Papers provide a critical correlative for “De Iron Trote”:       
Each newsprint fragment forms the sign for a visual meaning; then, as 
it butts against another, the sign re-forms and the meaning shifts ... 
[E]ach little paper piece submits itself to meaning, but never 
enduringly so. For the same piece, in another location, constellates 
another sign. (1) 
These lines could serve as a description of Joyce’s poem as easily as they do of 
Picasso’s collage, and yet there is something discomfiting about the poet suggesting 
this analogy for his own practice. Picasso’s status, alongside Georges Braque, as the 
                                                 
6
 The collage in question is Picasso’s Violin and Newspaper from November 1912 which includes a 




creator of collage makes him a potent reference point in the analysis of Joyce’s 
appropriative practice. The poet offers a more nuanced account of his practice in a 
series of emails from 2013. 
 In two emails from spring last year, Joyce articulates his assessment of the 
appropriative practices shaping “De Iron Trote” and their function within his 
poetics.
7
 Starting with his sources, Joyce explains that his selections tend towards 
older texts which are “rancid with nostalgia” and “almost fracturing already under 
the pressure of too much meaning” (29 Mar. 2013). This pressure might be attributed 
to “figures of speech (explicit or not) tearing [the texts] apart,” or simply to the fact 
that they come from “an older time or … different sensibility.” Examples of Joyce’s 
“fracturing” texts are replete within the poem, notably Spenser’s A View of the 
Present State of Ireland (1596) which comes laden not only with the specific social 
and literary contexts of sixteenth-century England, but also with the political and 
historical contexts of Ireland which are compounded for an Irish poet such as Joyce 
living and working in post-colonial Ireland.
8
 The reference from Trades for London 
Boys could also be read as “fracturing ... under the pressure,” although the pressure 
impacting this text is different to that afflicting Spenser’s text. The excerpt from 
Trades for London Boys provides an analogy between Joyce’s practice as a poet and 
the formal training required of these apprentice ticket writers. Meanwhile, the 
pressure that manifests itself in the middle lines of paragraph six where Joyce 
borrows from Peter Beckford’s 1847 text, Thoughts on Hunting, regards the “figures 
of speech” which are manifested as a warning against idle chatter among the 
huntsmen. If the poet collates source texts which reflect an overbearing pressure of 
meaning, what is the effect when these texts are gathered together in a poem? Joyce 
                                                 
7
 My thanks to Trevor Joyce for permission to quote from these emails.  
 
8
 Hereafter, A View. 
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offers his response to this question in his description of “De Iron Trote” and 
similarly procedural poems as:   
[I]mmersed within language, and comprised of the elements of 
language, words, syntax, [and] register, . . . which are often traceable, 
in differing granularities, to a variety of other texts, but they don’t 
rely on those other texts being recognized and recalled to memory. 
(17 Feb. 2013) 
For Joyce, then, these poems are a composite of language and literature which 
emerges at the local level of letters and syntax. The primary imperative for 
appropriating a text is the poem itself, and the texts appropriated must be 
“traceable.” “De Iron Trote” does not require that every text be revealed and 
recorded by the reader, but the poem carries with it the personal, political, historical, 
and aesthetic contexts of the texts it invokes. The poet works with “distinct methods” 
and “local effects” to gather letters and words towards the constitution of a line of 
poetry, and this aggregation of text progresses in accordance with the immediate 
demands of the line (29 Mar. 2013).  
 “De Iron Trote” is symptomatic of Joyce’s “many attempts to bring together 
diverse materials,” but it is not enough to amalgamate various texts (29 Mar. 2013). 
The poet demands that these texts “mutually resonate,” and this resonance manifests 
itself with Poundian force, “transfusing, welding, and unifying,” so that “the whole 
assemblage constitutes a new meaning” (Pound Essays 49). Joyce’s appropriations 
are declarative in the extent to which they provoke language to unfamiliar and even 
unintentional patterns of association, and the resonance he finds in a successful poem 
does not delimit those patterns of association. Having demonstrated the initial 
features of Joyce’s appropriative practice in “De Iron Trote,” I will turn now to 
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consider “The Peacock’s Tale,” “Causes of Affects,” and “Trem Neul” as they 
extend and develop the declarative features of Joyce’s appropriative practice.  
“The Peacock’s Tale” 
Alongside “De Iron Trote,” the “Undone” section of What’s in Store also includes 
the other appropriative poems, “Causes of Affects: A Sentimental Retrospect” and 
“The Peacock’s Tale.” 
9
 “The Peacock’s Tale” is dedicated to Fanny Howe and is 
oriented around a one-line excerpt from one of her poems entitled “The Sea-
Garden.” In his notes to the poem published in a special issue of Drunken Boat, 
Joyce explains how “The Peacock’s Tale” is structured according to three specific 
reference points: the quotation from Howe’s poem, an 1842 Encyclopaedia 
Britannica entry on Ireland, and “the dense formal organization of Chinese parallel 
verse” (“The Structure” n. pag.). Here, parallel verse is used as a constraint to 
organize the poem and offset the confessional predilection of the “poetry of 
expression” (Joyce “Point of Innovation” 46). Joyce applies the Chinese poetic form 
to “The Peacock’s Tale” because he admires the acuteness of language and rhyme it 
inspires such that “every element in a parallel couplet rhymes semantically with its 
counterpart, as well as fulfilling certain phonetic constraints” (“The Structure” n. 
pag.). After delineating a rigorous selection of rhyming chains, Joyce explains how 
he takes Howe’s line, “A human is a thing that walks around disintegrating,” as a 
reference point for a number of conceptual rhymes. These rhymes incorporate the 
rhetoric of renaissance butchery, three dances with animal names, “four terms from 
iron-founding, ... six realms of being in medieval Japanese-Buddhism, ... [and] the 
verbs occurring last in each of the four paragraphs of the accompanying prose.” It 
might seem strange that a poet such as Joyce who adopts such an intensely 
                                                 
9
 Neither “Elements” nor “Dramatis Personae” incorporate appropriation in the way the other three 
poems do, and so I have left them out of my analysis of the “Undone” section.  
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procedural form should delineate his process so clearly, however the poet feels no 
risk in granting the reader this access. As with “De Iron Trote,” “The Peacock’s 
Tale” works because of the declarative rhymes which emerge across the poem and 
contribute to the many associations and connections which offer a new perspective 
on and interpretation of the texts contributing to the poem.  
 The initial rhyme for Joyce is between Howe’s quotation and the “costume of 
the people” of Ireland in the 1840s which is “so wretched” that “if they once took off 
their clothes, it would be difficult to put them on again” (“The Peacock’s Tale” 239) 
This rhyme resounds with the verbs of dismemberment used by renaissance butchery 
which appear across the poem, including “tusk,” “frush,” “untache,” “disfigure,” 
“unbrace,” “tranche,” “leach,” and “splat” (240-41).
10
 The rhyme emphasizes the 
poverty of the Irish which the Encyclopaedia entry describes, and the exploitative 
nature of colonialism which reduces the colonized land to plantations for foreign 
markets. The rhyme is compounded by the description of “these sheer beasts” which 
makes the animals of renaissance butchery exchangeable with the destitute Irish 
(239).
11
 Twitchell-Waas elaborates on Joyce’s investment in Chinese parallel verse 
in “The Peacock’s Tale” in his essay on the influence of Chinese and Japanese 
literature on the poet. Reflecting on the poet’s appropriations of parallelism, 
Twitchell-Waas explains that “Joyce’s deployment of ... structural parallelism is 
never merely formal, since it is inextricable from his persistent thematic concerns 
with time, transience, and mortality” (199). The purpose of parallelism in Joyce’s 
poem is to “Allow[ ] the outside in,” the critic says, and thus to serve as an enabling 
                                                 
10
 Most of these terms are included in Mark Morton’s entry on carving in his book, Cupboard Love 2: 
A Dictionary of Culinary Curiosities, 69.  
 
11
 Without being able to source the original 1842 entry, I am not sure whether the reference to “sheer 
beasts” is Joyce’s own creation which serves to reinforce the rhyme, or whether it was included in the 
Encyclopaedia entry.  
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constraint for the poet writing. The parallelism constraint allows both poet and poem 
to express something without incurring what W.B. Yeats describes as the “self-
contempt” of individual “egotism and indiscretion,” or “the boredom of [the] reader” 
(522). Here, appropriation is a dissociating force, and parallelism “accept[s] 
temporality and change” which manifests itself both in the multitude of eras and 
societies represented and in the antithesis that emerges through these rhymes 
(Twitchell-Waas 199). The multiplicity that characterizes appropriation and 
parallelism “forever threatens any sense of the singular integrity of the poem,” and 
this multiplicity fosters associations and connections across the poem which are 
uniquely declarative. “The Peacock’s Tale” demonstrates the range and scope of 
Joyce’s declarative appropriations, extending and developing the conceptual rhymes 
of “De Iron Trote” in more explicitly formal ways. In order to gain a clearer 
perspective on Joyce’s appropriative practice, and the declarative force of his 
poetics, it will be helpful to analyse one of his poems which does not achieve the 
same declarative force as “De Iron Trote” and “The Peacock’s Tale.”  
“Causes of Affects: A Sentimental Retrospect” 
The third appropriative poem in the “Undone” section is primarily composed of an 
extract from General Edward Braddock’s “Letters from an Officer” which are 
excerpted from Archibald B. Hulbert’s The Paths of Inland Commerce (22). A 
comparison of Braddock’s “Letters” with the poem show that Joyce makes very few 
changes in his appropriation of the text, altering approximately thirty words from 
Braddock’s original. For the most part, Joyce’s alterations swap the geographical or 
agricultural details of Braddock’s Virginia landscape for human emotions. He 
exchanges “cow-pens” for “affections,” “woods” for “past,” “corn” for “love,” 
“calves” for “domestic rages,” and “head of cattle” for “head of feelings.” The 
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second, lyric section of the poem echoes that of “De Iron Trote” and “The Peacock’s 
Tale” with twelve six-line stanzas progressively indented. It is harder to establish 
connections between the two sections of the poem here than in the other two poems. 
Joyce’s decision not to deviate too far from Braddock’s original text limits the 
declarative force of the poem and the possible meanings which might emerge 
through this appropriative practice. The final paragraph of the poem serves as an 
example of these limitations: 
You see, Sir, what a wild set of Creatures Our Civil 
Men grow into, when they lose Society, and it is sur- 
prising to think how many Advantages they dispense, 
which our near industrious would be glad of: Out of 
many hundred Things Forgotten they will not give 
themselves the trouble of controlling more than will 
maintain their Family. (229) 
This passage includes five changes from the original text which are denoted in the 
passage using italics.
12
 The poem’s title supports Joyce’s invocation of “love,” 
“sadness,” and “feelings” though these alterations do not generate the same 
conceptual rhymes or imagery that emerge in the other poems. The alterations Joyce 
makes in “Causes of Affects” do not have the same force in the consolidation of 
rhymes or connection of disparate source texts, and his appropriations lack the 
imagery which fosters new interpretations and meanings of constitutive texts in other 
poems. If “Causes of Affects” does not achieve the same declarative force of “De 
Iron Trote” and “The Peacock’s Tale,” it is worth turning to one of Joyce’s earlier 
                                                 
12
 “Civil Men” replaces “English Men,” “dispense” replaces “throw away,” “near industrious” stands 
in for “industrious Country-Men,” “Things Forgotten” is substituted for “Cows,” and “controlling” is 
used in place of “milking” (Hulbert 22) (“Causes of Affects” 229). 
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poems which demonstrates the poet’s potential to use these declarative techniques 
and effects to extend the remit of the lyric.  
 “Trem Neul” 
“Trem Neul” offers more to an analysis of Joyce’s appropriative practices and the 
declarative force of his aggregation of text. This poem makes up the final section of 
Joyce’s 2001 selected poems where it was included as a sample of his contemporary 
writing. Peter Manson describes the poem as “defined by the points of intersection of 
an intricate golden braid of strands of appropriated language ... [with] the total effect 
[that] is both true to experience and extraordinarily moving” (8). In her reading of 
the poem, Satris is emphatic about the personal imperatives motivating Joyce’s 
appropriations. “Trem Neul” does not only reveal the “self-construction of the author 
through his use of texts,” she says, the poem is also “specifically about Joyce’s own 
past” (30). This interpretation of the poem as a feat of “self-construction” proceeds 
“despite the fact that the collage-like structure of the poem seems completely 
abstracted from the life of the author.” For Satris, the dynamic force of “Trem Neul” 
emerges from this dialectic between the abstract form of the poem and the “concept” 
of the poem which she says “originates in Joyce’s personal and family history.” Over 
forty-five pages, “Trem Neul” aggregates a myriad of texts and materials in a 
bicameral structure of block prose paragraphs and corresponding lyric stanzas. The 
epigraph to the poem comes from Yeats’s “General Introduction for My Work” and 
serves to suggest the various uses of appropriation in Joyce’s poetry. In this 1935 
introduction, Yeats records his process of discovering “a language to [his] liking” 
with which to write his poetry (521-22). The poet describes feeling “compell[ed] ... 
to accept those traditional metres” which provided him with a “passionate syntax for 
passionate subject matter” and diverged so much from the free-verse styles of his 
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modernist contemporaries. Translators of the Bible provided Yeats with evidence 
that “a form midway between prose and verse” was “natural to impersonal 
meditation” and yet, he warns, “all that is personal soon rots; it must be packed in ice 
or salt” (522). The poet’s commitment to discovering a “passionate syntax for 
passionate subject matter” seems far removed from the abstract appropriations of 
“De Iron Trote” and “Trem Neul,” but there is much to recommend a comparison 
between the two.  
 Yeats concludes this paragraph from his “General Introduction” by rejecting 
the possibility of originality in poetry: “Talk to me of originality and I will turn on 
you with rage. I am a crowd, I am a lonely man, I am nothing. Ancient salt is best 
packing.” The older poet resigned himself to “accept[ing] those traditional metres” 
and dual prose/verse form because it allowed him to avoid “self-contempt” and the 
“boredom of [the] reader.” Joyce’s criticism of the “poetry of expression” in his 
1997 essay corresponds with much of what Yeats articulates here, even if the 
category of “expression” in poetry means different things for the two poets (“Point 
of Innovation” 46). If “Trem Neul” is a poem of preservation, and “ancient salt is the 
best packing,” then it is only fitting that Joyce’s appropriations stretch from the 
Khmers in the eighth century up to Dōgen in the thirteenth, and Bashō in the 
seventeenth century up to James Joyce in the twentieth. Satris’s assertion that 
Joyce’s appropriations reflect the concept of “Trem Neul” which “originates in 
Joyce’s personal and family history” befits Yeats’s epigraph (“Voices” 30); however 
this personal imperative does not undermine the declarative force of Joyce’s 
appropriations. According to Satris, “through the act of reframing classical texts [—
Joyce’s Portrait of an Artist, Tim Robinson’s Setting Foot on the Shores of 
Connemara and P.W. Joyce’s “Some Reminiscences ... ” —] Joyce “unsettl[es] ... 
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memory and identity” in “Trem Neul” and thus “challenges the idea that there is a 
continuity with the past” (48). Here, the declarative force of the poem manifests 
itself with the same “arrangements of and meddling with” appropriated text, 
rhyming, and imagery that manifests itself in Joyce’s other appropriative poems (40).  
 These poems demonstrate the declarative features of Joyce’s appropriative 
poetry, recognizing the prevailing uses of rhyme and imagery as well as the local 
alterations and syntactical alignments of individual lines. If this analysis investigates 
how Joyce achieves a declarative effect through his poetry, the next question is what 
do these poems declare? What is expressed and what meanings manifest themselves 
through Joyce’s particular negotiations with appropriation? To respond to these 
questions, I will undertake a close reading of two of the poems addressed in this 
section, “De Iron Trote” and “Trem Neul.” In the following analysis of Joyce’s 
declarative appropriations, I will discuss the themes of dispossession, writing, and 
authorship, and the etymology of appropriation as it shapes “De Iron Trote.” My 
reading of “Trem Neul” follows Satris’s lead by attending to the interrogation of 
personal and collective history, and the form and function of memory. This analysis 
incorporates Joyce’s essays and critical responses to both poems, while also situating 
Joyce’s practice within a broader critical and cultural background of Irish poetic 
tradition. This situating of Joyce’s declarative appropriations investigates the relation 
between his appropriative practice and lyric poetry, and the possibility of reading his 
declarative appropriations as breaching the boundaries of the lyric.  
2.3 Joyce’s Poetic Declarations 
“De Iron Trote”: Appropriation and Dispossession 
In the previous chapter, I traced the etymological roots of appropriation and 
ascertained a “morally dubious” history bound up in property seizure, land 
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acquisition, and conflicts of ownership and authority. The close correlation between 
this etymology and the themes, images, and issues which distinguish “De Iron Trote” 
demonstrate that appropriation contributes directly to the over-arching themes of the 
poem. “De Iron Trote,” “The Peacock’s Tale,” and “Trem Neul” each incorporate 
representations of colonialism in Ireland, and each poem is composed according to 
appropriative practices. It is plausible then to suggest that Joyce chooses the practice 
of appropriation for these poems because it provokes the same issues of ownership, 
authority, and deprivation that the poems themselves engage. The conceptual rhyme 
between Huxley’s human/inhuman opposition and Spenser’s discussion of the Irish 
in A View serves as a particularly potent example of this alignment of form and 
content.  
 The first quotation Joyce takes from Huxley appears little over halfway 
through the philosopher’s essay in a paragraph comparing the vocal mechanism in 
animals and humans. In the following quotation, the phrases in italics are those Joyce 
carries over into “De Iron Trote”: 
In man there is also a vocal mechanism, and the cry of an infant is in 
the same sense innate and á priori, inasmuch as it depends on an 
organic relation between its sensory nerves and the nervous 
mechanism which governs the vocal apparatus. Learning to speak and 
learning to sing, are processes by which the vocal mechanism is set to 
new tunes. A song which has been learned has its molecular 
representative, which potentially represents it in the brain, just as a 
musical box, wound up, potentially represents overtures. Touch the 
stop and the overture begins; send a molecular impulse along the 
proper afferent nerve and the singer begins his song. (59) 
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The conflict surrounding the ontological distinction of humans and animals provides 
a useful dialectic for reading this poem which is populated by a number of different 
bodies and groups. The opening paragraph distinguishes the human as uniquely 
capable of learning and performing music, and presents this musical capacity as a 
physical process. It is fitting, then, that “De Iron Trote” attends to distinctions 
between human and inhuman and considers the consequences of such distinctions in 
enabling and approving mistreatment and violence.  
 Included in the population of the poem is the sleeping man of the first 
paragraph, the baby of the third paragraph whose larynx “migrates down the neck” at 
eighteen-months, a “woman who murdered her lover,” “‘a chauffeur [who] kills his 
wife,’” and “these brutes” who threaten to be nothing more than a “superior race of 
marionettes” (233). The “agopithecus” of the fifth paragraph indicates the problem 
of distinguishing between man and animal on the basis of speech and 
communication as this “ape-like goat” has a voice which is “very like a man’s” 
(234). The roll call continues with the speaker and little boy with his teddy bear, 
which precedes an oblique reference to the “Crying Boy,” the media name for a 
“cursed painting of a little boy blamed for a spate of house fires in working class 
areas of Northern England in the mid-eighties.” 
13
 Paragraph six sustains 
Clendening’s “Investigation on Respiration” with reference to “women who are both 
grown up and fat,” and goes on to list huntsmen, politicians, admirals, and 
somebody’s grandmother. This first section of the poem ends with a delineation of 
an apprentice’s requirements for Ticket and Sign Writing and Boiler-making as 
established by the Apprenticeship and Skilled Labour Association of London in 
1908. The array of individuals and groups that manifest themselves in “De Iron 
                                                 
13
 See here, http://www.forteantimes.com/features/articles/1308/the_curse_of_the_crying_boy.html . 
My thanks to the poet for this link.  
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Trote” serve as a reminder of the many authorial voices and texts that constitute the 
poem. This population also reflects a broad spectrum of the actions and interactions 
that Huxley analyses in his investigation of the relation between humans and 
animals, from the “cry of an infant” in paragraph three which is innately human, to 
the “brutes” in paragraph five who threaten the boundary between human and 
nonhuman. This opposition becomes particularly pointed when “these brutes” are 
aligned with Spenser’s description of the native Irish in A View (233).  
 Spenser’s denigration of the Irish problematizes Huxley’s careful 
comparison of humans and animals in his 1874 essay by reducing the Irish to 
animals or “brutes.” This treatise was written in the aftermath of the Desmond 
Rebellions in Munster (1569-1573 and 1579-1583) which were organized as a 
response to the strengthening of the English colonial forces in Ireland. Spenser took 
his cues for A View from Lord Arthur Grey de Wilton who was acting Lord Deputy 
of Ireland at the time and was later recalled by Queen Elizabeth I because his 
policies were deemed “excessively brutal” (Rambuss 26). This brutality manifested 
itself in scorched-earth tactics which led to famine, driving starving people to Cork 
city where plagues broke out. Sir Warham St. Leger, Provost Marshall of Munster, 
estimated that the death toll passed 30,000 within the first six months of plague 
(Hirst 103). This figure did not reflect the death toll through fighting, and yet 
Spenser is clear that the suffering endured by the native population was not the fault 
of the colonists: “yet sure in all that warr there perished not manye by the sworde, 
but all by the extremitye of famyne, which they themselues had wrought” (Spenser 
135). Spenser advocates for a violent military operation to bring the native 
population under control, arguing “yt is in vaine to speake of plantinge of lawes and 
plottinge of pollycies, till they [the native Irish] be altogeather subdued” (17). 
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Among the various arguments and assertions in Spenser’s text, his depiction of the 
Irish is particularly compelling and appalling, and this depiction constitutes the basis 
of Joyce’s appropriations from the text in “De Iron Trote.”  
 Joyce first references Spenser’s text in the third paragraph of the poem 
where he borrows and adapts the author’s lines to read, “from every corner of the / 
woods and glens see them come creeping on their hands, / for their legs cannot make 
fast” (233).
14
 These animalistic portrayals of the starving Irish eating carcasses out of 
their graves, “scrape[d] back out of their deeper sleep,” supports Huxley’s 
downgrading of human consciousness. Spenser’s text demonstrates that a physical 
process of the body such as hunger can drive humans to acts far removed from 
enlightened consciousness. Spenser’s call to more forcibly subdue the native 
population incorporates an opinion of the Irish as less human than the English. This 
attitude excused English brutality and holds the Irish accountable for a famine “they 
themselues hadd wrought,” justifying a range of behaviours that would not be 
necessary or appropriate in a more civilized society (135). 
 Spenser is not a neutral selection for an Irish poet such as Joyce living and 
writing in Cork, and A View is particularly provocative because of the violent 
subjugation which Spenser says is necessary to control “the moste barbarous nacion 
in Christendome” (56).
15
 It is important to note that Joyce makes no attempt to alert 
readers to this source text in “De Iron Trote,” and indeed the violence and destitution 
                                                 
14
 Spenser’s original text reads, “out of euerie Corner of the woodes & glennes they came crepinge 
forth vpon theire hands, for theire legges could not beare them, they looked Anotomies of death, they 
spake like ghostes cryinge out of theire graues, they did eate of the dead Carrions, happye were they 
could fynde them, yea and one another soone after in so much as the verie Carcases they spared not to 
scrape out of theire graues, and yf they founde a plot of water cresses or shamrocks, there they 
flocked as to a feast” (135).  
 
15
 Spenser has maintained an important position in Joyce’s poetics, emerging again in the 2014 
collection, Rome’s Wreck, which ‘translates’ Spenser’s Ruines of Rome. Manson describes Joyce’s 
translation as a “gleefully violent revenge” on the English poet which reduces each word of his thirty-
two poems to one-syllable (8).  
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of Spenser’s images are more forceful when they are taken out of their original 
political and historical contexts. The two themes of the human/inhuman opposition 
and the depiction of the starving Irish meet in the rhetorical statement which 
concludes the fourth paragraph of the poem: “What proof is there these brutes / are 
other than a superior race of marionettes, which eat / without pleasure, cry without 
pain, desire nothing, / know nothing, merely simulating true intelligence” (233). By 
changing Huxley’s “what proof is there that brutes” to “what proof is there these 
brutes,” Joyce reorients the question to refer to the wretched Irish of the previous 
paragraph. This alignment questions the processes by which consciousness becomes 
the distinguishing feature of humanity and is variously ascribed and denied to 
different groups. Here, the Irish experience of dispossession is manifested through 
the opposition of ontology and Spenser’s denigration of the Irish, an opposition 
which supported and justified a violent colonial regime. 
“De Iron Trote”: Writing and Authorship 
The conceptual rhyme between Huxley and Spenser is a primary declarative moment 
in Joyce’s poem and it reflects appropriation’s “morally dubious” history of 
dispossession. The second theme which emerges in “De Iron Trote” is writing and 
authorship which further elaborates the declarative force of Joyce’s poem. “De Iron 
Trote” is dedicated to Tuma, and this dedication is intended as a response to the 
critic and his comments on Joyce’s poetry in a 2003 essay on Tom Raworth. In this 
essay, Tuma discusses Joyce’s poem “DARK SENSES PARALLEL STREETS” 
which aligns Raworth’s “Dark Senses” with sixteen new quatrains, one responding 
to each of Raworth’s originals. Tuma’s distinction between the two poets regards the 
more “‘restricted’” nature of Joyce’s language when compared with his English 
counterpart (“Snifting” 81). In a 2015 essay, Tuma asserts that his comments about 
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Joyce’s “‘restricted’” diction eventually came to the poet’s attention, and “De Iron 
Trote” was his response. Tuma reads the poem as Joyce “working with found text to 
shape a lively, humorous prose and poetry diptych about the craft of putting words to 
song.” The final paragraphs of the poem on writing and authorship reconcile my 
reading with Tuma’s and contribute to this investigation into the declarative force of 
Joyce’s appropriative practice.  
The final three paragraphs of the first part of the poem are primarily derived 
from the 1908 text, Trades for London Boys, but it is the progression of Ticket 
Writers in the eighth paragraph which interests me here. Exchanging the original 
words, “The apprentice,” for “The illusion of experience,” Joyce leaves the rest of 
the excerpt exactly as it appears in the original text: 
      The illusion of experi- 
ence, as a rule, begins by filling in provided letters with 
paint, and later gets on to the proper writing and 
 lettering. Attendance at technical classes would be 
 useful in order to bring up a good style of writing with  
some originality. (234) 
This account of the “illusion of experience” uses the same imagery that Joyce 
invokes in his criticism of popular forms in Irish poetry in his essay from 1997. In 
“The Point of Innovation in Irish Poetry,” Joyce reflects on the general failure of 
mainstream Irish poetry, which he characterizes as “the poetry of expression,” to 
supersede the boundaries of individual experience (46). The difficulty that such 
poetry experiences is in “representing” the “reality” of the world and the “irreducible 
experience of real pain ... pressed on us by media.” This pain cannot register, Joyce 
says, in a poetic language “in which all positive terms have been appropriated by 
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advertising.” The problem with the Irish “poetry of expression,” Joyce explains, and 
he includes some of his early poetry under this category, is that “we imagine that all 
we need to do is lay bare our souls in a few images, neatly segmented through the 
line-break mechanism ... and there we have that sacred thing, a poem.” When “De 
Iron Trote” is aligned with this 1997 criticism of “a certain sort of recent poetry, 
particularly evident in Ireland,” the “ticket writers” of Joyce’s poem recall the 
contemporary authors of the “poetry of expression.” Read this way, the closing line 
of the eighth paragraph which advocates for “Attendance at technical classes to bring 
up a good style of writing” could be read either as an ironic criticism of the 
“originality” of the “poetry of expression,” or as a demand for a more original and 
formal approach to expression such as that represented by “De Iron Trote.” In this 
context, the final paragraph of this first section is a wry self-deprecating reflection on 
the poet’s process of composition: “Work with letters may be done sitting without 
difficulty / and is quite suitable for cripples. The trade is not a / large one” (235). 
This first section of the poem comprised of appropriated material is ostensibly more 
expressive and declarative than the “refined / precedent” of the lyric tradition that 
informs the second section (237). By aligning the second section with potential 
influences it is possible to gain a clearer understanding of how Joyce uses 
appropriation declaratively.  
 The first and second sections of “De Iron Trote” assert opposing stances on 
appropriation; however, this second section does bear the marks of different poems 
and texts. It might alleviate a reading of this verse section to relate Joyce’s “train / of 
state” in the ninth stanza to the same phrase in Samuel Johnson’s “The Vanity of 
Human Wishes” (1749) (237). The tenth stanza of Johnson’s poem addresses 
Thomas Wolsey, a clergyman and politician who amassed a great fortune and lavish 
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properties during Henry VIII’s reign. Wolsey played an important role in the 
progressive redefinition of appropriation during the English Reformation. In the 
previous chapter, I cited Prickett’s explanation of how the word appropriation 
became a euphemism for the “looting of ... monastic houses with well-rewarded zeal 
by a member of Henry’s newly Protestant merchant-aristocracy” (26-7). This 
historically specific definition supports the invocation of Johnson and Wolsey here, 
and the broader reading of appropriation as characterizing both the form and the 
content of “De Iron Trote.” A 1743 biography of Wolsey asserts that contemporary 
historians charged the politician with “sacrilege, on account of the dissolution of ... 
forty monasteries” (Grove and Cavendish 430).
16
 In “The Vanity of Human Wishes,” 
Johnson dramatizes the King’s turn against Wolsey and his alienation from Court by 
a retinue of courtiers and attendants: 
Claim leads to claim, and power advances power; 
Till conquest unresisted ceased to please, 
And rights submitted, left him none to seize. 
At length his sovereign frowns—the train of state 
Mark the keen glance, and watch the sign to hate.   
Where’er he turns he meets a stranger’s eye … (60) 
This reproach of Wolsey in Johnson’s poem is followed by another of King Charles 
XII of Sweden which is read as “skilfully includ[ing] many of Johnson’s familiar 
themes” that echo the themes of “De Iron Trote” (Weinbrot 47). Johnson’s themes 
include “repulsion with slaughter that aggrandizes one man and kills and 
impoverishes thousands, understanding of the human need to glorify heroes, and 
subtle contrast with the classical parent-poem [in Juvenal’s Satire X] and its 
                                                 
16
 That said, the authors are careful to point out that Wolsey put the revenue of these monasteries to “a 
spiritual use” (Grove and Cavendish 430). 
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inadequate moral vision.” One could interpret Johnson’s thematic influences as 
supporting Joyce’s interest in the human consciousness in “De Iron Trote” and the 
concomitant portrayal of colonialism in Ireland. That said, Joyce puts Johnson’s 
“train of state” to different use in his poem, demonstrating the difficulty of making 
assertions about the poet’s intention in appropriating a text and its cultural and 
political resonances within the poem (60). “De Iron Trote” extends the phrase 
beyond Johnson’s regal ascription to accommodate a more literal meaning. The 
phrase is elaborated in the final stanzas of the second section: 
 Let’s catch 
  the track 
  
will lead us 
 to our train 
   of state, 
then venerably  
 process.”  
…………………….. 
  You’ve heard it’s true. 
 
that by a snifting  
 clack 
  the air 
is expelled 
 from the  
  pickle-pot. (237-38) 
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A “snifting clack” is an old name for the safety valve on a steam engine that ejects 
air from the cylinder, and so the “train / of state” in Joyce’s poem recalls not just the 
royal retinue but also, through the “track” and “snifting clack,” an actual train. It is 
these final lines that present the second section of “De Iron Trote” as the inverse of 
the first with regards to appropriation. Here, Joyce sets two separate stanzas in 
quotation marks, neither of which gives way to ostensible bibliographical sources.  
There may appear to be little in the way of thematic connections between the 
two sections, and yet the oppositional approaches to appropriation serve as evidence 
of Joyce’s divergence from Picasso’s collage practices invoked via Krauss’s 1998 
study. Joyce’s play on true and false appropriations challenges Picasso’s comment 
on artistic copying and stealing which echoes T.S. Eliot’s assertion that “immature 
poets imitate, mature poets steal” (Sacred Wood 114).
17
 The endurance of these 
assertions of poetic and artistic theft as a compositional practice in modernism is 
reflected by Richard Ellman’s assertion, quoted in the previous chapter, that “the 
best poets expropriate best” (8). The conflict that Joyce generates around of the idea 
of appropriation also challenges the idea of the fully constituted text which Picasso 
presumes is there for the taking. The practice of appropriation problematizes the 
attribution of authorship as it is traditionally defined, and this problematizing recalls 
the question of Joyce’s appropriative practice as breaching the boundaries of 
lyricism. In order to address this relation between the declarative nature of Joyce’s 
appropriations and his innovations of traditional lyric form, I will turn to “Trem 
Neul” where this question comes to the fore.  
                                                 
17
 The quotation attributed to Picasso is “Bad poets copy, good poets steal,” however there is no 




In the previous discussion of the appropriative nature of “Trem Neul,” I suggested 
that this is a poem of preservation as signalled by its epigraph, its investment in 
personal and collective histories, and its preoccupation with memory. “Trem Neul” 
has attracted more critical comment than many of Joyce’s poems, partly because of 
its length, and partly because of its various methods of reconciling the individual 
with the social. The existing criticism of this poem recalls the arguments rejecting 
the critical opposition between formal complexity and lyricism by Brady, 
Sutherland, and Galvin. In the following paragraphs, I will investigate the relation 
between the declarative nature of Joyce’s appropriations in “Trem Neul” and the 
innovative reformations of lyricism which critics attribute to his poetry. If this poem 
is an exercise in preservation, the first two questions for “Trem Neul” is what it is 
that Joyce is trying to preserve, and why appropriation is particularly suited to this 
attempt at preservation. In order to explain Joyce’s predilection towards 
appropriation, it will be helpful to consider the poetic and cultural context within 
which he began writing in Ireland, and his divergence from this tradition. One of 
Joyce’s reasons for using appropriation is that it supports his attempts to “recoup part 
of the history of [his] world from what Beckett terms ‘the uniform memory of 
intelligence’” (“Why I Write” n. pag.). This “uniform memory of intelligence” 
shapes historical narratives and definitions of identity, and the terms in which these 
narratives and identities are expressed. In “Trem Neul,” the declarative nature of the 
poem emerges from Joyce’s contravening of traditional modes of lyric expression. 
By studying this formal innovation, we arrive at a deeper understanding of Joyce’s 
appropriative practice, and his poetry and poetics.  
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 The question of what is being preserved in “Trem Neul” is a difficult one for 
a poem so deeply indebted to the texts of other authors and eras. On the back cover 
of the 2001 edition of first dream of fire, “Trem Neul” is described as “an extended 
autobiographical essay in prose and verse from which everything personal has been 
excluded.” In the absence of confessional verse, the spaces of the poem are 
“crowded with the memories and apprehensions of others,” and yet Joyce is clear 
about the personal nature of his poem. In a 2013 interview with Satris, Joyce 
proposes reading “Trem Neul” as “a meditation on family, tradition, [and] lineage” 
(25-6). The story about Ned Goggin from P.W. Joyce’s 1913 essay serves as a 
guiding narrative for the poem while also consolidating the themes of family and 
tradition. The older Joyce recalls the visit of Ned Goggin, a famed fiddle-player, to 
his childhood home seeking shelter during the “Night of the Big Wind” in 1838. 
Joyce remembers Goggin playing “The Tuning of the Colours” during his visit, 
though it was many years before he could recall the melody and add it to his 
collection of Irish folk music. In this essay written the year before he died, Joyce 
recounts how the tune came back to him one night during sleep, “trem neul, as the 
song-writers would say,” “through my dream,” so that he “woke up actually 
whistling the tune” (17). Trevor Joyce’s selection of this phrase, “trem neul,” as the 
title of his poem indicates his interest in the processes of memory which sustain 
tradition and lineage. Alongside P.W. Joyce’s narrative, the poet also makes 
reference to James Joyce, and to textual representations of Galway and the west of 
Ireland where his mother, Nora Joyce, was born and raised, and which he brings 
together with lines lifted from his 1998 poem, Syzygy. The photo which forms a 
cover image of first dream of fire and “Trem Neul” was taken by his mother at her 
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ancestor’s home place of Coolaghy, Co. Galway, circa 1950.
18
 This image, and the 
tradition of community it represents, supports the poem’s aggregation of texts and 
authors and the broader themes of tradition and cultural lineage.  
 The question of what is being preserved in “Trem Neul” remains to be 
answered, and for that it will be helpful to take an excerpt from the poem. The 
following lines are drawn from the second page of the poem:
19
 
  It is a mixture of spaciousness and 
intimacy, with a slightly sunken  
stage at the centre, which is not to  
  be mistaken for the world. Round 
  three sides, rows of chairs await 
  their occupants, for the months 
  and days are the passing guests 
  of a hundred generations, and the 
  years that come and go are also 
  visitors, for which we must make 
  due accommodation. The fourth 
  side is open for the entry of actors. 
  An audience of several hundred 
  already fills the seats—so many 
  as the chamber can hold. Here is 
  included everything under the  
                                                 
18
 The image represents the Meitheal tradition wherein neighbours and friends gathered on a local 
farm to help the resident family save the hay. Joyce’s father’s family is from East Limerick and they 
“had more than enough family history to go around” compared with his mother’s upbringing in the 
poor house (Satris “Interview with Trevor Joyce” 25). 
 
19
 A brief bibliography of the contributing texts and compositional process of this page is available 
online at https://jacket2.org/poems/trem-neul-composition-process. 
Stretch out your hand 






  sky; next the fine austere stand the 
  gaudy young, the feeble lacera- 
  tion neighbours fleeting strength, 
  for debility is universal. All rise 
  and bow to the king as we enter.
  He and I sit above, opposite the  
  centre, and a hush falls as retainers 
  approach on their knees, offering 
  programmes for our instruction, 
  chocolates and sweets for our re- 
  freshment, and in such a company, 
  there’s no such things as time. (187) 
The opening image of a stage recalls the analogy between the theatre and the world 
in William Shakespeare’s As You Like it. In act 2, scene 7, the courtier, Jacques, 
offers his account of human life in a play replete with double-identities and false 
names; “All the world’s a stage,” he says, “And all the men and women merely 
players. / They have their exits and their entrances, / And one man in his time plays 
many parts” (1672). Joyce’s lines are actually drawn from Malcolm MacDonald’s 
Angkor and the Khmers, but the analogy to Shakespeare is more helpful for thinking 
about the relation between family, tradition, and lineage in Joyce’s poem.
20
 The 
speaker of Joyce’s poem resides in a relation of “spaciousness and intimacy” with the 
generations that went before (187). The actors and audience members that populate 
these opening lines reflect the “passing guests of a hundred generations” gone before, 
                                                 
20
 This analogy belies the fourth line of Joyce’s prose section which states that the “sunken / stage at 
the centre is not to / be mistaken for the world,” however I am making this analogy because it is 
useful for extending Joyce’s stage to meet the themes of family, tradition, and lineage which the poet 
says comprise the poem (187).  
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and “the years that come and go are also visitors, for which we must make due 
accommodation.” This rhyming of human history and the transience of time 
manifests itself not through the fact of the passing of life and time, but rather through 
the endurance of the two, and “Trem Neul” testifies to this endurance. The theatre of 
the second page “include[s] everything under the sun,” the “fine austere,” the “gaudy 
young,” the “neighbours,” and “the King,” and “in such a company / there’s no such 
thing as time.” In breaching the boundaries of time, all that remains is “a dense 
constellation / of some thousands of nodal points ... in a short phase of rhythmical / 
flashing,” and although this constellation may incur “a deliberate crescendo to a 
climax, declining then and dying away,” it will light up again “after due pause” 
(195). The appropriation of text in “Trem Neul” proceeds more seamlessly than in 
“De Iron Trote” and the concurrences which emerge work to escape “what Beckett 
terms ‘the uniform memory of intelligence’” (“Why I Write” n. pag.).“The rare 
thing” which might offer alternatives to this “uniform memory” can be achieved 
when one acknowledges that memory is also a process of change, both of the 
individual remembering and of the information internalized (“Trem Neul” 227).  
 The “rare thing” which is remembered “does / not stagnate but moves from / 
one style to another,” and this “mov[ing]” manifests itself in a variety of ways in the 
poem (227). The process of transformation might describe the notation of a song 
from a melody recalled to a tune written down and recorded, or the transformation of 
the individual’s body when, as Joyce says, “with the exception of your neurons / and 
your muscles, the cells of your / first body are long gone” (223). The aggregative 
nature of the poem supports Joyce’s effort to establish memory not as a cerebral 
phenomenon but rather as a physical and collective process, and yet this 
appropriative form may seem an unusual choice for a poem addressing themes as 
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personal as family, tradition, and memory. In order to understand Joyce’s invocation 
of appropriation here, it will be helpful to consider the alternatives available to him 
in Irish poetic tradition.  
Joyce’s Lyricism 
Joyce has frequently articulated his disinterest in the lyrical modes which have 
characterized Irish poetry over the course of his writing career. His earliest 
comments derive from the 1997 essay, wherein the poet articulates his divergence 
from the “familiar marketable thing, the Irish poem” (47). The traditional Irish poem 
“was invariably in the expressive mode,” Joyce says; “it took its theme from off the 
shelf, and told you, in lyric fashion, what the poet felt on the subject.” By Joyce’s 
own admission, it took some time for his poetry to move beyond these conventional 
lyric forms, and his near-twenty-year silence reflects this struggle. I have already 
outlined Joyce’s difficulty with the “poetry of expression,” and yet he acknowledges 
that by the early seventies, his own “technical development as a poet hadn’t got 
much further than the standard Irish bag of tricks: lyrics of description and 
expression dressed in the most transparent of formal attire” (“Phantom Quarry” 6). 
The implication is that the poems of Pentahedron (1972) constituted those same 
“lyrics of description and expression, ... the emphasis being almost entirely on the 
language as carrier of information, with little heed to other possibilities.” Much of 
the criticism of Joyce’s poetry addresses his departure from these traditional lyric 
forms, so that even the most densely appropriated and complexly procedural poems 
bear witness to declarative, and possibly even lyrical moments.  
 In Satris’s essay on “Trem Neul,” the critic reads Joyce’s poem as 
“renounc[ing] the lyric focus on expression from a self contained voice” (“Voices” 
31). In place of lyric “univocality,” Satris interprets the poem as “incorporating … 
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many different levels of discourse” to “show us ... that the individual is constructed 
from its contact with others” (33). Geoffrey Squires pushes Joyce’s rejection of 
lyricism further when he says that “the authorial agent” in Joyce’s poems “survives 
only as the arbiter and organiser of these various elements: a kind of poetic ‘hidden 
hand’” (95).  Both critics register Joyce’s divergence from the lyric, and yet both 
also read his poems as deeply meaningful and expressive. The implication that 
emerges from these analyses is that of Joyce’s capacity to reconcile the opposition of 
formal complexity and lyricism that Brady, Sutherland, and Galvin problematize. 
Gaynor articulates this capacity in Joyce’s poetry in his reading of the 2005 poem, 
“STILLSMAN.” Here, Gaynor assesses Michael S. Begnal’s and Stephen Vincent’s 
reviews of the poem which he says “reflect recognisable features of the poem but fail 
to register the importance of the plain narrative” (66). By omitting this narrative, 
Begnal and Vincent risk realigning “STILLSMAN” as either a poetic transcription of 
post-structuralist theory or an act of lyric resistance.” The account of 
“STILLSMAN” as a “poetic transcription of poststructuralist theory” is reductive, 
and the underlying idea of Joyce’s poem as either for or against lyric is even more 
problematic. “STILLSMAN,” like “Trem Neul” and “De Iron Trote,” is comprised 
of a variety of separate narratives and texts, but this in itself does not mean that the 
poem is for or against lyricism. To interpret the poem this way would be to concede 
to conceptualist extremism which embraces appropriation as a means of effacing the 
poet writing. What matters instead is the declarative effect of the poem and its ability 
to supersede the boundaries of individual experience. For Adorno, it is the 
“mediating elements within the individual” which make him or her “a part of [the] 
social subject” (150). Joyce’s criticisms of Irish poetry regard this failure to 
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supersede the individual, such that his own poetry is an explicit attempt to transcend 
these boundaries.  
 Joyce incorporates appropriative practices and procedural forms into his 
poetry as a way of avoiding the “self-consciousness of the expressive voice” (“Point 
of Innovation” 46). Having established that “the lyric mode” of his earliest 
collections “was quite as prone to exclude the incoherent world as the mannered 
narrative [he] so distrusted,” it was incumbent upon the poet to devise new ways of 
writing and articulating his experience of the world (“Why I Write” n. pag.). Eric 
Falci offers a revealing reading of Joyce’s negotiation with lyricism in his more 
recent poems, and his insights develop the relation between the declarative force of 
Joyce’s appropriative practice and lyricism. In his critique of Joyce’s poetry, Falci 
argues that what he describes as lattice poems from the late-nineties constitute a 
“simultaneous reinvigoration and undermining of lyric form” (130). Poems such as 
Syzygy, “Approach of Bodies Falling in Time of Plague,” “Proceeds of a Black 
Swap,” “Data Shadows,” and “DARK SENSES PARALLEL STREETS” “do not 
fully abandon the possibilities of lyric utterance,” Falci says, “while simultaneously 
submitting the usual features of lyric to disruptive compositional strictures.” Falci’s 
description of Joyce’s “reinvigoration and undermining of lyric” supports my 
assertions about the declarative nature of Joyce’s appropriative poems as they disrupt 
the opposition of formal complexity and expression and reaffirm the poet writing at 
the centre of the poem. In his 2003 essay in Assembling Alternatives, Joyce notes the 
lack of the kind of consolidated avant-garde tradition in Irish poetry which had 
provided poets in other countries with a way out of the confessional impasse in lyric 
poetry. There are no “second-generation Beats, or Black Mountain, or New York 
School” in Irish literary history for contemporary poets to “react to,” Joyce says 
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(165). Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that the declarative moments in Joyce’s 
densely procedural poems should be most reminiscent of lyricism. According to 
Falci, “the full abandonment of lyric poetry is, particularly in Ireland, unlikely,” and 
poets such as Joyce “seem to have registered this fact” both in their criticism and in 
their poetry (153). Joyce’s declarative appropriations provoke some intensely 
expressive moments, and whether or not one agrees with the assessment of Joyce’s 
poetics as reinvigorating lyricism in Irish poetry, or reconciling formal complexity 
with lyric expression, his poetry constitutes a sustained challenge to the critical 
interpretation of appropriation in poetry.   
Conclusion 
This chapter studies Joyce’s appropriative practices and demonstrates his innovative 
development of the practice beyond traditional definitions of collage as an abstract 
and aleatory form. This analysis sees that Joyce’s poems breach the boundaries of 
appropriation by reinvigorating the lyrical modes of expression that characterize 
much contemporary Irish poetry. Joyce’s appropriative poems retain the figure of the 
poet in a manner which challenges traditional critical understandings of 
appropriation. In these poems aligning appropriative practices with declarative 
effects, the poet writing may not occupy the centre of the poem as in traditional lyric 
poetry, but he is certainly a formative presence, curating text and materials towards 
the constitution of the poem. Joyce’s poetry demands a more expansive 
interpretation of poetic borrowing so that the appropriation of text is not opposed to 
expression or meaning but actually enables a more explicit account of both the poet’s 
and the reader’s experience of the world. Joyce’s poetry extends critical 
understandings of appropriation in poetry, and of Irish poetry more generally, by 
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challenging the precepts and parameters of both categories and demanding more of 
critical readings of his work.   
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Chapter Three: “Salvage or Creative Demolition”: Appropriation 
and English Literary History in Alan Halsey’s The Text of Shelley’s 
Death 
Jean-Michel Rabaté presents the poet of The Waste Land, T.S. Eliot, as “a young 
man walking with a ‘heap of broken images’ circling around his mind,” which 
Rabaté says precisely describes what Eliot means by tradition (213). The phrase, “‘a 
heap of broken images,’” provides the visual accompaniment to Eliot’s model of 
tradition, a model which some critics credit as consolidating the idea of tradition in 
twentieth-century literary criticism, and others reject because of its restricted 
ideological and cultural values. Reading a letter from Eliot to Mary Hutchinson 
written in 1919, Rabaté reflects on Eliot’s desire to appropriate tradition to himself. 
For Rabaté, this desire derives from the poet’s American heritage and his outsider 
status in the English society and culture within which he lives and writes. In his 
letter, Eliot warns Hutchinson to bear in mind that: 
I am a metic—a foreigner, and that I want to understand you, and all 
the background and tradition of you ... [I]t is very difficult with me—
both by inheritance and because of my very suspicious and cowardly 
disposition. But I may simply prove to be a savage. (212)  
For Rabaté, this admission presents a clear imperative for Eliot’s definition of 
tradition in his 1919 essay, “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” This model of 
tradition may have dominated the early decades of the twentieth century, but it was 
not the only definition in circulation at the time. 
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 Eliot’s “‘heap of broken images’” strikes a close rhyme with Ezra Pound’s 
“bundle of broken mirrors” from his 1915 poem, “Near Perigord” (63). Pound’s 
“bundle of broken mirrors” provides an image for an alternative model of tradition 
which emerges through the Cantos. According to Donald Davie, the “conflicting 
testimonies and mutually exclusive hypotheses which are all that ... the scrupulous 
historian has to show” is a “central and governing concern” of “Near Perigord,” and 
it becomes a guiding force in Pound’s poetry from 1915 onwards (Davie 63). The 
ambiguity and multi-perspectival approach of “Near Perigord,” and later the Cantos, 
enacts the historical process, challenging its authority and the historical narratives 
received by modern audiences. Pound’s influence is felt in Joyce’s appropriative 
practice and in his divergence from Pound’s example; however, it remains to be seen 
whether Eliot’s aesthetic offers anything to the declarative force of Alan Halsey’s 
appropriative poetry and his model of tradition. This chapter poses the question of 
the relationship between Eliot’s model of tradition and Halsey’s poetic engagement 
with tradition in The Text of Shelley’s Death.
1
 Before taking up the question of 
Halsey’s inheritance and divergence from Eliot, it will be helpful to outline the 
trajectory of the arguments and the critical response to Eliot’s negotiation with 
tradition in The Text. 
In this chapter, I study the declarative force of Halsey’s appropriative 
practice in The Text of Shelley’s Death through which he presents a textual 
reformulation of literary tradition. The chapter begins with a close reading of the 
opening pages of The Text to delineate Halsey’s practice of appropriation. Through 
the process of close reading, we gain a clearer perspective of Halsey’s negotiation 
with appropriation and its consequences for traditional concepts of narrative and 
                                                 
1
 Hereafter, The Text. 
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individual subjectivity. Halsey’s appropriative practice deconstitutes individual 
subjectivity, both of the author and of the drowned poet, and this undermines 
interpretations of The Text as being about Shelley’s death.  But if Halsey’s poem is 
not about Shelley and his drowning at sea, then what is it about? Halsey offers one 
answer to this question when he proposes reading The Text as a poem about 
narratives, the construction and development of specific narratives, and the process 
by which some narratives gain authority and become part of tradition. After 
delineating Halsey’s appropriative practice and its consequences for subjectivity, I 
move to consider The Text’s engagement with the narratives of literary tradition. 
Halsey’s preoccupation with tradition in The Text sets him in opposition to many of 
the poets and critics of innovative British poetry for whom tradition is the purview of 
the mainstream and necessarily delimits alternative poetries.  
 Having asserted Halsey’s engagement with literary tradition in The Text, the 
next task for the analysis of Halsey’s poem is to establish what definition or model 
of tradition he is writing against. The dominant voice in the twentieth-century turn to 
literary tradition is T.S. Eliot. Eliot’s 1919 essay “Tradition and the Individual 
Talent” was a formative text in the establishment of a concept of tradition in 
literature and scholarship over the following decades. This chapter proceeds with a 
close reading of Eliot’s essay and the understanding of tradition it instils in 
contemporary criticism. The impact of Eliot’s tradition extends beyond literary 
criticism, and so to gain an adequate picture of the model of tradition Halsey is 
writing against it is helpful to look to a more contemporary critical engagement with 
Eliotic tradition. John Guillory’s 1993 book Cultural Capital incorporates Eliot’s 
tradition as part of its ideological critique of the university. Guillory studies the 
social, political, and economic development of literary studies in the academy. 
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Halsey diverges from both Eliot’s Hegelian model and Guillory’s ideological 
critique by using textuality to undertake a radical demystifying of tradition for 
contemporary audiences. Halsey’s appropriative practice is integral to his textual 
reformulation of tradition and this textuality reflects the poet’s belief in fragments 
and ruins as the necessary inheritance of every English poet. By comparing this 
imagery of fragments and ruins in Eliot’s poetry and criticism to Halsey’s 1995 
poem it is possible to gain a clearer sense of his textual reformulation of tradition 
and thus the declarative force of his appropriative practice in The Text.  
3.1 Understanding Halsey’s Appropriations in The Text of Shelley’s Death 
Halsey is an English poet whose writing constitutes a sustained challenge to 
originality, voice, and elitism within art. His first collection, Yearspace, was 
published by Galloping Dog Press in 1979. Yearspace distinguishes itself by creating 
meaning not out of words or sentences but rather “within linguistic space,” Selerie 
says, and the poems “anticipate the concern with verbal fabric” that would become 
so important in later works such as The Text (n. pag.). Yearspace and Present State 
(1981) have an “emotional fullness that gets submerged in the work of the latter 
period,” Selerie continues, so that by the time Perspectives on the Reach is published 
in 1981, “the lyric tone” of Halsey’s poetry is “dim[med]” and collage practices have 
taken up a prominent place. From 1979 to 1997, Halsey managed The Poetry 
Bookshop at Hay-on-Wye which is remembered nationally and internationally as “a 
key source for British and American small-press material” (Caddel and Quartermain 
271). The Irish poet Maurice Scully describes the shop as “a cornucopia,” explaining 
how he received “a good chunk of [his] early education” as a poet by ordering 
chapbooks and collections from Halsey’s catalogue (Satris “Scully” 7). Halsey 
continued to write and publish his own poetry throughout this period, and in 1994 he 
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founded the small press, West House Books. Halsey’s lifelong involvement in the 
production and dissemination of poetry through West House and The Poetry 
Bookshop manifests itself poetically in the appropriative structure of The Text and in 
its engagement with literary history and tradition.  
 The Text of Shelley’s Death was published in 1995 and is the longest of 
Halsey’s prose poems. Halsey conceives of his poetry as “the work of a ‘logoclast,’” 
an individual predisposed to “break the too-serious word, to twit the dogmatic” 
(Latta n. pag.).
2
 The title of logoclast reflects Halsey’s predilection towards 
“carefully appointed assemblings and alignings” in the construction of his poems, 
and particularly in The Text. The poet uses these practices of textual appropriation to 
interrogate and undermine literary and institutional tradition. The reading of The Text 
in this chapter pursues the declarative force of his appropriative practices and the 
challenge they present to literary tradition, as well as his expansion of the critical 
understanding of appropriation in poetry and criticism.  
  The Text of Shelley’s Death first appeared from Five Seasons Press and was 
reprinted under West House Books in 2001. The poem is divided into three parts, 
with the first part entitled “The Text of Shelley’s Death” constituting the poem 
proper. This is followed by “Reversions on the Text” and a final section entitled 
“Towards an Index of Shelley’s Death.” “The Text of Shelley’s Death” makes up the 
body of the book, with the “Reversions” and “Index” sections composed of nine and 
twelve pages respectively. I use the word poem tentatively in the description of The 
Text because the prose-style block paragraphs which make up the body of the poem 
                                                 
2
 The word “logoclast” derives from the poem entitled “The Logoclast’s Lost Weekend” from Even if 
only out of, however the word has a longer history which provokes connections across this thesis. 
“Logoclast” is generally related to Samuel Beckett who proposes in a letter to Susan Howe’s mother, 
Mary Manning, to “start a Logoclast’s League,” stating, “May I count on your support? I am the only 




eschew conventional lyric form. The front cover of the book “reproduces the first 
page of one of Shelley’s last Italian notebooks” while the back reprints part of a leaf 
from The Triumph of Life (Back cover). This layering of text on text suggests 
something of the range, complexity, and playfulness of the work. The covers and 
front and back matter upset conventional distinctions between the text and its 
paratextual elements so that the “Reversions on the Text” and the “Index” occupy an 
ambiguous position in relation to the poem. A preliminary glance through the book 
wrong-foots the reader by upending even those most customary of literary devices. 
This effect is compounded in the opening line of the poem, “Everybody knows the 
text of Shelley’s death,” which sets a precedent that the rest of the book challenges 
through a maelstrom of statement, counter-statement, and flagrant contradiction (9).  
The Appropriative Construction of “The Text” 
The appropriative practice shaping Halsey’s poem inaugurates a vociferous cycling 
of voices which tell and retell the story of Shelley’s death. In this section on Halsey’s 
appropriative practice, I will undertake a close reading of the first ten pages of 
Halsey’s poem, attending to his excerption and combination of texts and the 
consequences for this retelling of the story of Shelley’s death. The paragraphs gather 
multiple accounts of the event, with the appropriated texts sometimes slotting 
together so that the change is imperceptible, and other times using line breaks as one 
text tapers off and another is introduced. At the conclusion of the “Index of Shelley’s 
Death,” Halsey includes a list of his “Sources” which catalogues the constituent texts 
included in the poem. This list indicates one of the many differences between 
Halsey’s and Joyce’s appropriative practices; Joyce offers a few clues to his sources 
in his notes at the back of each collection, while Halsey presents a complete list of 
constituent texts as part of the poem. Halsey’s sources manifest themselves early in 
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The Text, with the opening page appropriating material from at least five sources. 
This opening page offers an indication of Halsey’s appropriative practice, the form 
and style of his appropriations, and the interrelation of different source texts on the 
page: 
 
Fig. 1. From Alan Halsey’s The Text of Shelley’s Death, 9. 
The first narrative of Shelley’s death in the poem begins with William Sharp’s Life 
of Percy Bysshe Shelley (1887) which is one of the earliest texts included in Halsey’s 
 141 
 
bibliography. As the opening paragraph progresses, we hear how Trelawny 
accompanied Shelley’s boat out to sea in Byron’s yacht, the Bolivar, but when they 
were underway “the guard-boat boarded them to overhaul their papers” (9). Here, 
Sharp’s text is swapped out and Halsey replaces it with either André Maurois’s Ariel, 
or perhaps Isabel C. Clarke’s Byron and Shelley, to describe Trelawny’s failure to 
secure clearance and his return to port. Both Maurois and Clarke are referenced in 
Halsey’s “Sources,” and although Clarke’s is the earlier text by more than seventy 
years, there is no evidence to suggest which of the two Halsey uses. This ambiguity 
is cultivated as the text develops, becoming a guiding principle to the poem and the 
narrative it conveys.  
 The representative from the Health Office threatens Trelawny with 
quarantine if the Bolivar continued with Shelley’s boat. The length of quarantine 
ranges from “fourteen” to “forty” days depending on what text one reads, with the 
disparity denoted by square brackets and the term “var.” indicating a variation 
among the texts. This first paragraph does not conclude but rather breaks off, leaving 
Williams “fretting and fuming” with the possibility of delay. Opting for a sudden 
line break in place of a full stop or comma, Halsey ends this account of Shelley’s 
departure from Leghorn [now Livorno] and turns to Trelawny who tells us, “It was 
hopeless to think of detaining my friends / It was two o’clock already [var. past two 
o’clock], and there was very / little wind.” In 1858, nearly forty years after Shelley’s 
death, Trelawny published Recollections of the Last Days of Shelley and Byron 
which recounts tales of his travels with the poets and their untimely deaths. The text 
was reissued twenty years later by William Rossetti under the title Records of 
Shelley, Byron, and the Author, and Trelawny’s interjection in the first paragraph 
could equally be derived from this later text. The 1878 reissue has the distinction of 
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incorporating a variety of significant alterations from Trelawny’s first account of his 
time with the poets, and it also provides the source for the varying lengths of 
Trelawny’s threatened quarantine. In his 1858 edition, Trelawny reports that the 
Health Office official threatened him with forty days quarantine (118), while 
Rossetti’s 1878 version changes this to fourteen days (128). Whether the change was 
intentional or not, Halsey is attentive to the variances, acknowledging edits, errors, 
and alterations as part of the literary transmission of the narrative of Shelley’s death.  
 Trelawny’s interjection is followed by a line space before the poet revives 
the omniscient narrator for the final two paragraphs of the opening page, thus ending 
the preliminary account of Shelley’s drowning. The first of these two paragraphs 
combine lines from Peter Quennell’s Byron in Italy and Trelawny’s Recollections 
with Halsey’s own alterations and revisions. One significant alteration regards the 
name of Shelley’s boat. The boat was commissioned for Shelley by Trelawny to be 
built by Captain Roberts and it was delivered to Livorno under the title Don Juan, a 
name Shelley immediately rejected. In the lines drawn from Quennell, Halsey reverts 
to the original name of the boat despite Quennell’s use of Ariel. The final paragraph 
appropriates lines from Eileen Bigland’s Mary Shelley and includes a note in 
parenthesis which consolidates the variation in names. In the final lines, Halsey 
describes the Don Juan/Ariel “disappear[ing] into thick haze” as Captain Daniel 
Roberts watches fearfully from the shore (9). The description of Shelley’s boat 
disappearing provides a potent image for the formal and aesthetic devices at work in 
Halsey’s poem. Here, the omniscient narrator gives way to the singular speaker, 
Trelawny, albeit a speaker half-remembering Shelley’s drowning more than forty 
years after the date. This combination of narrators confounds rather than clarifies 
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matters, raising questions around the authority and reliability of the narrative voice 
and foregrounding contradiction as the necessary condition of literary history.  
 It would be gratifying to maintain a bibliographic approach to the Text, 
matching each passage to its source text and listing each of Halsey’s divergences, 
and yet, as in Joyce’s poetry, this offers little to a reading of The Text. Gregory 
Vincent St. Thomasino describes Halsey’s Text as “highly conceptual,” indicating 
the rich aesthetic and critical possibilities raised by the poem which redirect readings 
(n. pag.). The Text continues the narrative of events, restarting on the second page 
with the statement, “I could not believe it. An Adventurer and teller of tall tales” 
(10). With this warning, the poem returns to the morning of Monday, July 8
th
 1822, 
and the crew members’ preparations for their fated voyage to Lerici. Almost 
immediately the text is irrupted again and Shelley and Williams’s visit to the bank 
changes into a visit to “Mr. Dunn ... the banker,” before changing again to Shelley 
visiting “a notary about his will.” No sooner are the variations accounted for and 
Shelley and Williams “set out to buy provisions” than the text introduces a new style 
of parentheses, “[del. …],” which presents text under erasure. By the time the 
afternoon comes around and the boat is ready to depart, the chain of telling is undone 
as more and more alternatives enter the text:  
   The Don Juan [del. therefore] embarked just after  
one o’clock  
var. between two and three o’clock 
var. at three o’clock 
var. just after noon 
var. after two 
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the Don Juan sailed alone out of harbour [var. almost at the same 
moment as two feluccas]. (10) 
The instability attested to here is more than a simple plethora of voices which arises 
from Halsey’s appropriation of the many accounts of Shelley’s last sailing. The 
propensity to include all of the available variations reduces the semantic coherence 
of the text and makes these sections almost unreadable as narrative which justifies 
St. Thomasino’s description of the text. The concatenation of departure times 
ruptures the coherent progression of the paragraph and the desire to ascertain a true 
picture of events encourages a pedantry that distracts from the primary task of 
reading. Here, Halsey’s appropriation of text undermines the possibility of empirical 
knowledge of Shelley’s drowning. As well as disabling a clear account of Shelley’s 
death, Halsey’s appropriative practice also undermines traditional notions of 
subjectivity and authorship. This close reading of the poem proceeds with an 
analysis of Halsey’s negotiation with subjectivity in this appropriative poem.  
Individual Subjectivity and “The Text” 
In his review of The Text, Dorward interprets Halsey’s appropriative practice as 
invoking Roland Barthes’s “Death of the Author” in its play on authorship and 
identity. Despite Dorward’s analogy, it would be reductive to suggest that the 
conflicting voices and narratives of Halsey’s appropriative poem disable or deny 
authorial subjectivity completely. Contemporary criticism is still developing a 
suitable conceptual schema for aligning formally complex works such as The Text 
with traditional ideas of lyricism and authorial expression, and Dorward’s 
comparison with Barthes is helpful in differentiating Halsey’s appropriation from 
that of Joyce for whom appropriation can be a means of expression. Halsey’s poem 
is replete with voices and names, not just of people but also of boats and places, and 
 145 
 
yet the poem regularly insists on the first person singular. The word “I” appears 
seven times in the eleven lines of page sixteen and reflects five unique voices; 
without tracing each phrase, a reader might interpret the various sentences as spoken 
by one voice. The sheer number of times the word “I” appears on this page has the 
paradoxical effect of undermining the singularity and authenticity of the word. The 
Text is, as the poem states, a “confused ... mass, interlined [interworded] and broken 
into fragments” with each fragment derived from a different source (12). Each 
statement and text contradicts the next, and this undermines the possibility of 
deriving anything verifiably true about Shelley’s drowning from the poem. It is 
because of, rather than in spite of, this multiplicity of narratives and voices that The 
Text achieves such an insightful investigation of individual selfhood and subjectivity.   
 The concept of the individual speaker manifested on page sixteen becomes 
problematic when contrasted with the shifting names and identities on the following 
page. Byron’s boat is named Guiccioli after his Italian mistress, and Shelley’s boat is  
 
Fig. 2. From Alan Halsey’s The Text of Shelley’s Death, 17. 
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initially named Don Juan, and later renamed Ariel from Shakespeare’s The Tempest. 
From the oppositional accounts of the naming of Shelley’s boat on page seventeen, 
Halsey records the anxious wait for the boat to arrive, and then the wait for the 
“threatning weather” to pass so that Shelley can put to sea (17). The first person 
singular of the previous page is deconstituted by Halsey’s practice of appropriation 
through which names and identities are variously doubled and divided. Here, 
Guiccioli is both Byron’s mistress and his boat, Don Juan is Byron’s poem and 
Shelley’s boat, which is also known as Ariel, while Shelley himself is also “S.” The 
“threatning weather” which delays the poet sailing is also doubled in that it precedes 
the storm which wrecks the boat only two months later in July.  
 This problematizing of individual subjectivity is not just a matter for the 
author. It also extends to Shelley. Writing a book entitled The Text of Shelley’s 
Death suggests a commitment to discovering and relating actual events, and yet the 
acknowledgement of sources and their contradictions in this text distracts from the 
story of Shelley’s drowning. In reading the many variations, deletions, and revisions 
of the story of Shelley’s death included here, a reader loses sight of the purported 
point and purpose of the book—to learn how and why Shelley drowned in the Gulf 
of La Spezia. By pursuing this trajectory, which is at once the most faithful and least 
direct account of Shelley’s death, Halsey establishes an instability in the poem more 
radical than mere contradiction. The instability of the narratives passed down gives 
way to a deeper problematic regarding the difficulty of discovering the poet among 
the combination of voices, stories, reports, letters, and memories that make up the 
poem. In a poem promising an authoritative account of Shelley’s death at sea, the 
poet himself is missing. Shelley is lost in the crowd of witnesses, relatives, and 
friends that comprise the text, drowning in, or at least drowned out by the diffusion 
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and diffraction of different stories. This effect is compounded by the desire on the 
part of the reader to glean something tangible about the poet and his death from The 
Text. From the opening statement, “Everybody knows the text of Shelley’s death,” 
which is at once a challenge and a paradox, the poem appropriates the literature and, 
in the process, loses the poet among the plethora of letters, biographies, and analyses 
that deal with his death. With Shelley lost among the noise of the crowd, The Text 
comes to articulate the dissociation between a poet’s work and the processes of 
canon formation that lionize some poets and marginalize others.  
 Jeffrey C. Robinson also recognizes the “dis-figuring, the fragmentation, 
and the dismemberment” that I have identified in The Text, but he interprets it quite 
differently (642). In his 2012 essay, Robinson interprets Halsey’s appropriative 
practice as a “way to finding Shelley.” Halsey’s “characterization” of Shelley 
“picked from the shards of his language and the surrounding narratives belongs to a 
quotidian, erotic, often self-absorbed world,” Robinson says, “but also one drenched 
in sounds, rhythms, and figuration.” To read The Text’s materiality as uncovering 
Shelley for contemporary audiences, even a Shelley of “radical transformations,” 
undermines the rupturing of linguistic referentiality and linear narrative that 
characterize the poem (643). According to Robinson, “The text of Shelley’s death 
absorbs and transforms the poet-as-ego into a much larger and more poetic version 
of self, linked to mythological figures of his own referencing (like Prometheus or 
Mercury) and to poetic language.” Reading Halsey’s fragmentary, diffracted 
representation of Shelley as reconstituting a whole by recovering for modern 
audiences a Shelley suitable for the times ignores the conceptual development 
fostered by Halsey’s negotiation of the first person singular through his appropriative 
practice. Robinson’s and Dorward’s readings are not the only responses to The Text, 
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and by turning back to the poet we gain a more explicit account of the poem’s 
workings.  
 Halsey offers an alternative interpretation of the “dis-figuring, the 
fragmentation, and the dismemberment” of Shelley in The Text in an email 
discussion of the poem from 2013 (Robinson 642).
3
 Reflecting on the writing of The 
Text, Halsey explains his opening sentence, “Everybody knows the text of Shelley’s 
death,” by saying that “the stress can be put on any of the words, but whichever way 
you say it it’s untrue” (21 Aug. 2013). The treacherousness of the sentence is not 
solely a result of the fact that readers may not actually know the story of Shelley’s 
drowning, but also reflects the fact that there are only texts of Shelley’s death in the 
plural, and no definitive text, and because “death is of all things the most profoundly 
non-textual.” Halsey’s Text investigates the relation between the textual and the non-
textual in a manner which explains his admission in reintroducing the poem in 
“Reversions” as “The text of Shelley’s death, in so far as there is a text of Shelley’s / 
death” (61). Setting Halsey’s description of Shelley’s death as “profoundly non-
textual” alongside the progressive effacement of the poet by the appropriation of 
texts, it becomes more difficult to accept the poet’s drowning at sea as the topic of 
Halsey’s poem. But if Shelley’s drowning is not the sole or dominant subject of The 
Text, then what is the poem about? Halsey presents one response to this question in 
the email from August 2013, in which he suggests reading The Text as “a matter of 
narrative, how narratives are made, or apparently develop of their own accord, and 
why this or that one is believed, or this or that text privileged.” In the opening pages 
of the poem, there is a paragraph which recalls the images of tradition of Eliot and 
Pound which began this chapter. By aligning this image with Halsey’s assertion of 
                                                 
3
 My thanks to Alan Halsey for permission to quote from these emails.  
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the importance of narratives, it is possible to propose a critical approach to The Text 
as a poem about literary tradition, and, furthermore, as presenting a poetic 
redefinition of the critical understanding of tradition. In order to develop this 
interpretation of Halsey’s poem, it will be helpful to study this paragraph and its 
consequences for reading and interpreting The Text.  
3.2 Tradition and The Text 
On page twelve of his poem, Halsey appropriates a series of texts which, taken 
together, present an image not just of the appropriative nature of the poem, but also 
of Halsey’s redefinition of tradition in The Text. In a paragraph listing the books 
recovered on Shelley’s body, Halsey appropriates words and phrases towards an 
account of tradition as a uniquely textual phenomenon. The paragraph begins with 
Trelawny’s Recollections, and continues with lines from Mary Shelley’s “Notes” to 
Shelley’s poetry published after his death: 
 
Fig. 3. From Alan Halsey’s The Text of Shelley’s Death, 12. 
The first two lines derive from Trelawny’s account of coming upon Shelley in a 
forest where he used to read, and of opening his edition of Sophocles’s plays rather 
than disturbing the poet. Halsey pokes fun at Trelawny’s notorious inconsistency in 
his account of Shelley’s life and death, including the “edition of Aeschylus” which 
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Trelawny exchanges for Sophocles in later retellings, along with “Faust and a 
volume of Shakespeare’s plays.” From here, Halsey turns to Mary Shelley’s account 
of the woeful condition of the poet’s manuscripts in her “Notes to P.B. Shelley’s 
1839 Poetical Works.” Reflecting on the paucity of her sources, the author states that 
had anyone seen the volume she was working from, “the wonder would be how any 
eyes or patience were capable of extracting it from so confused a mass, interlined 
and broken into fragments” (290). Of the following phrases, the first, beginning 
“words one upon the other” derives from Trelawny’s Recollections, the second, “the 
torn leaf of a book,” comes from Shelley’s note to Jane Williams accompanying a 
poem entitled “Remembrance,” and the third is lifted from another of Shelley’s 
poems  to Williams, entitled “To Jane: The Recollection.” Beginning from the 
middle of this extract, Halsey’s image of tradition in these lines is of “so confused a 
mass, interlined [interworded] and broken into fragments–words one upon the other, 
over and over in tiers all run together–the torn leaf of a book out of date–overgrown 
blots” (12). Here, Halsey generates his own image for the critique of tradition which 
emerges through the poem. I interpret these lines as Halsey offering a visual 
accompaniment for his reformulation of tradition; however, contemporary criticism 
of innovative British poetry does not share his views on tradition. By comparing 
Halsey’s poem with the prevailing attitudes to tradition in contemporary criticism we 
gain a clearer sense of Halsey’s innovations in The Text and of his divergence from 
the dominant ideas and beliefs in innovative British poetry and criticism.   
 Halsey’s appropriative practice deconstitutes Shelley, rejecting the 
possibility of wholeness that is promulgated by biographies and literary criticism of 
the poet and his work. By denying the possibility of recovering a complete picture of 
the poet, Halsey’s poem also denies literary tradition’s ability to reconstruct and 
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retain a complete or even an adequate image of the poet. There are a number of 
anthologies and critical studies on contemporary British poetry that are useful in 
distinguishing Halsey’s interest in tradition in The Text from the critical 
problematizing of mainstream literary tradition.  
 
Ric Caddel and Peter Quartermain’s introduction to their 1999 anthology Other: 
British and Irish Poetry since 1970 serves as evidence of the critical proclivity to 
distinguish linguistically innovative poetry from literary tradition on the basis that 
tradition is necessarily affiliated with the perceived mainstream. Caddel and 
Quartermain are clear that tradition is primarily a restrictive term for Halsey’s peers 
whose work appears in the book, poets such as Tom Raworth, cris cheek, Bob 
Cobbing, and Grace Nichols. According to Caddel and Quartermain, the vocabulary 
of “tradition”  “prizes terms like ‘unified’ and ‘centred’” they say, “for in proposing 
their contraries—edges, margins, fragments—such terms trivialize and thus silence 
dissent” (xxi). Tradition is an “instrument of power,” the editors argue, an instrument 
which “sanctions agreed habits of syntax, rhythms, and sequences of thought, 
intonation, figurative language, and range of diction” (xx). By enforcing these 
“sanctions,” tradition becomes a “normative” power which “reinforces notions of 
intelligibility.” For Caddel and Quartermain, the normative power of tradition 
enables “the intellectual legitimation of political rule, of the hegemony, whose very 
existence resides in and relies upon its moral and cultural legitimation by tradition” 
(xi). The publication of any collection of poetry requires that the editors to take a 
poetic, and often a political stance on the function of their anthology and the value of 
the poetry presented. Caddel and Quartermain are attentive in framing Other as an 
anthology of poetry which distinguishes itself from the work of the “well-established 
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mainstream,” and yet the editors are conscious of the limitations of this oppositional 
stance, hence their invocation of literary history in the title of their introduction, “A 
Fair Field Full of Folk.” The title is drawn from Piers Plowman and counteracts the 
oppositional tone of the introduction by suggesting that the anthology is intended to 
present a more complete account of the “field” of contemporary British poetry. The 
editors’ commitment to representing the broader community of British and Irish 
poets is reflected in their inclusion of Halsey who maintains quite a different attitude 
towards tradition. In his 1983 essay “On Poetic,” Halsey argues that “The demand 
for ‘political’ or ‘committed’ poetry is [a] betrayal of [the] poetic as [a] mode, as a 
distinct kind of thought,” and yet, he says, “it is true that [the] poetic can not fail to 
be political” (n. pag.). The difference between Halsey’s position and the editors of 
Other is that Halsey is willing to consider tradition as itself a suitable topic for 
poetry, while Caddel and Quartermain are not. In this essay, Halsey designates 
poetry as fostering a “distinct mode of thought,” and, simultaneously, for that poem 
to be deeply invested in the political (n. pag.). Halsey’s proposition contributes to a 
reading of his poetry but before engaging with his ideas and testing their relevance to 
The Text it is worth extending the critical comparison between his poem and his 
orientation to tradition. 
 Jacques Derrida has much to say on the opposition of margins and centre in 
philosophy and criticism. Despite Halsey’s unwillingness to be associated with 
literary theory, Derrida’s analysis is useful in explaining the conflicting accounts of 
tradition in British poetry and criticism.
4
 Just as Joyce and Smith did not accede to 
categorizations of New Writers’ Press as alternative because doing so would “accede 
                                                 
4
  In his interview with St. Thomasino, Halsey separates himself from the influence of European 
literary criticism, saying, “I could certainly name some English poets whose work seems riddled with 
theory but it’s not true of any of those I’ve been closely associated with or have published at West 
House” (n. pag.). 
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to the claims made by the ‘mainstream’ for its own centrality,” Derrida too rejects 
the opposition of centre and margin as unnecessarily maintaining a restrictive binary 
(Joyce “Point of Innovation” 47). For Derrida, the free play of signification means 
that “each mark [of signification] is constituted by its contexts and its limit” 
(Siemerling 586). In texts such as The Margins of Philosophy and The Truth in 
Painting, Derrida demonstrates how the “mark” is “mediated by a continual process 
of contextual ‘re-marking’ that undoes the oppositions in which it is–necessarily–
first approached,” oppositions such as margins and centre. Halsey’s appropriation of 
tradition as a theme in The Text runs against the prevailing rhetoric of tradition in 
British poetry criticism, and his engagement with tradition challenges the 
oppositional approach that this criticism supports. In effect, Caddel and 
Quartermain’s rejection of tradition as a mainstream concept distinguishes Halsey’s 
innovation in incorporating the theme of tradition with formally complex practices 
and an avant-garde poetics. Andrew Duncan offers a more critical account of the 
problem of tradition in innovative British poetry, and his criticism is helpful for 
understanding Halsey’s reformulation of tradition. 
 Duncan’s 2003 study, The Failure of Conservatism in Modern British 
Poetry, offers another perspective on the role of tradition in innovative poetry, 
although here the perspective is expressly negative. Duncan defines the dominant 
literary tradition of contemporary Britain as a “vast and expensive machinery of 
cultural conservation” (2). Now that the majority of poets and “most of our leading 
cultural figures” have become “employees” working in the industry of “Ruins 
Management,” he says, it is less and less likely that the mainstream can produce any 
poetry that might carry contemporary writing beyond these old tomes. The work of 
“cultural conservation” is all-consuming, and in any case, “nothing is being added to 
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the ruins.” Duncan describes literary history as haunting the present so that 
contemporary poets are merely “conservators,” “servants, solemnly reciting the 
words of the dead.” There is a distinction to be made between literary history and 
tradition, but Duncan does not untangle the two here. Instead, modernity becomes a 
“vague and overblown term” aligning history and tradition, “a terrifying ghost, 
whose name we give to the wreckage which has engulfed so many cultural projects, 
or to the failure of 20
th
 C [sic] British poetry.” According to Duncan, contemporary 
poetry is plagued by the memory of literary history in which tradition is the 
organizing device consolidating a concatenation of ideal texts. If Halsey 
demonstrates quite a different engagement with poetry in his writing, he still retains 
the imagery of ruins that Duncan is so enamoured with in his essay. I will return to 
the imagery of ruins later, but for now it will be helpful to say a little more about 
Halsey’s textual approach to tradition as it emerges in The Text.  
 The textuality of Halsey’s appropriative poem receives close attention in the 
few reviews it has received, and these reviews indicate Halsey’s difference from the 
prevailing poetic approach to textuality and its contribution to his reformulation of 
tradition. Robinson and Dorward both identify the variorum as a formal model for 
The Text, as does Halsey himself in his “Mythopoeic Retrospective” on the poem 
(153). A variorum is a scholarly form which takes an empirical approach to a work 
of literature by attending to the breadth of scholarship surrounding the work and 
variations in the critical analyses of different ages. The form gained popularity with 
Dutch publishers in the seventeenth century who sought “interpretive 
comprehensiveness” by focusing on the critical and annotative history of a text 
(Gondris 126). The variorum reached the height of its popularity with editors of the 
eighteenth century which Júlia Paraizs describes as “the peak of the received text 
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tradition” (128). Halsey’s poem supports the variorum comparison on a conceptual 
level, mirroring the aggregation of versions towards the consolidation of one 
authoritative manuscript of Shelley’s death. The clamour of descriptions, 
perceptions, and assertions of Shelley’s character, his life and death, that constitute 
this poem exist at a remove from the poet himself. While the translation of the 
Latinate “variorum” as “of various persons” might be a fitting account of the 
appropriative form of Halsey’s poem, the form reveals a central and motivating 
contradiction within the text (“Variorum”). This scholarly form gathers all of the 
known variants of a text so as to demonstrate the textual decisions and emendations 
influencing editions and reissues of the text. The literary history reflected in Halsey’s 
poem, meanwhile, creates an effigy that has little direct relation to Shelley the man, 
and this infers that readers will have to look elsewhere for the subject of The Text. 
 Taking tradition and textuality rather than Shelley as the subject of Halsey’s 
poem provides new parameters for his appropriations, and for the declarative force 
of this practice. Reuben Sanchez describes the body of criticism gathered in a 
variorum as a reflection of “the critical and cultural period in which the annotator 
lives and works” (3). In Halsey’s poem, it is the textuality of the work that reflects 
the “critical and cultural period” of the poet wherein appropriative practices are de 
rigeur again. The textuality that Halsey draws attention to through his poem has not 
always enjoyed an easy relationship with collage practices, despite the fact that, from 
a contemporary perspective, the two seem conceptually well suited. Elza Adamowicz 
notes the Surrealist difficulty with verbal collage in her 1998 book, Surrealist 
Collage in Text and Image. In Surrealist art the breaks, disjunctions, and clashes of 
appropriated materials which are constitutive of collage, are glaringly apparent, 
Adamowicz notes, but when it comes to literature these effects are muted because of 
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the “invisibility of some verbal collages” (15). Henri Behar rejects verbal collage on 
account of this invisibility, saying that collage is “condemned, in the area of literary 
collage, to a perpetual blindness, whereas in the plastic arts it appears as such by a 
set of formal indices” (15-6).
5
 Michel Décaudin makes the problem of literary 
collage more clear when he states that “in the literary domain ... the glued elements 
do not rupture; they are most often words and phrases pasted in the middle of other 
words and phrases; the thread of the discourse will be more or less disturbed, but the 
principles of reading are not changed” (16). Surrealist collage calls into question the 
very possibility of Halsey’s appropriative practices, and yet contemporary 
interpretations of collage are more expansive in the parameters they provide to 
Halsey’s textuality and his redefinition of tradition.  
 In an essay celebrating Guy Davenport’s innovations and insightfulness in 
modernist criticism, Quartermain offers a definition of collage which extends the 
Surrealist delimitation of the practice in literature. This development reflects the 
endurance and development of collage practices after the 1920s and ‘30s and extends 
the critical and aesthetic remit of Halsey’s Text in a way which enables critical 
analysis of his reformulation of tradition. Reflecting on Davenport’s resistance to 
“completeness,” both in life and in art, Quartermain warns that “no order of the 
universe can finally be seen order it [sic], and we must keep our options open” (79). 
Practices of textual appropriation and assemblage are ideally suited to retaining this 
openness, Quartermain says: 
The logical mode for the expression of such ideas, the form, is 
collage, for collage resists finality, resists categories and the notion of 
completeness; it resists ... any theory that does not keep open the 
                                                 
5
 The translations of Behar and Décaudin from French to English are both my own.  
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possibilities of meaning, and always keeps a firm eye on the world of 
perception before it heeds the erring brain. (79)    
While Davenport’s belief in “resist[ing] finality,” “categories,” and the “notion of 
completeness” are echoed in Halsey’s collage practices, this affirmation of openness 
also undermines the status of tradition which relies for its authority on a closed order 
of elite texts. Halsey diverges from the critics of British poetry because his belief in 
poetry’s “distinct kind of thought” means that it can offer a new perspective on and 
understanding of tradition in literature. For him, tradition is not just a possible but a 
necessary topic for poetry. Halsey’s appropriation of tradition in The Text, a concept 
usually reserved for literary critics, also works the other way, bringing his poetry 
within the domain of literary criticism. Graham Allen’s 2009 essay on Mary Shelley 
reads Halsey’s Text as articulating a critical position, and by studying Allen’s 
reference, the innovation of The Text becomes more explicit.  
“The Text’s” Intervention in Critical Tradition 
Allen’s 2009 essay challenges an enduring critical misconception regarding Mary 
Shelley which infers that her writing life ended with her husband’s death in 1822. In 
this way, Allen’s essay is itself an engagement with tradition, and the contemporary 
memory and inheritance of Shelley and her writing. Rather than resisting the 
“biographism” that has influenced readings of Shelley’s literature, Allen proposes 
that critics use her biography and all the “letters, notes, [and] journals” not as “data” 
but as “texts” (70). By taking this approach to Shelley’s letters and journals, these 
texts “begin ... to present us with a host of connections with her novels and other 
published works,” Allen says,” “connections which demonstrate a remarkable, 
complex and multiple ‘voice.’” Allen begins this task of re-reading with the author’s 
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September 1822 letter to Maria Gisborne and the various deductions critics have 
derived from this text.  
In the process of re-reading, Allen cites Richard Holmes’s depiction of P.B. 
Shelley in his biography on the poet as an example of the more extreme negative 
consequences of conventional biographism. Allen quotes Holmes saying that 
“Shelley’s death is ‘one of the most powerful of all Romantic legends. And also one 
of the most misleading’” (75). The problem for Allen regards Holmes’s suggestion 
that P.B. Shelley’s drowning is “the origin of the misunderstanding, confusion, [and] 
strangeness” of his biography. Allen takes issue with the assertion that Shelley’s 
death “‘transformed his life almost beyond recovery’” (75), which he says 
perpetuates Matthew Arnold’s representation of the poet as a “beautiful and 
ineffectual angel” (Arnold 380). Allen’s criticism regards the term “recovery” and 
the critical suggestion of reviving P.B. Shelley from the plethora of descriptions, 
accounts, and biographies which have been published since his death (75). The 
problem with the term “recovery” is that it implies the “successful separation of 
textual information into the opposed categories of fiction and fact,” and thus, a 
particular hierarchy of scholars and critics capable of making the necessary 
distinctions. For Allen, the “recovery” of Shelley would require a “re-establishment 
of temporal order and the successful explanation (biographically, historically, 
culturally, psychoanalytically) of phantasmal effects such as déjà vu, doppelgangers, 
proleptic visions, proleptic texts, [and] the return.” No rational explanation has been 
offered for Jane Williams’s vision of Shelley disappearing off the terrace of the 
house in Viareggio on page twenty-four of The Text, or for Shelley’s meeting his 
double who ominously asks “siete soddisfatto?” [“How long do you mean to be 
content?”] (25). No such recovery is possible, it seems, and so critics such as 
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Robinson and Holmes must acknowledge that the poet’s death has indeed 
“transform[ed] his life … beyond recovery” (75). Without a “successful explanation 
… of [these] phantasmal effects,” Allen says, any “recovery” of the poet is illusory. 
The failure of chronological certainty and rational explanation also shapes Halsey’s 
critique of literary tradition in The Text, though in quite a different way to Allen’s 
argument. The critic’s appropriation of Halsey’s poem here serves as evidence of 
The Text breaching the boundaries between poetry and criticism, and the declarative 
force of his appropriations as interrogating the narratives that shape literary tradition.   
 Allen disagrees with Holmes’s “sense of chronology” which makes Shelley’s 
death “the origin of [the] misunderstanding, confusion, [and] strangeness” that 
shadows the poet in literary tradition (75). Holmes’s attempt to “straighten out or 
‘recover’” Shelley’s life and work into a chronological narrative “sever[s] historical 
work, biographical or critical, from its own foundation (its origin) in writing” (80). 
In the course of his essay, Allen also questions Halsey’s assertions and ideas in The 
Text, “despite the beautiful way in which ... [he] has formed the ‘texts’ ... in a strange 
non- or a-fictional poem” (75). The problem regards Halsey’s assertion that after 
Shelley’s drowning, “in Mary’s mind / The idealization of Shelley begins almost at 
once” (63). The invocation of Halsey here demonstrates that The Text can be and is 
read as declarative, presenting critical arguments and statements which situates it as 
a contemporary addition to the history of criticism that surrounds Shelley and his 
poetry, and thus as a part of literary history. To challenge this reading of Halsey’s 
text by suggesting that it transcends the complex of history and myth that surrounds 
Shelley would require a model of criticism that positions itself at a remove from 
literary history. Halsey is unconcerned by the fact that his Text represents another 
addition to the long history of Shelley literature which derives from and contributes 
 160 
 
to the myth surrounding the poet. Halsey distinguishes between mythology and 
tradition such that tradition is not simply a list of important texts but is rather a 
history of textuality. The poem does not depend on publication or readership, on 
myth as an overarching concern, or even on Shelley as a canonical poet for its 
integration into literary history. Rather, the inculcation of The Text into that tradition 
relies on the implicit and explicit textuality of the work itself. Allen’s invocation of 
Halsey’s poem demonstrates its propensity to intervene in Shelley scholarship, not 
just by taking up Shelley’s death again but also by using the appropriated material to 
interrogate the chronology of texts that constitutes this scholarly tradition. In order to 
understand the innovations of Halsey’s poem and his reformulation of tradition, it is 
necessary to consider the definition of tradition that he is writing against. If Halsey’s 
poem challenges conventional conceptions of tradition, then how did this conception 
of tradition develop, and where did it come from? To answer these questions, we will 
return to T.S. Eliot whose prose essays are formative of twentieth-century 
understandings of literary tradition.  
3.3 Halsey’s Challenge to Literary Tradition 
Inheriting T.S. Eliot’s “Tradition”  
In the preface to The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism (1964), Eliot 
complained about the degree of critical attention that his early essay on tradition 
received. Just as “objective correlative” and “dissociation of sensibility” have 
become catchphrases for contemporary critics of his work, Eliot says, it is equally 
inevitable that “every anthologist wishing to include a sample of [his] essays will 
choose “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (n. pag.). The problem is compounded 
for Eliot by the fact that he considers this essay to be “the most juvenile” of his 
publications, “and certainly the first to appear in print” (9). The essays collected in 
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the 1964 volume are intended to provide alternatives for anthologists of the future to 
consider when selecting from Eliot’s prose. The implication is that the text is over-
read, over-anthologized, and thus precisely a part of that process of historicizing and 
tradition that preoccupy the essay. In this sense, Eliot’s essay exemplifies the very 
material and concrete processes by which literary tradition is established and 
disseminated, which remains a motivating factor in this analysis of Halsey’s poetry. 
Eliot’s instruction for a broader consideration of his critical work haunts each 
ensuing scholarly assessment of the essay. That said, Eliot’s denigration of the essay 
has done little to dissuade critics from reading it as the pre-eminent statement on 
tradition in modernist poetry.  
 Eliot’s essay was first published in the Egoist in September 1919 and 
appeared again in the Selected Essays towards the end of his life. The original 
publication date of the essay is changed, “perhaps inadvertently,” in Eliot’s Selected 
from 1919 to 1917, a change that Lawrence Rainey says presents the essay as “the 
gateway to his [Eliot’s] entire oeuvre” (Modernism 152). Eliot’s essay is divided into 
three parts, with the first section defining tradition and presenting it as the measure 
of an artwork, and containing the majority of the essay’s critically acclaimed phrases 
and statements. Criticism might be “as inevitable as breathing” for Eliot; however, 
contemporary literary critics still seem to be making serious errors in their analysis 
of texts (Eliot “Tradition” 152). When responding to a work, Eliot says, the tendency 
is to “insist, when we praise a poet, upon those aspects of his work in which he least 
resembles anyone else.” By approaching a poet “without this prejudice, we shall 
often find that not only the best, but the most individual parts of his work may be 
those in which the dead poets ... assert their immortality most vigorously.” Taking 
the relationship between poets and poems as his topic, Eliot is alert to the long 
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history of literature and the necessity of “great labour” to engage with literary 
tradition. Developing this “historical sense” requires a perception “not only of the 
pastness of the past, but of its presence.” Once acquired, this perception can:  
[C]ompel[ ] a man to write not merely with his own generation in his 
bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe 
from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own 
country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous 
order. (152-53) 
For Eliot, then, “it is the “sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the 
timeless and of the temporal together” that “makes a writer traditional” (153). Once 
he has established that poets and their work must be compared to be properly 
understood, Eliot spends the remainder of the first section of his essay explaining the 
process by which tradition develops and an artwork enters into that lineage.  
 In order for a poem to become part of tradition, it must present a disruption to 
the standing order of that tradition. “The existing monuments form an ideal order 
among themselves,” Eliot says, and this is “modified by the introduction of the new 
(the really new) work of art among them” (153).
6
 Each text that is produced impacts 
those that have gone before and, as far as Eliot’s essay is concerned, “Whoever has 
approved this idea of order, of the form of European, of English literature will not 
find it preposterous that the past should be altered by the present as much as the 
present is directed by the past.” In addressing the process of tradition and the 
interrelations between past and present, the poet remarks that art cannot get better or 
worse from era to era, but “the material of art is never quite the same” (153). Eliot 
closes this first section by articulating the importance of “depersonalization” as a 
                                                 
6
 Hereafter, each full quotation and excerption from this line of Eliot’s essay, “The existing 
monuments form an ideal order among themselves,” is drawn from the same source, page 153 of 
“Tradition and the Individual Talent.”   
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necessary characteristic of any artwork that would join the “ideal order” of “existing 
monuments” (154).   
 With the conclusion of the first section, the conversation moves from the 
definition of tradition to the question of individual talent. The second section begins 
with a chemical analogy which Eliot uses to describe the ideal process of poetic 
composition. Having defined tradition and outlined the accretion of poetic works, 
Eliot now turns his attention to the development of the poem which here is presented 
as a wholly organic phenomenon, and which therefore challenges Halsey’s 
appropriative practices that explicitly undermine such organicism. The goal of the 
analogy is to demonstrate the neoclassical organicism of the seventeen-hundreds 
discussed in the first chapter is carried through modernist aesthetics such that “the 
more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man who 
suffers and the mind which creates” (154). Taking Canto XV of Dante’s Inferno as 
his example, Eliot directs attention to the final quatrain of the Canto as realising this 
poetic ideal. In this last verse of Dante’s Canto after Bruno Latini, the poet presents 
“an image” which achieves this separation of man and poet. This is an image or “a 
feeling attaching to an image, which ‘came’, which did not develop simply out of 
what precedes, but which was probably in suspension in the poet’s mind until the 
proper combination arrived for it to add itself to” (155). For Eliot, Dante’s final 
quatrain is evidence that “The business of the poet is not to find new emotions, but to 
use the ordinary ones” in poetry to “express feelings which are not in actual 
emotions at all” (156). Rather than presenting the feelings or experience of the poet, 
the poem should be “a new thing” resulting from the “concentration” “of a very great 
number of experiences.” The individual talent of the title refers to the poet’s ability 
to write poems not as a “turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion ... not 
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an expression of personality, but an escape from personality.” With sections one and 
two affirming the centrality of tradition and the abnegation of personality as 
motivating forces for contemporary poetry, the shorter third section constitutes a 
statement on the essential concurrence of past and present in the poem.  
 In order for a poet to achieve the state of impersonality required by a great 
work, the poet must surrender her- or himself fully to the work “to be done” (156). 
Knowing what needs to be done means living in “what is not merely the present, but 
the present moment of the past,” Eliot says, of being conscious “not of what is dead, 
but of what is already living.” This sense of simultaneity or continuity between past 
and present reflects the neoclassical imperative within modernism which became a 
distinguishing feature not just of Eliot’s poetry and prose but also of the literature 
and criticism of the twentieth century. Before moving on to address the 
consequences of Eliot’s essay, it is worth considering his style in this essay and the 
consequences for his argument about tradition in poetry and criticism.  
 Many critics have commented on the evasiveness and ambiguity riddling 
Eliot’s essay and the implications for the particular model of tradition it presents. In 
the following sentence from the first section of the essay, Eliot’s combination of 
authoritative statement and conceptual blurring becomes clear: “The historical sense, 
which is a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and of 
the temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional” (153). Here, Eliot presents 
a definition of “historical sense” which invokes the binary opposites of “timeless” 
and “temporal” and conflates them in their difference as a unitary “sense” that 
distinguishes the responsible artist. In this programmatic statement from the essay, 
Eliot appropriates the “timeless” and the “temporal” as distinct ontological concepts 
and then erodes the conceptual difference between the two by aligning them as the 
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definition of “what makes a writer traditional.” This blurring of critical boundaries 
has less to do with the advancement of conceptual thought and more with the 
exploitation, at the conceptual level, of the empirical framework of critical thought.  
 Jean Paul Riquelme recognizes this issue in his reading of Eliot’s essay in 
Harmony of Dissonances published in 1991. Focusing attention on the final section 
of the essay, Riquelme takes the following line as an example of this problematic:  
He [the artist] is not likely to know what is to be done unless he lives 
in what is not merely the present, but the present moment of the past, 
unless he is conscious, not of what is dead, but of what is already 
living. (10) 
According to Riquelme, the sentence’s “obvious repetitions and contrasts create an 
effect that is harmonious but dissonant” (30). In lines revealing the source of his title, 
Riquelme explains how Eliot achieves a prosody that is “harmonious because of the 
sense of patterning that conveys an impression of logically coherent, concordant 
relations, [and] dissonant because the patterning includes elements that are not fully 
compatible with one another.” The combination of didactic pronouncements and 
rhetorical ambiguity creates problems for the critical assessment of Eliot’s model of 
tradition because “Despite the impression of concord and formal coherence among 
the sentence’s parts [and thus among Eliot’s pronouncements], they are permanently 
at variance.” This same effect leads Stanley Edgar Hyman to assert that “it is 
impossible to read Eliot’s criticism for very long without beginning to feel that he is 
making statements in a language in which it is impossible to discuss the matter with 
him” (58). In a stern criticism of the poet, Hyman describes the “doctrine of tradition 
in Eliot’s criticism  ... [as] primarily a weapon for achieving ... [that] unattractive 
society” of Eliot’s “‘corporative state’” in which fascism is only “‘the extreme 
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degradation of democracy’” (72). With Eliot’s essay and prose-style provoking such 
virulent attacks, it is important to consider the reasons for these criticisms and the 
implications for contemporary readers.  
 Eliot introduces his topic by demonstrating that the term “tradition” appears 
infrequently either as word or concept in English writing, “save when lamenting its 
absence” in contemporary literature (152). Here already, a significant problem arises 
for contemporary critics. According to Max Saunders, the twentieth-century 
institutionalization of literary criticism is such that “Certainly now one can refer both 
to ‘the tradition’ and to ‘a tradition’” (185). Along with this radical shift in the 
literary and critical environment, other changes have also taken place. Tradition has 
lost much of the positive meaning that Eliot acknowledged in his analysis of the term 
and it is generally used as a negative adjective or “phrase of censure” for 
contemporary critics. (Eliot “Tradition” 152). Tradition may have been granted 
particular canonical value or values in the decades since Eliot’s essay but this has 
been accompanied by an almost complete break with Eliot’s “approbative” sense of 
the term. It is revealing that this restriction in meaning should be the outcome of 
nearly a century’s worth of intensified literary study, during which time Eliot’s 
restitution of tradition to a position of literary and critical importance was a, if not 
the, dominant influence. Halsey’s Text does not attempt to recover the “approbative” 
meaning of tradition by echoing the condemnation of contemporary critics of 
innovative British poetry. Instead, his poem challenges the authority of the “existing 
monuments” which form “an ideal order among themselves,” and Halsey’s critique 
is not limited to the literary definition of tradition. By aligning Halsey’s interrogation 
of the dominant narratives of tradition with John Guillory’s account of the processes 
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of institutionalization which have delimited literary studies in the twentieth century, 
it is possible to trace the broader social and political resonances of The Text. 
Literary History and “Cultural Capital” 
John Guillory’s 1993 publication, Cultural Capital, provides a revealing delineation 
of the processes of institutionalization that established Eliot’s as the defining model 
of tradition for twentieth-century criticism. Guillory takes his cues from Pierre 
Bourdieu’s formulation of cultural capital developed in The Forms of Capital (1986) 
and applied to higher education in The State Nobility (1996). In Cultural Capital, 
Guillory presents an ideological critique of the processes of canon construction 
which set the barbed criticisms of Eliot in relief. Guillory’s recognition of the dense 
complex of socioeconomic and political imperatives implies that Eliot’s dominance 
of twentieth-century literary criticism is more complicated than it might first appear. 
Guillory’s text provides a perspective on tradition that is not available either in 
Eliot’s work or in the criticism that surrounds him. In a chapter entitled “Ideology 
and Canonical Form: The New Critical Canon,” Guillory addresses the New Critical 
appropriation of Eliot’s ideas and the propagation of that aesthetic in classrooms 
across the US since the end of the Second World War. Asserting “interpretation” 
over judgement as the ideal critical strategy, the New Critics were more interested in 
distinctions between literature and mass culture than they were in evaluative 
judgements of individual authors (141). In this sense, the New Criticism “was at 
once unfaithful to Eliot’s specific revisionary judgements,” Guillory says, “and more 
deeply faithful to the principle of his judgement than Leavis ever was.” With the 
period after the war pre-empting a dramatic increase in university enrolment 
numbers and a newly diverse student body, the New Critics were granted the 
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opportunity to impose a radical revisioning of the nature of literary study and its 
status and function within the academy.  
 According to Guillory, Cleanth Brooks and the New Critics revise Eliot’s 
concept of ‘minor poetry’ to “find in the traditional canon of ‘major’ authors ... the 
reserve of orthodoxy” (140). The point of “institutional victory for the New 
Criticism is marked by a strategic reaffirmation of the traditional canon of major 
authors” Guillory explains. This reaffirmation constitutes a “reread[ing] according to 
a pedagogic strategy—‘close reading’—that  refinds in these authors what is well 
hidden there ... the same orthodoxy of opinion Eliot found only in the ‘minor’ 
tradition” (141). Following Eliot’s assertion that literature should be “unconsciously, 
rather than deliberately and defiantly, Christian,” the New Critics repositioned 
literature to occupy the position of orthodoxy in society (136). For Guillory, this 
revisioning of literary sensibility as a pre-given standard encourages readers to 
acknowledge the truth of the poem as transcending the dogma of orthodoxy to 
emulate the status of doxa. It is in this way, he says, that every poem was 
transformed into an “image of the very institutional space in which it is read, a 
perfect mirror in the imaginary of that space” (165-66). Despite the many successes 
of the New Critical programme, Guillory argues for the ultimate failure of Brooks’s 
either/or approach to literature and mass culture for the generation of post-war 
readers. The cultural capital available through canonical literature and university 
education should have been diffused by the radical opening up of the academy 
beyond the elite classes in the 1940s. Instead, there emerged a kind of “recusant 
literary culture, at once faithful to the quasi-sacred authority of literature but paying 
tribute at the same time to the secular authority of a derogated mass culture” (175). 
The New Critical paradigm performed a significant and powerful reformation of the 
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literary canon, and yet this bastion of High Culture continues to exist in a relation of 
parity to rather than dominance over mass or low culture.  
 Despite the New Critics’ failure to completely dominate the cultural realm, 
the literary canon and its proponents still control the dissemination of cultural capital 
via the academy. If there is “no way out of this game of culture” as Guillory 
concludes, then there still remains the possibility of “another kind of game, with less 
dire consequences for the losers” (340). An alternative “aesthetic game” would 
acknowledge “‘prestige’ or fame” as a symbolic representation of cultural capital 
freed from the academic “institutions of the materially advantaged” (339). This 
freedom is manifested as a “Socialising [of] the means of production and 
consumption” so that cultural capital is “disarticulat[ed]” and the university is 
divested of its role in the “the system of class formation, and thus … ‘distinction’ 
based on inequality of access to cultural goods” (339). The task of separating the 
university from the dissemination of cultural capital is a difficult one, and Guillory’s 
resolution to the inequitable distribution of cultural goods in society is not without its 
critics.   
 Guillory’s conclusion mirrors Bourdieu’s characteristic trope of the 
“thought experiment,” and yet, as Bill Readings points out in The University in 
Ruins, this formula is a somewhat lacklustre response to “rethinking” the academic 
control over culture (109, 112). Assessing the viability of Guillory’s “experiment,” 
Readings argues that “One can immediately observe that it begs the thorny 
institutional question of who will perform this reorganization, and how” (109). 
Readings charges Guillory’s “redistribution of cultural capital” with following 
“techno-bureaucratic culture in the moment when capitalism seeks to expand its 
consumer base” (110). Readings goes so far as to align Guillory’s resolution to 
 170 
 
Cultural Capital and the problem of literary canon formation with “the Thatcherite 
desire to bring all subjects within the fold of the ‘property-owning democracy.’” 
Guillory’s demystifying of literary history is criticized as a defence of the literary 
tradition which Readings describes as an “arbitrary archive” symptomatic of the 
modern “University of Excellence” (86). “Once the link between literary study and 
the formation of the model citizen has been broken,” Readings says, “knowledge 
tends to disappear, to be replaced as a goal by facility in the processing of 
information.” As far as Readings is concerned, the goal of any such break is to make 
literature “one field of knowledge among others.”  With the Humanities taking the 
brunt of the academy’s current economic difficulties, it seems safe to assume that the 
link between literature and the model citizen has lost ground. It does not follow that 
the canon has “come to function as the arbitrary delimitation of a field of 
knowledge” that has dispensed with tradition and literary history as Readings 
suggests. The arguments of Caddel, Quartermain, and Duncan serve as evidence that 
canon and tradition are still central to the study of literature, whether or not the critic 
agrees with them, and neither Guillory nor Readings offer any explanation of this 
fact. Before returning to Eliot to demonstrate Halsey’s development of existing 
definitions of tradition, it will be helpful to look again at the poem and Halsey’s 
declarative appropriative practice which engenders a uniquely textual engagement 
with tradition.  
3.4 The Text of Shelley’s Death, or, Tradition in Ruins 
In “Reversions on the Text,” Halsey cautions readers against reading The Text as a 
verifiable record of Shelley’s death because “the text of Shelley’s death / is an 
embodiment of contradiction” (61). The poem resists the monumentalizing force of 
tradition by insisting on the divergences that characterize Trelawny’s hypotexts and 
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the many other contributing texts and documents. The proclamation on page twenty-
five, “Now let us together solve the great mystery,” suggests a break or interjection 
in the “confused ... mass” of appropriated text, and proposes to resolve the mystery 
of Shelley’s death (12): 
 
Fig. 4. From Alan Halsey’s The Text of Shelley’s Death, 25. 
The statement actually derives from Shelley himself, who, arising from a deep 
reverie during a boat trip with Jane Williams and her children, suddenly exclaimed, 
“now let us together solve the great mystery,” leading Williams to believe that he 
intended to capsize the boat and drown her and her children (Trelawny Records 108). 
Reading the line as part of Halsey’s poem, one cannot help interpreting the 
proceeding lines as the beginnings of a traditional narrative of Shelley’s drowning. 
Lines such as “It was very dark. The sea looked as solid and smooth as a sheet of 
lead” conform to the inherited style of narrative introductions, not least because 
Trelawny’s style of biography and narrative has indeed shaped the narratives of 
Shelley’s life and death. The page proceeds with the same appropriative style that 
distinguishes the poem, moving from Trelawny’s narrative to Mary’s re-telling of 
Shelley’s nightmare about Edward and Jane Williams. The page concludes with an 
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unsourced account of Edward reading Shakespeare, and the final line, “He seems 
happy and content,” derives from one of Shelley’s letters to Claire Clairmont. The 
viability of the narrative form in recounting events is called into question again 
several pages later with the stated “wish to escape from the third person” (31). 
Following Halsey’s suggestion of reading his poem as a “matter of narrative,” The 
Text becomes a poetic interrogation of the narratives that constitute tradition (21 
Aug. 2013). Here, the aggregation of conflicting narratives demonstrate the 
instability of contemporary definitions of tradition. This instability is attested to 
several pages later with the following statement: 
It may be that Nature masks in life several copies. They seemed as 
they moved to blot the thoughts [var. the shadows of all forms] and 
the light imaginings. I have lived to be older than my father; I am 
ninety. (33) 
Here, the seeming authority of the natural dominates the possible alternatives, 
“blot[ting] the thoughts ... and the light imaginings” that might organize literary 
tradition differently. Literary history and tradition ensures that Shelley has indeed 
“lived to be older than [his] father,” and the wealth of literature and criticism 
surrounding the poet and his work has extended that life long past ninety. Literary 
tradition makes a monument of the poet, which belies the many conflicting accounts 
of his life and death and supports critical accounts of the poet as a “beautiful, and 
ineffectual angel” (Arnold 380). Halsey appropriates the textual history of Shelley’s 
death so as to demonstrate the unreliability of the critical tradition that has inspired 
generations of texts and arguments regarding the poet and his work. Having outlined 
Halsey’s break with conventional understandings of tradition in The Text, it is 
necessary now to address the consequences of this break, both for his own poetry 
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and for our understanding of tradition. To answer these questions, it is worth looking 
again at The Text and its development from the inherited model of tradition. To do 
so, I will return to the imagery of ruins referenced earlier, which illuminates 
Halsey’s negotiation with tradition in his poem and his development of, and 
divergence from, the Eliotic tradition.  
 Many critics have discussed the ambiguities and inconsistencies in Eliot’s 
essay, and the difficulty of clearly establishing Eliot’s understanding of tradition is 
compounded by close analysis of the terms of his argument. The OED definition of 
“monument” offers an alternative perspective on Eliot’s use of the term in “Tradition 
and the Individual Talent,” and its implications for his model of tradition. The OED 
definition begins as follows:  
1. A tomb, a sepulchre. Also fig. 
2. a. A statue, building, or other structure erected to commemorate 
a famous or notable person or event. 
b. An effigy; a carved figure, statue.   
3. a. A written document or record; (Law)  
Here, monument is shown to rely on an idea of the personal and the individual which 
is unusual for a poet so wary of poetic personality. Eliot’s use of the term instils a 
sense of tradition as enduring and permanent, hence the “existing monuments” of 
tradition, however according to the OED definition, these “existing monuments” are, 
at the same time, tombs or sepulchres for what is already dead. Paul de Man writes 
insightfully of the meaning and import of the monument in our understanding of 
literary tradition in his 1979 essay entitled “Shelley Disfigured.” Here, de Man 
compares the inculcation of an author or poet into the canon to “bury[ing] them in 
their own texts made into epitaphs and monumental graves” and, in effect, 
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“monumentaliz[ing]” the author into “historical or aesthetic objects” (121). This 
process of monumentalizing is neither positive nor negative, and is certainly not 
avoidable, for “monumentalization” “is the madness of words” (122). To understand 
monumentalization as a “source of value” “leads to a misreading” de Man says 
(123). Reading is itself a process of “disfiguration,” and recognizing this fact means 
relinquishing the desire to monumentalize the reading process. If the monument is an 
ambiguous figure for de Man, it gains positive force in Eliot’s essay on tradition. 
Eliot aims to delineate the authoritative lineage of texts that would join the “existing 
monuments” of literary tradition, but he does so with a curious abstraction between 
the texts constituting that tradition and the concept of the monument. This 
abstraction is manifested in the alignment of the “really new ... work,” which shapes 
that tradition, and the monument, which serves as a memorial to commemorate some 
“notable person or event” (“Monument”). This alignment empties out the text which 
Eliot imbues with permanence and focuses instead on the text as already dead. This 
abstraction might be read as yet another of Eliot’s contradictory statements were it 
not for the fact that the criticism of British poetry is replete with the imagery of 
monuments, ruins, and wreckage. This imagery also permeates contemporary British 
literary criticism and has particular relevance for Halsey’s invocation of tradition in 
The Text.  
 Perhaps the most direct statement on the centrality of ruins to English poetic 
tradition, and to contemporary poets, comes from Halsey himself in his 2010 
interview with St. Thomasino. Here, Halsey is challenged to distinguish between the 
work of British avant-garde poets and that of their American peers for whom literary 
theory has been such a pervasive influence. Halsey begins by acknowledging some 
“similarities and some cross-fertilisation in more recent work” by British and 
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American poets; however he is adamant about the profound and fundamental 
differences between the two groups (St. Thomasino n. pag.). Language poetry 
applies European theory to a “disruptive version of the Whitman-Williams quest for 
a poetic language grounded in American speech,” Halsey says. By contrast, there is 
no equivalent model of “poetic language” available to British avant-garde poets. 
Lacking a reliable route to national poetic tradition, he continues, an “English poet 
has to be busier picking through local wreckage to find whatever’s worth either 
salvage or creative demolition.” Halsey’s description of the English poet “picking 
through [the] local wreckage” provides a useful starting point for assessing the 
consequences of his interrogation of tradition in The Text and for understanding the 
relevance of ruins to contemporary British literary criticism.   
 Charles Martindale does much to delineate the relationship between ruins and 
tradition in British poetry in his essay, “Ruins of Rome: T.S. Eliot and the Presence 
of the Past.” Martindale’s analysis of textual borrowing via allusion and topos in 
Latin poetry was important to the definition and distinction of appropriation from 
alternative concepts of textual borrowing in the first chapter. The critic’s attention to 
author-centred concepts of textual appropriation reflect the Latin poets’ self-
conscious appropriations from earlier poets which were often coloured by their own 
annotations. The shift in poetic and cultural values from the Renaissance period 
onwards meant that contemporary poets were much less likely to flag their 
influences and appropriations in the poem, and practices of textual borrowing came 
to be seen as undermining the “author’s integrity” (Hinds 22). While Martindale 
provides a point of contrast to my definition of appropriation as an author-centred 
but not author-determined practice of textual borrowing in the first chapter, his 
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arguments in this essay outline the role of ruins in modernist poetry which serves 
both to connect and to oppose Eliot’s and Halsey’s poetics.  
 Martindale traces the history of the relationship between ruins and tradition 
in terms particularly apposite to Halsey’s vision of English poetry. His essay 
revolves around a discussion of The Waste Land’s vision of modernity as a condition 
of “ruins and rubbish” (102). With just three years between the two, The Waste Land 
is the obvious and concurrent poem to read alongside Eliot’s essay on tradition. The 
criticism that surrounds Eliot’s poem is replete with ideas of tradition, nostalgia, and 
history, and yet the title of the poem denotes an approach to history and tradition as 
already ruined and perhaps irrevocable. By aligning Eliot’s poem with phrases like 
“ideal order” and “existing monuments” from his 1919 essay, it becomes harder to 
secure a stable definition of Eliot’s model of tradition, and thus of the relevance of 
that model for contemporary poets such as Halsey. Martindale relates The Waste 
Land to the genre of “ruin poem” through which “English literature can be traced 
back to Anglo-Saxon times, and to the poetic fragment” (120), and thus, for Eliot, to 
the broader “mind of Europe” (“Tradition” 153). Martindale, a professor of Latin, is 
interested in The Waste Land as revealing “the presence of ancient Rome” in the 
twentieth century (103). He cites the cultural significance of Eliot’s poem, its 
espousal of “classicism, imperialism, and tradition,” and Eliot’s commitment to 
establishing Virgil as the “indisputable European classic,” as making the 1922 poem 
a “good starting point” for articulating the relationship between modernist poetry and 
Rome (102-3). Taking Eliot’s definition of tradition as the dominant model for 
twentieth-century modernist poetry, The Waste Land is an even better starting point 
for investigating the relationship between Eliot’s tradition and the imagery of ruins 
which continues to define contemporary poetry.  
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Monuments and Ruins 
Martindale understands The Waste Land as a quasi-archaeological project, a poetic 
mode which he says is “not uncommonly encountered among modern poets” (115).
7
 
Reading Eliot’s opus as a ruin poem, Martindale interprets the use of the 
appropriated fragment as symptomatic of post-World War I literature and 
characteristic of much modernist poetry. Recalling the ruins of his title, Martindale 
presents ruins as “signs both of origins and of ends or the end” (122). Ruins also 
serve a second function in society which Martindale learns from Anne Janowitz’s 
England’s Ruins, that of “restor[ing] art to nature, or blur[ring] the distinction” 
between the two. Martindale echoes Janowitz in describing this accord between 
ruins, art, and nature as rooting the “present social order ... deep in time and the soil 
[which] will thus endure.” This conflation of ruins, art, and nature promotes a range 
of “ideological entailments” which have significant consequences for Eliot’s poem, 
Martindale says, and for the interpretation of tradition in contemporary poetry (121).  
 The monument is central to Janowitz’s study of ruins in English poetry, and 
thus to Martindale’s analysis of Eliot’s poem. Janowitz refers to Henri Lefebvre in 
her definition of monument and his comments are useful for distinguishing Halsey’s 
poetics from Eliot’s model of tradition as manifested in The Waste Land. Quoting 
from Lefebvre, Janowitz describes monuments as “offering ‘to each member of a 
society the image of his/her appurtenances and social face’” (46). Here, the 
monument connects the singular with the collective, promoting identification of “the 
individual with the nation.” Lefebvre’s analysis reveals how the “existing 
monuments” of Eliot’s “ideal order” constitute and cultivate “ideological 
entailments” which bring with them particular models of authority and morality 
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 This representation of the poem is deeply antithetical to Duncan’s criticism of mainstream British 
poetry which invokes precisely the same terms to denigrate the majority of poetry.  
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(Martindale 121). Janowitz’s brief commentary on The Waste Land as “arrang[ing] 
cultural fragments into a new coherence” to “repair … the crisis of European 
imperialism” is indicative of this problematic, linking Eliot’s poem with a repressive 
colonial history (8, 19). In this way, Halsey’s description of the English poet, 
“picking through [the] local wreckage to find whatever’s worth either salvage or 
creative demolition” (St. Thomasino n. pag.), begins to distinguish itself from Eliot’s 
model of tradition and the “ideological entailments” it incurs (Martindale 152).  
 Towards the end of The Waste Land, there is a now famous line which 
provides a useful basis for differentiating between Eliot’s and Halsey’s ideas of ruin 
and their attitudes towards tradition. Drawn from the very final section of the poem, 
Eliot’s line, “These fragments I have shored against my ruins” may well be the most 
quoted line in critical analysis of tradition in The Waste Land, but I use it again here 
because it demonstrates the stark contrast between the two poets (140). The 
fragments comprising Eliot’s poem, which Janowitz describes as seeking a new 
coherence in the “crisis of European imperialism,” are shored by the speaker against 
downfall or decay (19). It is notable that the poet says ruins, in the literary and 
figurative description of a building or town, however there is also the implication of 
ruin, of a private or personal downfall and the accompanied loss in social or moral 
standing. Eliot’s fragments are intended to save the speaker from ruination, a motive 
Janowitz reads as explicitly Eurocentric and imperialist. Halsey offers quite a 
different imperative for the fragmentary structure of his poem. Whereas The Waste 
Land appeals to the authority of its constitutive texts, not all of which are literary or 
historical tomes it must be said, Halsey’s poem foregrounds its fragmentary structure 
as a challenge to the tradition his constitutive texts represent. The fragment emerges 
as a point of difference for Eliot and Halsey, indicating two very different attitudes 
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towards tradition. If The Waste Land attempts to bolster the speaker and his culture 
against the threat of destruction, The Text takes destruction as its starting point, not 
to attack English poetry and tradition but rather as the point at which every 
contemporary poet begins. The flaws, inconsistencies, and contradictions that 
characterize the various accounts of Shelley’s death set the model of tradition 
presented in The Text at a definite remove from Eliot’s example.  
 Both Eliot and Halsey are interested in ruins as a way of understanding 
tradition in poetry, but the ideological entailments of Eliot’s ruins are very different 
from Halsey’s textual engagement with tradition. Martindale learns from Janowitz 
that a ruin is “evidence ... of the power of time to weaken and destroy, but it can also 
be read as ‘the site of a recovery’ and even, in D.F. Rauber’s phrase, ‘an aspiration 
for the infinite’” (121). Ruin poetry had serious social and political ramifications for 
poets and readers at the height of the genre’s popularity in eighteenth-century 
Britain. Janowitz puts the case succinctly when she articulates “The paradox of 
eighteenth-century ruin” as a “figure of decay” which was at the same time “the 
image used to authorize England’s autonomy as a world power” (2). The ruin poem, 
just like the physical ruin, justified the present social order of eighteenth-century 
Britain as it was reformed according to the twin enterprises of colonialism and the 
industrial revolution. Here, ruins are made “signs of a lost whole,” a lost authority or 
power which is made to seem natural by ceding with the physical landscape as it is 
reinvigorated and even piqued for a return to working order (Martindale 122). This 
idea of ruins may have some appeal for Eliot’s vision of the “ideal order” of 
“existing monuments,” but it is also symptomatic of the divergence between his 
example and Halsey’s use of appropriation and textuality to challenge the authority 
of hermetic tradition.   
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 Janowitz’s analysis of monuments and ruins as performing a “central social 
function” by offering society a “‘collective mirror ‘more real’ than the individual 
one’” recognizes the “existing monuments” of Eliot’s “ideal order” of tradition as an 
authoritative list of works (46). According to Lefebvre’s comments, this authoritative 
list is not simply a lineage of preferable works or texts; it cultivates a way of life 
which is reflected back onto its audience and which establishes social and cultural 
mores that encourage specific economic and political principles. In effect, Eliot’s 
model of tradition is prescriptive, culturally and morally superior, and it gives 
support to the processes of class construction that Guillory discovers within the 
infrastructure of the university. In their 2010 edited collection on the Ruins of 
Modernity, Julia Hell and Andreas Schönle assert the responsibility of “the beholder” 
in recognizing ruins (7), and thus manifesting the “ideological entailments” that 
reflect the “central social function” of monuments and ruins (Martindale 121) 
(Janowitz 46). This attribution of responsibility to the beholder distinguishes the 
authoritative nature of Eliot’s tradition from Halsey’s textual approach. Halsey’s 
textual model of tradition eschews the top-down approach of Eliot’s “existing order” 
and begins instead with the physical material of language which constitutes each 
literary monument (153). Hell and Schönle share Martindale’s belief in the 
“ideological entailments” of ruins, but they are also explicit about the role of the 
individual in identifying and recognizing the ruin (Martindale 152):  
The beholder defines the ruin, and the ruin could not exist without 
such creative appropriation. As a result, the ruin is often the 
playground of speculative strategies that tell us more about the 
beholder than about the ruin or its original environment. (7) 
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Hell and Schönle are emphatic that it is up to the individual to acknowledge a ruin, 
thus supporting Eliot’s belief articulated in The Waste Land of the individual poet’s 
capacity to offset ruin/s by writing poetry. In order to avoid ruination, an individual 
must be able to recognize it as such. Despite Eliot’s attribution of independence to 
tradition wherein “the existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves” 
and thus not at the behest of the poet or critic, his statement in The Waste Land, 
“These fragments I have shored against my ruins,” suggests quite a different 
imperative in the construction of tradition (Waste Land 140). If “the beholder” is 
responsible for “defin[ing] the ruin,” and this process “tell[s] us more about the 
beholder than about the ruin” (7), then it is also possible that the beholder is 
responsible for defining tradition and the particular “ideological entailments” that 
ensue (Martindale 121). In The Waste Land, Eliot presents tradition as a means of 
saving himself, and all of European culture, from destruction, and yet his definition 
and delineation of tradition invokes strikingly similar images, ideological 
imperatives, and forms of authority to that attributed to ruins by Martindale, 
Janowitz, Hell, and Schönle. If Eliot’s definition of tradition displays the same 
ambiguity and evasiveness that Riquelme terms a ‘harmony of dissonance’, then 
what does Halsey offer as an alternative in his engagement with tradition in The 
Text? 
  Halsey is explicit about poetry offering a “distinct kind of thought” from that 
available in the critical writing of Eliot’s 1919 essay (“On Poetics” n. pag.). Perhaps 
the clearest way of understanding Halsey’s textual reformulation of tradition in The 
Text is as manifesting this “distinct kind of thought” which eschews imperial 
imaginaries and elitist “ideological entailments” in favour of a more materialist 
textual approach to writing and literary lineage (Martindale 121). The “distinct kind 
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of thought” that Halsey attributes to poetry enables an alternative approach to 
tradition which is not beholden to the empirical accretion of worthy texts or “ideal 
monuments” (Eliot “Tradition” 152). Instead, Halsey’s poetic thought orients itself 
to textuality which forms the basis both of the constituent literature of any model of 
tradition, and of the particular appropriative practice that shapes and structures The 
Text. By rejecting the empirical account of tradition as a chronology which forms an 
“ideal order” of texts, Halsey’s Text proposes a more lateral account of tradition that 
focuses attention not on the macro-level processes of empire and ruin, but rather on 
the local level of letters and words. This lateral approach addresses the textuality 
which constitutes and consolidates tradition, renewing it day by day so that tradition 
is not a retrospective phenomenon. The Text rejects that vision of tradition as the 
canonising of those most revered and inaccessible of texts and understands it instead 
as a history of our language, a language as diverse and mutable as the readers and 
writers who put it to new uses every day.  
Conclusion 
Contemporary criticism of innovative poetry tells us that tradition is not an 
appropriate topic for poetry, and yet Halsey’s Text uses poetic practices and effects 
to illuminate tradition in new and provocative ways. Halsey’s negotiation with 
tradition extends the remit of appropriation in poetry, using the conflict of different 
texts and narratives to effect a declarative challenging of received ideas on the 
construction and development of tradition. Textuality is the common denominator of 
Halsey’s appropriative practice, and it also provides the basis to the tradition of 
literature and criticism that informs the poem. The innovative nature of The Text 
emerges by enabling a perspective on tradition which avoids the elitism, the 
exclusivity, and the authority of Eliot’s hermetic definition of tradition. Halsey’s 
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Text emphasizes the textual basis of tradition and, in so doing, recalls the collective 
imperatives within literature, namely the shared nature of language and the 
communal nature of tradition collectively inherited and celebrated.  
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Chapter Four: “Was there ever an original poem?”:  Refashioning 
Authorship in Susan Howe’s A Bibliography of the King’s Book, or, 
Eikon Basilike 
Susan Howe is the third and final poet in this triptych study of poetic appropriation 
and its declarative potential. This chapter consolidates the analysis of alternative 
practices of appropriation in contemporary experimental poetry and suggests another 
development of the current understanding of the term in literary criticism. In her 
essay on the poet in the seminal text on Language Poetry, In the American Tree, Tina 
Darragh outlines Howe’s combination of historical material and contemporary 
practices and its consequences for critical analysis of her poetry. In this short essay 
on the American poet, Darragh recalls her initial reading of Howe and her surprise at 
discovering “vocabulary of the ‘Old World’ (terms from the classics, mythology, the 
Bible, Latin liturgy, and so on)” combined with “experimental techniques such as the 
fragmentation of words and the isolation of individual letters” (547). Here, Darragh 
interprets Howe’s appropriation of historical texts in her writing as evidence of the 
poet “stand[ing] up” and “as an intellectual” “fight[ing] back” against “the weight of 
our own language’s history” (549). This perception of Howe as resisting language’s 
history sets her at odds with Halsey who embraces linguistic history as constitutive 
of tradition. Whether or not one agrees with Darragh’s assessment of her poetry, 
Howe shares with Halsey and Joyce a profound interest in the language and literature 
of earlier times. Her interests and imperatives in practising appropriation diverge in 
important ways from her English and Irish counterparts, and these differences are 
indicative of the necessity of redefining appropriation beyond the conceptualist 
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definition. Before undertaking a critical reading of Howe’s poem, it will be helpful 
to offer an outline of this chapter and the trajectory of the arguments that shape this 
reading of her work. 
This chapter begins by addressing the materialist nature of Howe’s 
appropriative practice which manifests itself from the very beginning of A 
Bibliography of the King’s Book, or, Eikon Basilike.
1
 By moving from letter to letter 
and line to line of Howe’s poem, specific differences emerge between her 
appropriative style and those of Joyce and Halsey. Howe’s poem proposes a radical 
deconstitution and redefinition of authorship, and this becomes a guiding force of the 
poem. As the chapter progresses, appropriation emerges as a vital force in Howe’s 
rejection of the traditional, patriarchal definition of authorship. This rejection 
manifests itself and is worked out through a variety of themes and issues in the 
poem. The enclosure of the commons is essential to Howe’s redefinition of 
authorship, while also provoking provocative parallels with the etymology of 
appropriation that recurs across this thesis. The debates surrounding enclosure raise 
the same “morally dubious” questions of authority, ownership, and propriety that 
characterize the practice of appropriation for Halsey and Joyce. Howe echoes Halsey 
by incorporating literary criticism into her poem, and this appropriation provides the 
poet with a direction for her redefinition of authorship. Under the surface of 
patriarchal literary tradition, bibliography, and scholarship, Eikon Basilike envisions 
a female ancestry of writing and authorship divested of the restrictions of 
proprietorship and authority. Howe’s feminist redefinition of authorship reorients 
appropriation by revealing its potential for critical and conceptual work. Howe’s 
Eikon Basilike extends contemporary understandings of appropriation in a new 
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 Hereafter, Eikon Basilike. 
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direction, and thus compounds the critical requirement to extend and develop 
contemporary understandings of appropriation in poetry and criticism.  
4.1 Appropriation versus Authorship in Eikon Basilike  
This section investigates Howe’s appropriative practice in Eikon Basilike, beginning 
with an introduction to the text and proceeding with a close reading of the poem 
which attends to the specificities of her engagement with appropriation. Eikon 
Basilike was published by Paradigm Press in Providence, Rhode Island, in 1989.
2
 
The title of the poem is carried over from Edward Almack’s 1896 bibliography 
which documents the many versions and reprintings of The King’s Book since its 
publication in the wake of Charles I’s execution in 1649. The sources and setting 
may seem unusual for Howe, a poet firmly committed to uncovering the violent 
history of the New England Puritans; however, the regicide of Charles I intervenes as 
“a primal sin” for the settlers and haunts them as an act of originary violence (Foster 
175). Eikon Basilike is Howe’s tenth collection and it was published in her first year 
working as Visiting Professor at SUNY Buffalo. This is not the first of Howe’s 
poems to feature appropriation, although it is her first to address English literary 
history. Howe’s poetic preoccupation with American history was established with 
her second collection, Chanting at the Crystal Sea (1974), and consolidated with her 
invocation of the seventeenth-century narrative of Puritan Minister Reverend Hope 
Atherton in Articulation of Sound Forms in Time (1987). William Montgomery has 
argued that the collections published before and after Eikon Basilike—Articulation of 
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 Hereafter, the original 1649 text will be referred to as The King’s Book and Howe’s poem will be 
referred to as Eikon Basilike. Page numbers and citations for Howe’s poem will reflect the 
republished version of the poem, which is collected in The Nonconformists Memorial: Poems by 
Susan Howe and published by New Directions in 1993. With a publication date of 1989, Howe’s 
Eikon Basilike is the earliest of the poems included in this project; Halsey’s Text appeared six years 




Sound Forms in Time (1987) and Thorow (1990)—are Howe’s “most sustained 
poetic attempts at addressing the colonization of America and its ramifications for 
American literary identity,” and this raises questions about Howe’s influences and 
imperatives at the time of writing Eikon Basilike (86). The Western Borders (1979) 
was Howe’s first text to address her Irish heritage with the poems incorporating Irish 
landscape and myth. The Irish theme was taken up again in Cabbage Gardens 
(1979), The Liberties (1980), and Defenestration of Prague (1983). Howe is 
primarily known as a poet interested in America and Ireland, and so Eikon Basilike 
represents something of a change while still reflecting her primary interests.  
Eikon Basilike runs to thirty-seven pages and begins with a prose 
introduction. Howe aligns poetry and visual art in the poem with pages of rich 
textual collage intersecting terse stanzas of appropriated text. The poem incorporates 
more than forty source texts, ranging from Shakespeare’s Coriolanus written in the 
early 1600s to Stephen Greenblatt’s Renaissance Self-Fashioning published in 1980. 
In the opening chapter of this thesis, I investigated the conflicted relationship 
between appropriation and authorial expression and argued for an enduring historical 
understanding of appropriation’s declarative force in poetry. In this analysis of Eikon 
Basilike, the practice of appropriation is extended beyond authorial expression to 
address the possibility of authorship itself. Howe is deeply invested in questions of 
the possibility and propriety of authorship in this poem, and in its proprietary nature 
under appropriation. This chapter takes up the question of authorship in Howe’s 
poem and asks how her particular negotiation with appropriation proposes a 
redefinition of authorship. By aligning Howe’s appropriative style with the broader 
themes and issues in the poem, it is possible to propose a reading of Eikon Basilike 
which contravenes traditional patriarchal understandings of authorship without 
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relinquishing the poet’s, or her poem’s, capacity to be declarative and meaningful in 
new and provocative ways.  
The following close reading of the introduction and opening pages of Eikon 
Basilike outlines the materialist nature of Howe’s appropriative style, and the 
implications of this materiality for her negotiation with authorship in the poem. 
Eikon Basilike begins with a four-page introduction, entitled “Making the Ghost 
Walk About Again and Again,” which provides a context both for The King’s Book 
and for Howe’s poem.
3
 The tone is as factual and objective as that of a standard 
scholarly text, with the same details of date, name, and location framing the King’s 
execution. The precise difference between Howe’s writing and traditional scholarly 
prose emerge as the specificities of time and place give way to a more subjective 
tone and poetic form. After recounting the textual history of The King’s Book, Howe 
disrupts the traditional scholarly form, as follows: 
 Printers of the Eikon Basilike were hunted down and 
imprisoned. But in spite of many obstacles the little book was set in 
type time and again. 
      During 1649 fresh editions appeared almost daily and sold out 
  at once. 
  The Eikon Basilike’s popularity continued throughout the years of the 
   Commonwealth and Cromwell’s Protectorate.  
      The Eikon Basilike is a forgery. (55) 
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 In his Dictionary of Catch Phrases, Eric Partridge relates the phrase to the theatre where “ghost 
walk” means ‘payday’: “‘[The] ghost walks on Friday’, ‘the ghost does not walk’, ‘when will the 
ghost walk?’, ‘has the ghost walked yet?’ There is—or is not—any money for salaries and wages; 
when will there be—has there been—such money?” (152). The theme of theatre will come up again in 




Howe breaks the line after “Cromwell’s Protectorate” to position on a new indented 
line the statement, “The Eikon Basilike is a forgery” (55). The force of the statement 
is compounded by this break which also demonstrates the particularity of Howe’s 
prose form and its difference from academic writing. Howe describes the ambiguity 
between a scholarly imperative and the more creative form of her prose in an 
interview with Lynn Keller: 
Writing poetry, I feel completely free. It’s meditative ... Writing an 
essay, I want to say something specific ... I’m very anxious to be 
scholarly correct ... Then there is sound. The power of sound never 
changes between poetry and essays. More and more, as I write essays 
I seem to be ... obsessing that every line is right. (26) 
The difference Howe perceives between poetry and prose is important because of her 
frequent merging of the two forms in her poetry and in prose works such as My 
Emily Dickinson (1985) and The Birth-mark (1993). David Arnold reads Howe’s 
aligning of poetry and prose in The Birth-mark as the poet going “‘off-road,’” 
“extend[ing] the topography of scholarship” in “a typically antinomian gesture, 
which challenges the authority of overseers, … cartographers,” and literary critics 
(128). Arnold’s response to Howe’s innovation in literary form is to suggest that 
literary critics “shed the mantle of critic and reveal ourselves as writers, as a result of 
which disrobing we might enter a broader community” (130). As well as 
encouraging a more self-conscious and subjective critical style, Arnold’s response 
also reflects the radical potential of Howe’s poem by encouraging critics to supplant 
institutional borders and challenge the empirical nature of scholarly objectivity. In 
The Birth-mark, and Eikon Basilike, meaning is manifested not just through the 
syntax and semantics of rhetorical prose, but also through the form and structure of 
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the writing—the sound, lineation, and line-breaks—which have traditionally 
preoccupied poetry and poetry criticism.  
 The introduction continues with a discussion of the bibliographies and 
sources influencing the text. The many bibliographers and critics referenced in 
Howe’s poem reflects Eikon Basilike’s engagement with the scholarly tradition that 
surrounds The King’s Book. The poet’s son, Mark, purchased Almack’s bibliography 
for her and this provides the hypotext of Eikon Basilike; however, she also draws on 
Christopher Wordsworth’s Who Wrote Eikon Basilike? (1824) and Francis F. 
Madan’s New Bibliography of the Eikon Basilike (1950). Howe explains the history 
of her acquaintance with Almack’s and Madan’s bibliographies as follows:  
Eikonoklastes is a political tract … But it is A Bibliography of the 
King’s Book; or, Eikon Basilike, by Edward Almack, that interests me 
… Almack’s Bibliography was published in 1896 in support of Royal 
authorship. Francis F. Madan’s A New Bibliography of the Eikon 
Basilike of King Charles the First, with a note on the authorship was 
published in 1950 in support of John Gauden. (Eikon 57) 
Howe makes clear the different affiliations of the two bibliographies. In the 
following lines, the poet outlines the difficulty that this difference creates for the 
supposedly empirical nature of bibliographical work. If bibliography is defined as 
“‘the history, identification, or analytical and systematic / description or 
classification of writings or publications considered as mater / -ial objects,’” as 
Howe says, then how do Almack’s and Madan’s texts also present arguments for the 
real identity of the author (58)? In his 2006 essay aligning Howe with H.D., David 
Clippinger points out that Howe’s appropriation of Almack’s title page reflects a 
bibliographical commitment of her own. Clippinger notes that Howe does not cross 
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out “‘member of the bibliographical society’” on Almack’s title page the way she 
does Almack’s name and the original publisher (n. pag.). As well as sharing a 
“critical methodology” based on bibliography with Almack and Madan, Howe also 
shares with them the proclivity towards statements about the real author of the text 
(Clippinger n. pag.). For Howe, this proclivity manifests itself quite differently than 
for her forebears, and is heightened by her interrogation of authorship in the poem.
 Howe concludes the introduction by interrogating the concept of the “original 
text” and articulates her dissatisfaction with literary criticism’s deference to the 
author (58). The poet articulates her doubts about authorial and textual originality by 
asking, “Can we ever really discover the original text? Was there ever an / original 
poem? What is a pure text invented by an author? Is such a con- / ception possible?”.  
For Howe, these questions of originality regard the difference between the poet’s 
intentions in writing and the materiality of the published poem: “Only by going back 
to the prescriptive level of thought / process can ‘authorial intention’ finally be 
located” she says, “and then the material / object has become immaterial.”  Poetic 
intention should not feature in the analysis of the text, Howe argues, because the 
finished poem acquires a materiality that transcends the cognitive and aesthetic 
processes of the poet writing, and to revert to the poet’s intentions in writing the 
poem is to deny the poem its distinct material existence. Howe’s position is a 
familiar one for contemporary Language poets writing in the 1980s at a moment of 
acute consciousness about the material conditions of textual production. That said, 
her assertion that deferring to authorial intention betrays the materiality of the poem 
is itself an expression of her poetic intentions. But now, the formal introduction 
gives way to pages of dense collage, and the questions of bibliography and authorial 
expression become much more complex. 
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 The opening page of Howe’s poem typifies the visual violence of Eikon 
Basilike and its consequences for readers of her poem:    
 
Fig. 1. The first page after the introduction of Susan Howe’s A Bibliography of the 
King’s Book, or, Eikon Basilike (Howe The Nonconformist’s Memorial 59). 
The tilted text, “Oh Lord / o Lord,” toppling off the left margin provokes a number 
of references and interpretations for a reader acquainted with the literary history 
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behind The King’s Book. As well as offering a visual representation of the King’s 
beheading and evoking the King’s fear on approaching the scaffold, these lines also 
recall Philip Sidney’s ‘Pamela Poem’ which Milton uses to bring The King’s Book 
into disrepute (Bloomfield 428). Howe herself explains the sloping lines that 
structure the poem as “based around the violence of the execution of Charles I, the 
violence of history,” and also “the stage drama” of the King’s execution (Keller 8). 
The visual materiality of the text is a response to this violence, Howe says, because 
“There’s no way to express that [violence] in ... words in [an] ordinary fashion” (8). 
The poet’s intention to present “chaos and violence” “visually” in the poem explains 
the “frequent violent visual disruption” of these opening pages, but it does not help 
to elucidate the particular arrangement of letters and lines, or how to read them 
(Keller 8) (Bloomfield 419). Howe offers a description of her process in composing 
these collaged pages, but even this offers little to the analyses of Eikon Basilike. 
Responding to Keller’s question about her mode of composition, Howe explains:  
First I would type some lines. Then cut them apart. Paste one on top 
of another, move them around until they looked right. Then I’d xerox 
that version, getting several copies, and then cut and paste again until 
I had it right. The getting it right has to do with how it’s structured on 
the page as well as how it sounds. (8) 
Sound is essential to Howe’s construction of these pages, just as in her prose, and 
yet, with no recordings of Howe reading Eikon Basilike, it is hard to know how to 
sound out her “visual[ly] disrupti[ve]” lines, much less how to understand them 
(Bloomfield 419). The following excerpt from the opening lines is indicative of the 




Fig. 2. An excerpt from the first page after the introduction of Susan Howe’s A 
Bibliography of the King’s Book, or, Eikon Basilike (Howe The Nonconformist’s 
Memorial 59). 
What order should we read these lines in, and how to sound out the inverted 
“obwructions” and “comand”? The reader is explicitly required to answer these 
questions in order to read the poem. This divesting of responsibility to the reader 
sees the poet withdrawing from her own poem, which supports Howe’s statements 
on poetic intentionality in the introduction. Howe leaves it to the reader to make 
more or less informed guesses as to the sound and meaning of her lines, and this 
obligation to attend to the material nature of the poem undermines critical analysis of 
“authorial intention” (Eikon 58). By attending closely to these lines and considering 
potential approaches, it is possible to gain some sense of how to read and interpret 
this poem. 
 So far, I have outlined Howe’s distrust of poetic intentionality, her innovative 
prose style, and the materialist nature of her appropriative practice, all of which will 
be shown to contribute to her negotiation with authorship in the poem. This 
materialist approach is compounded over the following pages so that the instability 
of the opening lines permeates the phrases that follow with some letters missing, 
some doubled, and other part-words extracted and repeated. On page fifty-nine, the 
“a” hanging upside-down from the second “e” of “beering” evokes the ligature of the 
Latin diphthong “æ” and by literally “transpos[ing]” the two letters, “beering” turns 
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to “bearing.” The inversion of “transposed” on the same page is a physical 
representation of the meaning of the word “transposed,” to “cause (two or more 
things) to exchange places,” or to “transfer to a different place or context” while also 
reflecting the historical power shift from Charles I to the Parliamentarians 
(“Transpose”). This transformation of the phrase from “beering transposed” to 
“bearing transposed” establishes new relations between the phrase and those 
surrounding it. Here, “transposed” “bearing” refers both to the King’s fall from 
sovereign to prisoner and to the conflict of “Laws” and “zeal” which characterize the 
era (59). “Laws” and “zeal” manifest themselves in Charles I’s belief in the Divine 
Right of the monarch which led him to refuse to compromise with the 
Parliamentarians who held him captive. The same passionate belief prompted the 
Parliamentarians to establish the Black Tribunal to try the King, a tribunal described 
as “the most extraordinary judicial body to be met with in English history” (Sachse 
69). William L. Sachse confirms the exceptional nature of the Tribunal in English 
law, stating that “no court has ever been so vigorously disclaimed as to jurisdiction, 
or so bitterly vilified as to personnel.” Already, there is a strong sense of the 
materiality of Howe’s appropriative poem. The “u” missing from the phrase 
“nfortunate Man” is emphasized in the following phrase “un ust” which, if we input 
the right letters becomes “Unfortunate Man / / unjust” (59). “Futnre” recalls the 
middle letters of “nfortunate,” and the word ‘future’, but, like Bloomfield, I have 
little to offer to an interpretation of “woule,” and the final line “audPaged doe of 
Title-page.” Kent Lewis compares this final line to “a Rorschach ink-blot,” a 
description which proves useful for understanding Howe’s poetry (124). The 
Rorschach test analyses a subject’s psychological response to intentionally abstruse 
and conflicted images, and thus serves as an analogy for Howe’s challenge to readers 
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to discover their own way of reading Eikon Basilike. It is worth remembering that, 
for Howe, these collages are ordered by sound and not syntax or semantics and so it 
should not come as a surprise that every line cannot be accounted for and explained.  
 Howe makes indeterminacy her goal in this poem, and yet her materialist 
appropriative practice does achieve certain declarative effects. Pages sixty-four to 
sixty-five of the poem are indicative of the interpretations or meanings available 




Fig. 3. From Susan Howe’s A Bibliography of the King’s Book, or, Eikon Basilike 
(Howe The Nonconformist’s Memorial 64).
4
 
These collaged doubles betray a textual self-consciousness both of the form of the 
poem, as in the phrase “a pivot” which denotes the physical relation of these pages, 
and also of a broader awareness within the poem as a whole. This self-consciousness 
                                                 
4
 Pages sixty-four and sixty-five are collaged doubles of each other.  
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is disconcerting. It is as though the poem knows things that the reader does not or 
will not know, and it knew these things long before the reader might come to 
recognize them. These self-annotative or declarative moments emerge repeatedly 
across the poem. The line “A cleric’s forgery / of pseudo-biographical / apology” 
running perpendicular to the main stanza on page sixty-six provides a counter to the 
primary lines describing King Charles I approaching the scaffold. The two margins 
multiply the number of available perspectives on the King and The King’s Book, 
expanding the range and scope of Howe’s poem beyond the empirical realm of 
argument and counter-argument. The effect is replicated on the next page where the 
first paragraph beginning “England’s Black Tribunal” is followed by the phrase, “It 
passed with the Negative,” which appears in a chapter on the execution in Liljegren’s 
Studies in Milton (67). The lines read as a dialogue with one source responding to 
another such that the poem answers its own questions. This interpretation is 
compounded by the use of the word “Historiography” on the same page which draws 
attention to Howe’s poem as a literal “[re-]writing of history based on ... the 
synthesis of particulars into a narrative that will stand the test of critical methods”  
(“Historiography”). In her essay on Eikon Basilike, Bloomfield attributes 
“communicative capacities” to the “material dimensions of the printed word” which 
is cut, pasted, and copied in Howe’s poem (431). These “communicative capacities” 
are the product of Howe’s materialist appropriations and they encourage critical 
attention to the declarative force of her aggregative constructions. The relation 
between Howe’s appropriative practice and her definition of authorship in Eikon 
Basilike becomes clearer with an excerpt from Sir Thomas More’s The History of 
King Richard the Third which illuminates the play of identity that becomes a 
framing image in the poem.  
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 The excerpt from More is the longest block quotation in the poem after the 
references from Charles Dickens’s David Copperfield. The passage from More 
asserts the theatrical nature of the Royal Court and Court politics. In this arena, “pore 
men be but ye lokers-on” and “they; yt wise be, wil medle / no farther. For they that 
sometyme step vp and play wt them, when / they cannot play their partes, they 
disorder the play & do themselves no / good” (Eikon 61). The lesson here is not that 
“pore men” should not intervene in Court life but rather that they must “play their 
partes” well if they are to be successful. To be successful is to uphold the “play” 
which extends from the “pretended Court / of Justice” to the King’s “performance on 
the scaffold” (62, 56).
5
 Here, an actor’s exchanging of roles and identities mirrors the 
question around authorship and identity in The King’s Book, thus elaborating the 
poet’s interrogation of authorship in Eikon Basilike. The theatre analogy permeates 
the text and complicates the critical propensity to assert the real identity or voice of 
the poet and of the author of The King’s Book. 
 Taken together, the materiality of Howe’s appropriations, the textual self-
consciousness of the poem, and More’s theatre analogy encourage the progressive 
effacement of authorship from the poem, at least as authorship is traditionally 
defined. The traditional conception of authorship inferred here is that which Duff 
delineates in his 1767 tract, Essay on Original Genius. According to Duff, an author 
of original genius will not content himself with a “mediocrity of reputation” (131). 
More important than the author’s reputation, however, is Duff’s assertion that the 
author “disdains to imitate what perhaps he is qualified to excel.” Imitation is 
inclined to “cramp the inventive powers of the mind,” Duff says, “which, if indulged 
in their excursions, might discover new mines of intellectual ore” (131-32). Instead 
                                                 
5
 More’s lines on theatre also compound the theatrical title of the introduction to Howe’s poem. 
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of “tracing the footsteps of his predecessors,” an author should allow his 
imagination, and it is his imagination, to eschew imitation, and thus appropriation. 
By avoiding imitation an author can “allow his imagination to range over the field of 
Invention ... [and] strike out a character like his own Genius, perfectly original” 
(132). The appropriations of text that constitute the poem take the place of Howe’s 
authorial voice, but if these appropriations replace the poet speaking, do they also 
dominate the declarative or expressive function in the poem? With appropriation 
taking the place of poetic intentionality or voice in Howe’s poem, what, if anything, 
do these appropriations declare in Eikon Basilike? As well as addressing the 
declarative force of Howe’s appropriations, this question of appropriation in Eikon 
Basilike also illuminates Howe’s negotiation with authorship. Of the various images 
and issues that manifest themselves in Howe’s poem, the enclosure of the commons 
is one of the most significant for the question of authorship. Having outlined the 
materialist nature of Howe’s appropriative practice, I will move now to investigate 
her engagement with enclosure in the poem and the consequences for her negotiation 
with authorship.  
4.2 Authorship and the Enclosure of the Commons   
Enclosure of the Commons  
The enclosure of the commons emerges as a theme with a number of reference points 
in Howe’s poem. From the shared history of English literature which is freely 
invoked in Eikon Basilike, to the enclosure of copyright law which delimits the same 
appropriation of texts, and the construction of authorship as individual ownership, 
there are a number of compelling correlations between Howe’s interrogation of 
authorship and the subject of enclosure. The theme of enclosure begins with 
references to “Tract,” meaning a “stretch or extent of territory” (“Tract”), and 
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continues with the “Historiography of open fields” and “The place name and field 
name” (64-66).
6
 “The commons” refers to the collective ownership and management 
of land, a phenomenon which characterized agriculture in England until the twelfth 
century when enclosure first got underway. Nigel Harris describes enclosure as the 
“appropriation of common lands by private owners to the point where all the 
territory within Britain was officially parcelled up among a category of ‘owners’” 
(124). The theme of enclosure is consolidated as we move through the poem, 
beginning with the narrow lines of page seventy-one: 
Strip furlong field 
 
Feet on someone else’s wheat 
 
  Easy market access 
 
  On-going struggle 
  abandoned lands 
 
  Lost power of expression 
  Last power of expression 
 
  The Battle of Corioli 
 
  Obsessive images of Coriolanus … (71) 
                                                 
6
 Howe became interested in the topic of enclosure while working on My Emily Dickinson (1985). 




The furlong was the “fundamental operating unit” of the enclosure, Robert C. Allen 
says, and this allowed land to be “shifted to new or experimental uses in small 
quantities” (62). A furlong is constructed of several adjacent strips in a field, and so 
Howe’s first line, “Strip furlong field” describes the taxonomy of land division 
during the process of enclosure. As well as the obvious appropriation of public land 
during the enclosure, individual plots were often separated by “mere strips [balks] of 
turf about a foot wide,” so one might easily find their “feet on someone else’s wheat” 
(Slater 22). If the open field system ensured that even the poorest people had access 
to land, the enclosure guaranteed that the poor could gain “access only by means of 
economic leases subject to the market” (Wood 38). With the onset of capitalism, 
everybody was subject to the same market conditions, and so while “market access” 
might have been “easy,” in Howe’s ironic phrasing, this “access” did not prevent or 
reduce “On-going struggle.” Shakespeare is one of the most distinguished 
landowners fined for “purchas[ing] and stor[ing] grain, malt, and barley for resale at 
inflated prices to neighbours and local tradesmen” (Archer 8). In this context, 
Howe’s next lines, “abandoned lands / / Lost power of expression / Last power of 
expression,” invokes the poor farmers relinquishing of subpar land, and their 
consequent loss of authority or voice in English society.  
This relationship between the loss of land and “lost powers of expression” is 
made clear in a statement by Thomas Rainsborough, a Colonel, a Member of 
Parliament, and a leading spokesperson for the Levellers in the Putney Debates.
7
 The 
Levellers, mentioned on page eighty of Howe’s poem, were proto-democratic 
activists in seventeenth-century England who got their name because of their 
involvement in levelling the hedges during the enclosure riots. Rainsborough was 
                                                 
7
 Rainborough’s brother, William Rainsborowe, was a Ranter, a Major in the Royal Navy, and a 
political and religious radical, who was among the early settlers of New England, moving to the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony in the 1630s.   
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speaking on behalf of the pro-Leveller soldiers of the New Model Army at the 
Putney Debates when he made the following proclamation aligning his own anti-
enclosure principles with the concept of individual voice: 
I think that the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live as the 
greatest he ... the poorest man in England is not at all bound in the 
strict sense to that government that he hath not had a voice to put 
himself under. (Gentles 209) 
Here, Rainsborough articulates the radical potential of democracy, but Howe is more 
interested in the fact that “the poorest man,” divested of access to land because of 
enclosure, “hath not a voice.” Howe makes reference to the matter obliquely again in 
the lines, “In his reply Pseudomisus / shifts the balance / of emphasis,” the first few 
words of which are borrowed from a tract by the pro-enclosure writer, Reverend 
Joseph Lee (75). In 1654, Lee published his response to an anti-enclosure pamphlet 
written a year earlier by the Puritan clergyman, John Moore. Lee’s essay used the 
pastoral debate form, with himself as Pseudomisus, to challenge each tenet of the 
1653 pamphlet and demonstrate that there are no viable ways of making the 
commons as profitable as the enclosures. I have not discovered the exact source of 
Howe’s three lines, if indeed there is one, but most accounts of the exchange report 
Moore’s enthusiasm leaving him open to a “stunning retort from Pseudomisus” that 
contributes towards a more positive conception of enclosure (Kerridge 126).  
 The criticism of enclosure manifests itself most clearly in Howe’s invocation 
of Shakespeare’s Coriolanus.
8
 The historical figure, Gaius Marcius, received the 
name Coriolanus on account of his bravery in fighting for Rome in the Battle of 
                                                 
8
 T.S. Eliot includes the line “Revive for a moment, a broken Coriolanus” in the final lines of The 
Waste Land. Here, the word “broken” compounds the fragmentary nature of the poem while also 
attesting to the epic grandeur of that history “shored” by the poet “against [his] ruins” (Waste Land 
140). Eliot describes Coriolanus as “Shakespeare’s most assured artistic success” and he also wrote a 
two-part poem about Coriolanus (The Sacred Wood 91).   
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Corioli (493 B.C.E.). In Shakespeare’s tragedy, Coriolanus is expelled from the city 
of Rome for rejecting the rule of the people. He returns with an army to seek revenge 
for his expulsion and is only dissuaded from burning the city by his mother’s 
entreaties. The play is replete with images of food, eating, and nourishment which 
recall the “corn shortages and insurrections” that characterized Shakespeare’s 
England in the early 1600s (Cavell 211). The opening scene of the Roman people 
rioting because the city’s grain stores have been withheld from them would have 
struck a chord with Shakespeare’s audience. Coriolanus’s criticism of Greece’s 
democratic model, “they nourished disobedience, fed / The ruin of the state,” would 
also have resonated with viewers in the wake of the Midland’s Revolt of 1607 
(2838).  
 Stanley Cavell, who is responsible for the phrase “obsessive images of 
Coriolanus” in Howe’s poem, asserts that the play depicts Shakespeare’s Rome as a 
“circle of cannibalism,” an image which provokes provocative parallels with Howe’s 
Eikon Basilike and the transference of power shaping the English Interregnum (203). 
The cannibalism Cavell introduces manifests itself at all levels of the poem and 
among all political groups. Charles I levied the Ship Money tax against coastal cities 
and counties without Parliamentary consent in 1629. This tax decreased his 
popularity among the public which meant that there was little sympathy for the King 
at the time of his death. In effect, the revenue the King collected from his subjects 
encouraged public support for the Parliamentarians’ call for his execution. The King 
was executed by a Parliament strengthened by the Bishops’ Wars which were a 
result of his own attempts to force the Church of Scotland to accept high Anglican 
principles and practices. Against this backdrop, the relation between Howe’s poem 
and Cavell’s depiction of “the eater eaten by what he or she eats” becomes clear 
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(203). Cavell’s cannibalism also applies to the Parliamentarians. The many radical 
political groups which were encouraged during the Interregnum—the Levellers, the 
Diggers, the Religious sects, and the Conservatives—all had their own intentions for 
the Commonwealth. This diversity made it difficult to establish an effective model of 
government, and decision-making power passed from the Rump Parliament to the 
Nominated Assembly, on to the Instrument of Government, and finally to the 
Humble Petition and Advice, before Charles II regained the throne in 1660. The 
enclosure of the commons provokes a number of parallels for Howe’s appropriative 
practice in Eikon Basilike, but the theme is most powerful as it illuminates Howe’s 
negotiation with authorship in the poem. By pursuing this question of authorship in 
Eikon Basilike, we gain a clearer account of the declarative effects of Howe’s 
appropriative practice. 
Appropriation and Authorship 
The question of authorship which preoccupies Howe’s poem is one of the most 
personal questions a poet can address in her writing. Instead of attributing the text to 
a particular author, either herself or her contributing authors, Howe presents her 
Bibliography of The King’s Book as an interrogation of the idea of authorship itself. 
In the following extract from the poem, Howe indicates the difficulty of discerning 
and attributing authorship, and the dangers in doing so: 
This still house 
  An unbeaten way 
  My self and words 
  The King kneeling 
  Old raggs about him 
  All those apopthegems 
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  Civil and Sacred 
  torn among fragments 
  Emblems gold and lead  
 
  Must lie outside the house 
  Side of space I must cross 
 
  To write against the Ghost … (68-9) 
These lines stage a conflict in the action of writing and the attribution of authorship, 
calling into question Charles I’s contribution to The King’s Book while also 
problematizing the poet’s own authority as author. The “unbeaten way” of the 
second line suggests the originality and creativity traditionally required of the author 
writing, an idea which Howe overtly challenges in the introduction to the poem. 
Howe positions “My self and words” against “The King kneeling,” and despite the 
impoverished depiction of Charles I—“Old raggs about him / All those apopthegems 
/ Civil and Sacred / torn among fragments”—the task of writing is still a burden to 
her. Elisabeth W. Joyce reads these lines as expressing the speaker’s doubt about her 
own status in the writing of the poem. The speaker is bound to “repeat what others 
have said,” Joyce says, “without assurance that these words are real, that she is real, 
that anything is or could be the truth” (43). Such “assurance” “Must lie outside the 
house,” on the “Side of space I must cross / / To write against the Ghost” (Eikon 69). 
These lines indicate the poet’s difficulty in asserting authorship, and the authority 
that accompanies it, as it is traditionally defined, and her preference for an 
alternative model of authorship derived from the “torn … fragments” that The King’s 
Book leaves behind.  
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 The cannibalism that Cavell’s text introduces to the poem manifests itself too 
in Howe’s negotiation with authorship. This image of the poem as cannibalistic in its 
appropriation of materials, voices, and texts has a long history in the analysis of 
appropriative practices, and can be traced back to Oswald de Andrade’s 1928 
Cannibalist Manifesto. Galvin reads the Brazilian poet De Andrade’s Manifesto as 
evidence of the historical antecedent to the current conversation around 
appropriation and conceptual poetry. De Andrade’s Manifesto “energetically 
reclaim[s]” “the traditionally denigrated figure of the cannibal or New World 
barbarian,” Galvin says, so that the poetic appropriation of texts is synonymous with 
the native consumption of colonial culture (19). This “reclaim[ing],” or “cultural re-
mastication” empowers poets of the “colonial or subaltern culture,” Galvin explains, 
making him or her “‘a conquering agent unexpectedly capable of transformations 
that affect both self and other.’” The appearance of the word ‘cannibalism’ in the 
poem serves as evidence of Howe’s problematizing of the practice of appropriation 
and the violence it infers, while also offering a more insightful account of her 
negotiation of authorship in the poem. In this context, the line “Lost power of 
expression” also applies to the poet through a new conception of the author as 
“borrower” (Eikon 72). This new role is carved out through the stanzas of the 
following page: 
Driest facts  
  of bibliography  
  Scarce tract work 
  pagination signatures running 
  The borrower 
  Stamp of the King’s  
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  own character 
  I am a seeker 
  Blades Blades & Blades 
 
  Tell you my author 
  I knew his hand 
The book was his 
  The cloathing Hands 
  I am a seeker 
  of water-marks    
  in the Antiquity 
  The Sovereign stile 
  in another stile 
  Left scattered in disguise. (72) 
The switch to small case in these stanzas encourages us to read adjoining lines as 
complete phrases or sentences, with several four-word phrases broken over two lines 
from Almack’s Bibliography. With “Driest facts / of bibliography,” “pagination 
signatures running,” and “Stamp of the King’s / own character” lifted directly from 
pages four, two, and six of Almack’s Bibliography respectively, the remaining lines, 
“Scarce tract work,” “The borrower,” and “I am a seeker” become more prominent. 
The first of these phrases describes the poet’s task of searching for and selecting 
material from “scarce” or rare old books, or instead of her style of appropriating 
restricted fragments and phrases into the poem. “I am a seeker” reads as a direct 
statement by the poet about her obligation in composing the poem by aggregating 
and arranging enough words and phrases to “get ... it right” (Keller 8). The final line, 
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“Blades Blades & Blades” plays on the name of Almack’s original publisher while 
also invoking Howe’s cutting and pasting of words and pages in the process of 
composition, and the framing violence of the King’s execution. It would be a 
mistake to underplay Howe’s sense of the violence of cutting and pasting another’s 
text. Kathleen Crown describes the dangers incurred through this practice, and the 
risk of propagating colonial mentalities by “‘convert[ing], recod[ing], mak[ing] 
transparent, and thus represent[ing] even those experiences that resist 
[representation] … with a stubborn opacity’” (n. pag.). Howe is also conscious of the 
more “alluring … but problematic” dangers of effacing authorial presence from the 
poem (Guthrie n. pag.). This is why the repetition of “I am a seeker” has such force. 
By ignoring the shifts to small case in this second stanza, we arrive at a more 
insightful reading which contributes to Howe’s rejection of traditional definitions of 
authorship.  
In the opening three lines of the second stanza, Howe delineates one of the 
major problems of authorship as it is conventionally understood. As we saw in the 
first chapter, the emergence of originality as the primary principle of authorship 
coincided with the effacement of traditional appropriative practices in poetry and the 
progressive development of copyright law. Howe takes up this question of 
originality in her interrogation of authorship in Eikon Basilike, using it to undermine 
the authority of traditional conceptions of authorship. First, Howe offers to “Tell you 
my author,” where “my author” could be the authors behind her many 
appropriations, or else an assertion by the poet of her authority over these authors 
who she claims as her own. The poet “knew his hand,” and “the book was his” but is 
now hers through her new role as “the borrower.” Through the poet’s practice of 
appropriation, “The Sovereign stile” is now “in another stile,” Howe’s style, whose 
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sources she leaves “scattered in disguise” (72). Here, Cavell’s imagery of 
cannibalism also applies to Eikon Basilike’s self-consciousness whereby the poem 
not only consumes other texts but also recognizes itself as such, generating more text 
by commenting on or feeding off this act of appropriation. Howe’s interrogation of 
her role as author echoes that broader question of the authorship of The King’s Book:  
Printing an edition 
  of the Eikon Basilike 
  Insertion of prayer 
 from Sidney’s Arcadia  
 The Eikon is an imposture  
………………………… 
Amateur such as the King 
 Saying so I name nobody … (74) 
Here, Howe recalls Almack’s account of the printer, William Dugard, who divulged 
on his deathbed that “Milton found [him] printing an edition of the Eikon Basilike 
about the time of his arrest and compelled the insertion of the prayer from Sidney’s 
Arcadia” (Almack 9). As well as calling into question the possibility of attributing 
the text to one author, these lines also demonstrate the instability of the published 
text. Bloomfield reports that “a version of The Eikon Basilike edited by Almack 
neither contains the prayer nor makes any reference to it,” which presents another 
blow to the empirical authority of bibliographical texts and their influence in shaping 
literary history and scholarship (429). From this perspective, “the commons” in 
Howe’s poem might be said to represent the full extent of texts, versions, 
interpretations, and editions, “the share to which each member of the company is 
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entitled,” that  supposedly objective forms such as bibliography wish to restrict or 
enclose through the attribution of authorship (“Commons”).   
 Joel Kuszai outlines the conflicted nature of bibliography in Howe’s poem by 
attending to the oppositional conclusions of the various bibliographers of The King’s 
Book. Almack and Madan based their bibliographies “‘on approximately the same 
set of data’” Kuszai says, and yet they draw different conclusions as to the author of 
the text (Back 127). This difference can be explained by the fact that “‘[in] each case 
… their reading of the Eikon was mediated through what they already believed 
true,’” a starting point which defies the first principles of bibliographical study. “The 
Eikon is an imposture,” Howe says, echoing her earlier accusation of the text as a 
forgery, with the final two lines, “Amateur such as the King” and “Saying so I name 
nobody” quoted from Almack and [Christopher] Wordsworth respectively and their 
opposing arguments for authorship of The King’s Book (74). The divergence 
between Almack and Wordsworth contributes to Howe’s destabilizing of empirical 
literary history; however it also adds weight to her rejection of traditional 
conceptions of authorship by progressively undermining the possibility of a 
verifiable author of The King’s Book. Howe’s appropriations on the following pages 
extend her interrogation of authorship by aligning with concurrent developments in 
contemporary literary criticism, leading Eikon Basilike towards an explicitly female 
redefinition of authorship.  
4.3 Howe’s Feminist Refashioning of Authorship 
Authorial Refashioning 
Howe’s appropriations from Cavell’s literary criticism seem an unusual choice for  
a poem primarily composed of historical texts and authors. Just as Halsey breaches 
the boundaries of scholarship in The Text, Howe’s quotations from Cavell reflect her 
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poem’s engagement with contemporary literary criticism. This engagement becomes 
more pronounced with Howe’s borrowings from Stephen Greenblatt’s 1980 book, 
Renaissance Self-Fashioning. These references from Greenblatt consolidate the 
relation between appropriation, authorship, and enclosure in Howe’s poem and 
develop her redefinition of authorship through Eikon Basilike. Chris Baldick 
identifies Greenblatt’s 1980 book, and the following 1988 publication 
Shakespearean Negotiations, as two texts integral to the development and definition 
of new historicism. This school of criticism is directed against the “purely formal or 
linguistic critical approaches such as the New Criticism and deconstruction” 
(Baldick n. pag.). In Renaissance Self-Fashioning, Greenblatt reads the literature of 
English poets and authors “From Shakespeare to More” for evidence of “an 
increased self-consciousness about the fashioning of human identity as a 
manipulable, artful process” during the sixteenth century (2). This investigation of 
self-fashioning during the Renaissance period shapes the critical definition of new 
historicism which “emphasize[s] the historical nature of literary texts and at the same 
time ... the ‘textual’ nature of history” (Baldick n. pag.). Howe’s references from 
Greenblatt consolidate the poem’s engagement with literary criticism by aligning her 
rewriting of the Bibliography with a provocative re-reading of literary and historical 
texts by contemporary critics. The new historicists “attempted to show how literary 
works are implicated in the power-relations of their time,” Baldick says, “not as 
secondary ‘reflections’ of any coherent world-view but as active participants in the 
continual remaking of meanings.” Howe’s appropriations from Greenblatt provoke 
questions for Eikon Basilike, both of her reorienting of The King’s Book and of 
authorship as traditionally conceived. Responding to these questions extends critical 
readings of Howe’s poem, and brings her divergence from traditional conceptions of 
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authorship within a literary critical framework that affords new and different 
opportunities for authorial self-fashioning.   
 Just as Cavell’s statements on Coriolanus and cannibalism provoke broader 
parallels in Howe’s poem through the theme of enclosure and authorship, the 
quotations from Greenblatt also provoke concurrences across Eikon Basilike. The 
particular lines Howe borrows from Greenblatt derive from a discussion of More’s 
1516 book, Utopia, and specifically concern More’s criticism of enclosure. More 
takes issue with enclosure in Book I of Utopia and uses the dialogue form, which 
characterizes the text, to stage a debate on the topic. In a conversation with John 
Morton, Cardinal and Chancellor of England, More’s speaker diagnoses enclosure as 
the real cause of theft in contemporary English society. Here, More claims that the 
appropriation of lands which “devour[s] men and unpeople[s], not only villages, but 
towns” greatly impoverishes the population, and “then what can they do but steal—
and be very properly hanged ... or to go about and beg?” (26). More’s text continues 
the theme of enclosure, but it is Greenblatt’s response to the text which provides 
Howe’s appropriations.  
 In his analysis of More’s Utopia, Greenblatt borrows Louis Marin’s assertion 
that “there are in the smooth surface of Utopian life a series of half-hidden ruptures” 
(Greenblatt 23). Marin reads these ruptures in More’s text as “reveal[ing] the 
presence in the work of the half-effaced signs of its own production, the presence of 
sociohistorical forces to which Utopia owes its existence and which it is designed to 
render invisible.” For Marin, the “brief, fragmentary narrative enclaves” in More’s 
text “destroy[s] the structural integrity” of his utopia, revealing “subtle 
inconsistencies and contradictions in topography, economic exchange, the exercise 
of power, concepts of criminality, and the uses of violence” that ground More’s text 
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in the realities of English life in 1516. Greenblatt disagrees with Marin’s 
interpretation of the ruptures in More’s text. Far from disabling More’s ideas, 
Greenblatt interprets these ruptures as contributing to Utopia’s “subtle anamorphic 
art” which “constantly question[s] its own status and the status of the world it 
pretends to represent.” The two phrases that Howe appropriates from Greenblatt’s 
text can be traced to his defence of More’s Utopia, and this supports a comparison 
between More’s self-reflexive text and Howe’s poem. Howe selects the phrase 
“fragmentary narrative enclaves” from Greenblatt’s account of Marin for inclusion in 
her poem.
9
 Greenblatt uses the phrase to describe the “ruptures” Marin finds in 
More’s text which bestow upon it such declarative reflexiveness. The second phrase 
Howe appropriates from Greenblatt’s text is “Mock alphabet and map” which 
appears a few paragraphs later in his analysis and serves as an example of just some 
of the artefacts gathered in humanist works of the era such as More’s text and 
Holbein’s “The Ambassadors.” Greenblatt interprets these two items as evidence of 
the humanists’ “mode of civility” and their “enhancement of specifically human 
powers” (24). The “mock alphabet and map” of More’s text are two contradictory 
items, one deriding empirical knowledge and the other supporting scientific study. In 
his text, these two items sit next to each other “without contradiction” on account of 
More’s “profound, playful attention” as author. The connections forged between 
Howe, Greenblatt, and More through the poet’s appropriations extend beyond the 
cutting and pasting of text to situate the poem in relation to a specific critical 
conversation about the form and function of the text and its capacity to reveal 
something about the society within which it was written. Studying this relation offers 
                                                 
9
 I will return to this phrase in the following paragraph. 
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more to a reading of Howe’s poem and her redefinition of authorship through 
appropriation.  
 Howe’s appropriations from literary criticism bring her poetry into contact 
with the university, an institution and bastion of cultural capital that has proved 
deeply problematic for her and her writing. Howe has written about her literal 
exclusion from the Harvard libraries which promised such riches to a “‘library 
cormorant’” such as herself (Birth-mark 18). In The Birth-mark, the poet remembers 
her need for “out of the way volumes” from Widener Library at Harvard University. 
Howe’s father refused her request to accompany him, saying that “it would be 
trespassing if [she] went into the stacks.” This feeling of exclusion followed Howe 
through to her adult life until she took her first post at the University of Buffalo, and 
it returned, presumably, before and after various appointments and professorships at 
Stanford, Princeton, and Wesleyan that occupied her over the following years. 
Rather than suggesting that Howe’s poetry provides a poetic corollary to 
Greenblatt’s new historicism, it is more helpful to situate Eikon Basilike in the 
Poundian and Olsonian tradition which it extends and develops. In the chapter on 
Halsey, Pound’s Malatesta Cantos were presented as the necessary development of 
“conflicting testimonies and mutually exclusive hypotheses” of the historicist (Davie 
63). By the time that the Malatesta Cantos were published in 1924, Pound had found 
a way to gather materials towards the constitution of the poem so as to respond to 
historical scholarship. The poet’s purpose in drawing on primary sources such as 
Sigismundo’s letters, papal edicts, and lists of building materials was not to 
supplement academic study of the Italian condottiero. In gathering together these 
archival sources, and sometimes modernizing them for effect, Pound “undercuts their 
historicity” and asserts instead the endurance and relevance of these texts, and the 
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issues and concerns they raise, to a contemporary readership (Perloff Indeterminacy 
183).  
 Howe’s poem, like Pound’s Malatesta Cantos, “insist[s] on our participation” 
as readers, but if Pound’s appropriative collage is, in part, a response to the 
perceived advancements in mass media, technology, and information exchange that 
characterized the period, Howe’s poem uses the same practices to opposite effects 
(Perloff 183). Howe’s appropriations in Eikon Basilike slow the reading process by 
encouraging the reader to labour over individual decisions of sound and meaning. 
Reading Pound’s appropriations in the Malatesta Cantos as reflecting contemporary 
developments in the dissemination of information does not undermine his belief in 
the interconnectedness of past and present. Rather, his appropriative practice serves 
as a contemporary response to the consequences of these transformations and 
processes of cultural transmission. Rainey elaborates on this relation between 
appropriative form and the ‘meaning’ of Pound’s poem in his response to Perloff’s 
analysis. Rainey rejects Perloff’s reading of the Cantos, and her “assumption” that 
“the relationship between inset (quoted item) and frame (quoting agency) is purely 
‘textual’ in character” (Ezra Pound 71). In focusing on the “relationship between 
text and text” in the Cantos, Rainey says, Perloff fails to consider the “social 
dynamics of transmission that comprises numerous inscriptures.” Pound’s 
appropriation of texts in the Malatesta Cantos might “undercut” the constitutive 
texts’ “historicity,” Rainey says, but only to elaborate the “social dynamics of 
transmission.” These “social dynamics” provide an alternative to the restrictive 
empiricism of the discipline of history and of our understanding of the processes and 
practices by which knowledge is passed down.   
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 Howe carries Pound’s commitment to the “social dynamics of transmission” 
through to Eikon Basilike, taking up the same critique of scholarly forms and 
academic authority that Pound outlines in his poetry (Rainey 71). Her quotations 
from Greenblatt compound this relation by showing the poet encroaching on an 
academic discourse which explicitly re-reads and thus redefines the past for a 
contemporary audience. This historical re-reading provokes comparisons with 
Howe’s poetic projects in Articulation of Sound Forms in Time, for example. Here, 
Howe incorporates the story of “Hope Atherton’s Wanderings” for the challenge it 
presents to historical and contemporary definitions of knowledge, civility, and 
intelligibility. Peter Nicholls outlines Howe’s incursions on scholarly form and 
empiricism in this poem when he says that “Atherton ... like [Emily] Dickinson and 
[Mary] Rowlandson ... falls out of the safe discursive space of a ‘prophetic’ and 
corporate’ identity–though his wanderings remain ‘untraceable’, not directly 
narratable” (594-95). Eikon Basilike too disrupts the discourses of history and its 
claims on knowledge and authority. In orienting Eikon Basilike to the “social 
dynamics of transmission” that characterize literature, culture, and society in 1989, 
Howe asserts her own belief in the continuities of past and present (Rainey 71). This 
poem does not attempt to return readers to the issues and debates of 1649, or indeed 
of 1896, and the poet acknowledges that she “can’t really bring back a particular 
time” in her poetry (“Incloser” 194). Howe is “not ... a chronicler” rewriting history 
for a contemporary audience as Perloff says, and to do so requires some certainty as 
to the separation between the past and the present (“Collision” 533). One of the 
purposes of Eikon Basilike, and of Howe’s other appropriative poems, is to broach 
the possibility that “then is now,” that the critical debates and bibliographies carried 
over from earlier times, and the faith in empirical knowledge that they reflect, 
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continue to elide a reality of contradictions, inconsistencies, and unknowability that 
is as tangible and definite now as it was in the 1650s. Howe’s invocation of 
Greenblatt might challenge the narratives and discourses of literary criticism and 
history that shape academic knowledge, but she also gleans something from these 
appropriations. By turning to the third of Greenblatt’s quotations in Eikon Basilike, it 
is possible to gain a clearer sense of how his statements on Renaissance self-
fashioning illuminate Howe’s redefinition of authorship.  
 Greenblatt is emphatic about the insights available through the “fragmentary 
narrative enclaves” of More’s Utopia (23). In Howe’s poem, the phrase reflects the 
multitude of individual texts and narratives that constitute the poem, and especially 
those that contradict each other or are discovered to be citations of citations. If 
More’s Utopia conceals just below the surface of the text “subtle inconsistencies and 
contradictions,” then Howe moves her “inconsistencies and contradictions” to the 
surface, so that the reader must negotiate and understand the many disjunctions 
which emerge in and through Howe’s poem (Greenblatt 23). More’s disjunctions in 
“topography, economic exchange, the exercise of power, concepts of criminality, and 
the uses of violence” have particular relevance for Howe’s investigation of 
enclosure. The ruptures in Eikon Basilike are not “half-hidden” as in More’s text but 
are instead unavoidable, and yet their effect upon the reader who encounters them is 
the same. Like More’s text, Howe’s poem “constantly question[s] its own status and 
the status of the world it pretends to represent.” Howe exhibits the same “profound, 
playful attention” that Greenblatt attributes to More, though with a less buoyant, 
more literal playfulness in phrases such as “Thin king the Personator” and the 
alliterative “Archaic Arachne Ariadne” (76-7). The third quotation from Greenblatt 
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in Eikon Basilike elaborates on Howe’s interrogation of authorship in the poem and 
indicates her process of redefinition. 
 This third phrase from Greenblatt occurs several pages later in a longer 
passage which I will quote in full:   
Who is not a wild Enthusiast 
 
  in a green meadow 
 
furious and fell 
 
  Arriving on the stage of history 
  I saw madness of the world 
 
  Stripped of falsification 
  and corruption 
  
  anthems were singing 
  in Authorem 
  
  Father and the Father 
  by my words will I be justified 
 
  Autobiography I saw … (82) 
The line from Greenblatt, “stripped of falsification and corruption,” is taken from a 
discussion of Thomas Wyatt’s practice of poetic “self-fashioning” (127). Before 
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demonstrating the relevance of these lines to Howe’s redefinition of authorship, I 
will suggest a few cues and contexts for the surrounding lines. The first line, “Who is 
not a wild Enthusiast,” is drawn from Patricia Caldwell’s 1985 text, The Puritan 
Conversion Narrative, which Howe praises in The Birth-mark and in her interview 
with Foster. The line is taken from a discussion of the incongruities within the 
conversion narrative of Mrs. Elizabeth White, purportedly a Puritan and a member 
with her husband, Thomas White, of one of the Massachusetts Bay colonies.
10
 
Caldwell makes it clear that Mrs. White “is not a wild Enthusiast” like the Ranters, 
the Antinomians, and the Quakers who were gaining momentum at the time, but 
rather “uses her Bible with prudence and faithfulness” (17). Mrs. White’s moderate 
faith makes it difficult to understand how her conversion narrative contains dreams 
which are subject to “deep suspicion” in “Puritan psychological theory” (16). Mrs. 
White is one of several women who provide parallels to Howe’s own negotiation of 
authorship and identity through the text.  
 Proceeding through the rest of the excerpt, “furious and fell” appears in 
Canto IX of Spenser’s The Faerie Queen (118), and “In Authorem” is the title of a 
poem by Ben Jonson. Jonson’s poem anticipates the anamorphic quality of Eikon 
Basilike which is also suggested in Greenblatt’s discussion of the “subtle anamorphic 
art” of More’s Utopia. In her account of the poem, Lynn S. Meskill argues that 
Jonson learned from Samuel Daniel and John Harrington to perceive “the envious 
reader as capable of ‘deforming’ the text,” a perception evident in poems such as “In 
Authorem” where “the act of ‘looking’ is metaphorically compared to the viewing of 
an anamorphic perspective” (88). Meskill describes how Jonson “puts a twist on the 
                                                 
10
 Caldwell moves immediately to demonstrate that Mrs. White “was not an American Puritan,” that 
“she lived and died far away from Boston, in the hamlet of Caldecot, in the parish of Newport 
Pagnell, in the county of Buckingham, England, and there is no indication that she ever set foot on the 
American strand” (3).   
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analogy with an anamorphosis” at the conclusion of his poem with the reader 
discovering that “the deformation that defines the anamorphic image, lies not in the 
text/painting,” as in Holbein’s “The Ambassadors,” “but rather in the eye of the 
reader” (79). The lesson of Jonson’s “In Authorem” is to learn to “‘look well’” at the 
poem (Jonson 256), “instead of taking it from an oblique angle” (Meskill 89). Howe 
is more indebted to More’s productive, playful attention than to Jonson’s 
prescriptive anamorphosis; however the rhetoric of “oblique angles” and “lateral 
view[s]” of “In Authorem” befits the poem. In Howe’s poem, the phrase “In 
Authorem” emphasizes the question of authorship, but instead of accusing the reader 
of “look[ing] asquint” at the poem, Howe writes a poem that is all “oblique 
angle[s],” so that looking at it directly will not always generate the most productive 
or revealing reading (256).  
Eikon Basilike sparks a multitude of indirect relations, associations, and 
connections which challenge conventional reading processes and critical attributions 
of authorial voice. Howe exploits a “distorted projection” or perspective in her poem 
which “tell[s] all the truth but tell[s] it slant” (Dickinson 431),  in the words of one 
of her favourites (“Anamorphosis”). Howe accumulates these distortions as a 
powerful rejection of the prevalence of historical narratives oppressive in their 
wholeness and factual correctness. These “distort[ions]” disrupt the unity and 
authority of the following line, “Father and the Father,” which is excerpted from the 
Gospel of John, verse 14.10, and shows Howe asserting her own authority as a writer 
of distortions and “oblique angles” (Meskill 89). The verse reads, “Don’t you believe 
that I am in the Father and the Father is in me? The words I speak are not my own, 
but my Father who lives in me does his work through me,” but in many ways, the 
second line has more relevance to critical analyses of Howe’s poem than the one 
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quoted in Eikon Basilike (“John 14.10”). Howe’s appropriative practice works to 
replace the patrilineal line of textual inheritance from male author to male author 
represented by her bibliography of source texts. Instead, she proposes a matrilineal 
line of women’s texts disrupting, interjecting, and pushing through history and the 
literary canon. In this way, Howe maintains the second image from verse 14.10, of 
‘speaking through’ another without wholly relinquishing her own authority. The 
following line, “by my words will I be justified,” is a deformation of a similar phrase 
from verse 12.37 of the Gospel of Matthew, “by your words shall you be justified,” 
which strengthens Howe’s assertion of a matrilineal line of expression that does not 
depend on the patrilineal lineage for authority or permission (“Matthew 12.37”). In 
effect, Howe rejects the opposition of author and reader in Eikon Basilike and uses 
her poem to align the two in the practice of appropriation as writing.  
 Howe’s proposed matrilineal tradition and her reconciliation of author and 
reader are consolidated in the lines she borrows from Greenblatt and his framing 
discussion of Renaissance self-fashioning. The words from Greenblatt, “stripped of 
falsification and corruption,” are drawn from a discussion of the “alternative and 
even competing modes of self-fashioning” which the critic says characterize Wyatt’s 
psalms and satires in an analysis which also references More (127). In this chapter, 
Greenblatt rejects traditional interpretations of Wyatt as either “inheriting an inert 
mass of clichés” which “by virtue of his intense individuality, [he] managed ... to 
infuse ... with warmth and life,” or the idea that “his poetry exemplifies ‘the clash 
between a desperate personal need and the impersonal and ceremonial forms which 
such needs assumed in the court of Henry VIII” (120). In contrast, Greenblatt argues 
that “there is no privileged sphere of individuality in Wyatt, set off from linguistic 
convention, from social pressure, from the shaping force of religious and political 
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power.” Writing in this context, “Wyatt cannot fashion himself in opposition to 
power and the conventions power deploys.” Greenblatt’s account of Wyatt’s psalms 
recall Howe’s appropriative practice and can be productively applied to Eikon 
Basilike. Here, self-fashioning is a means of responding to the failure of “Absolutist 
identity” both in the author of The King’s Book and in Howe’s own writing (Eikon 
76).  
This concept of self-fashioning is helpful in the critical analysis of Howe’s 
interrogation of authorship through appropriation. Greenblatt compares Wyatt’s 
psalms with his satires, both of which “self-consciously give voice to a ‘true’ self, 
stripped of falsification and corruption,” but which exist in opposition to each other 
(127). The same oppositional forces are present in Howe’s poem. Eikon Basilike is 
the latest text in a long critical tradition of investigating “The Authorship 
Controversy,” but it is also written by a poet who is the direct descendant of the 
seventeenth-century Puritan migration to New England, and who consistently 
problematizes the conventional modes of expression as patriarchal and therefore 
repressive for women, without either surrendering her right to self-expression (Eikon 
70). Howe embodies and engages each of these positions in Eikon Basilike, 
manifesting to the fullest extent the complexity and dialecticism that properly 
represents autobiography in Howe’s terms. These conflicting standpoints all 
contribute to Eikon Basilike and reflect the various women who appear in the poem 
and disappear as quickly. If Howe’s negotiation with authority in the poem reflects a 
matrilineal rather than a patrilineal inheritance of modes of assertion and articulation, 
it still remains to consider those women and their role in elaborating a new definition 
of authorship.  
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Feminist Refashioning of Authorship 
Howe’s form in Eikon Basilike is attributable to the texts of women such as Sidney’s 
Pamela, Elizabeth White, Mrs. Gauden, King Charles I’s sister, Arachne, and 
Ariadne, who subsist textually and rupture the surface of their enclosing texts, 
including Howe’s poem. These women come to the fore in the final section of the 
poem which Bloomfield says effects “a final partial distancing from the specifics of 
the poem’s theme and a contemplation of broader historical questions” (420). This 
“final partial distancing” manifests itself most emphatically in the wild collage form 





Fig. 4. From Susan Howe’s A Bibliography of the King’s Book, or, Eikon Basilike 
(Howe The Nonconformist’s Memorial 87). 
The collages of pages eighty-six and eighty-seven appear as an interjection after the 
previous twenty pages of narrow verses and block text. This change to collage form 
can be attributed to the forthright assertion of Ariadne in the role of the weaver and 
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the parallel with Howe’s concept of herself as poet gathering texts toward the 
constitution of the poem. We meet Ariadne after she has “led Theseus” through the 
Minotaur’s maze by giving him a ball of thread to trace his path and find his way 
out. Bloomfield is attentive to the “frayed and intertwined strands” of Ariadne’s 
story, “many of them contradictory, and none of them authoritative,” which befits 
Howe’s poem (Bloomfield 432). One version of the story sees Theseus promise to 
elope with Ariadne after he escapes the maze, but he “let[s] [her] down” by 
abandoning her on the island of Naxos (Eikon 87). References to thread and weaving 
surround “Minos’ / daughter” in Howe’s poem with the phrases “from / Thread,” 
“Trace / weft,” “CLOATHE” and “she wore ... / the sea,” establishing her presence, 
and references to “fate,” “Island,” “Crown,” “deathless,” and “Stars,” evoking the 
various accounts of her demise. The page is “Illimited” in a manner unlike many of 
the surrounding pages, with no prescriptions of style or convention enclosing the 
form, and no obligations of meaning circumscribing the language. This “Illimited” 
style continues on the final page where the few semantically coherent phrases belie 




Fig. 5. From Susan Howe’s A Bibliography of the King’s Book, or, Eikon Basilike 
(Howe The Nonconformist’s Memorial 90). 
Here, the same references to “thread,” “weft,” and “trace,” with “ARACHNE” 
written upside down, appear alongside a vertical column reading “She / was / 
winding / wool” (90). Hank Lazer warns critics against selecting “pithy passages” 
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when critically analysing a poem, as though “the experience of the poem crystallized 
with some finality in such remarks” (65). Bearing this warning in mind, I will link 
Arachne and Ariadne in Howe’s poem to the critical representation of these women 
so as to learn more about their contribution to Howe’s redefinition of authorship in 
the poem.  
 Arachne is the central figure of Nancy K. Miller’s 1988 essay, 
“Arachnologies: The Woman, the Text, and the Critic,” where she is taken as “a 
trope of feminist literary agency” (77). In Miller’s essay, “arachnology” is defined 
as: 
[A] critical positioning which reads against the weave of 
indifferentiation to discover the embodiment in writing of a gendered 
subjectivity; to recover within representation the emblems of its 
construction. (80)  
By making “indifferentiation” her target in “Arachnologies,” Miller is writing 
against Barthes’s “recasting of the text as texture” in “The Death of the Author.” In 
acceding to texture, Barthes undercuts the autonomy and authority of the author as 
white, Western, and male, but his deference to the author also undercuts the female 
writer who is historically denied these privileges. Miller’s twin propositions in her 
essay–to challenge the “interpretative model” that defines inherited reading practices 
and to construct a “new object of women’s writing” –both befit Howe’s poem (83). 
Eikon Basilike challenges traditional reading practices by “Slowing the consumption 
of text, [and] resisting the emptying of language” so that “the packaging of intellect 
and imagination becomes the task of the poet, [and] then, in turn, of readers” 
(McCorkle n. pag.). Howe’s appropriative practice is central to her challenge to the 
inherited “interpretative model” of reading, while also shaping her development of 
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that “new object of women’s writing” (Miller 83). Miller learns from Annette 
Kolodny that “‘Only the subject who is both self-possessed and possesses access to 
the library of the already read has the luxury of flirting with the escape from 
identity’” (Miller 83), hence Howe’s statement of the “alluring … but problematic” 
nature of self-effacement for female authors (Guthrie n. pag.).  
The densely collaged and fragmented nature of these final pages dominated 
by Arachne and Ariadne constitutes Howe’s “representation of writing itself” which, 
for Miller, “figure[s] the production of the female artist,” but not in the “classical 
sex/gender arrangements of Western culture” (83). Howe’s appropriative style 
rejects the male-dominated lineage of writing and literature in favour of a female 
mode of expression and articulation. This framing of Howe’s appropriative practice 
in Eikon Basilike as presenting an alternative to the traditional, patriarchally “coded 
representations of female signature” support contemporary re-readings of her poetry. 
Danielle Spinosa interprets the visual disruptions and wild collage style of Howe’s 
poem as “a kind of joyful proclamation” (n. pag.).
11
 In her reading of Eikon Basilike, 
Spinosa “designat[es] the radical potentials of joyful movement, at once out of the 
static, the stasis of grid and structure, as well as a communication coming out of 
static, or noise.” This assertion of joy rather than violence in these final collaged 
pages correlates with Howe’s references to Mr. Dick from David Copperfield who 
celebrates the wilful dispersal of knowledge and facts. The reference to Mr. Dick, 
who is variously identified by his former name, Mr. Richard Babley, and by critics, 
with Dickens himself, elaborates the enduring problem of identity and authorship in 
                                                 
11
 Spinosa is working on a doctoral thesis on poetry and post-anarchism which she is composing as “a 
digital, hypertextual project ...  made up of twelve sections” with “each hyperlinked chapter as a 
“plateau” (2 July 2013). Spinosa uses the word “plateau” in the “same way Deleuze and Guattari use 
it: “‘A plateau is always in the middle, not at the beginning or the end. A rhizome is made out of 
plateaus. … We call a ‘plateau’ any multiplicity connected to other multiplicities by superficial 
underground stems in such a way as to form or extend a rhizome’ (A Thousand 21-22)” (2 July 2013).  
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the poem. The positioning of the excerpt, surrounded by pages of collage, and its 
development of the poem’s thematic intertwine the “string” of Mr. Dick’s kite with 
the threads of Ariadne and Arachne to “take the facts a long way,” which is Howe’s 
“manner of diffusing ‘em” (Eikon 89).   
Conclusion  
Howe divests herself of responsibility for “the facts” in Eikon Basilike, not as a 
reactionary gesture but rather because “the facts” are so difficult to discern in the 
case of The King’s Book (89). Scholarly efforts to articulate certainties use the 
authority of critical objectivity as a guise to hide the subjective nature of their 
arguments. Howe revels in the multiplication of voices and identities in Eikon 
Basilike because it allows her to communicate her distrust of the unity and 
wholeness of the dominant historical narratives and the literary canon. She redefines 
authorship from the fragments of these traditions, and fashions from the scraps and 
remainders a poem, and a model of authorship, which is wholly her own. By 
recognizing Howe’s appropriative practices as enabling rather than disabling a 
concept of authorship which does not replicate the traditional, unified definition, it is 
possible to extend our understanding and interpretation of appropriation in her 
poetry. Through this process of poetic redefinition, appropriation becomes a means 
of affirming the poet’s particular version of authorship. Howe’s poetry is a clear 
example of a very distinct and different practice of poetic appropriation, a practice 
which variously bolsters and interrogates the appropriations of Halsey and Joyce, 
while also adding weight to the idea that appropriation can mean different things for 




In his review of Plagiarism and Literary Property in the Romantic Period, Andrew 
M. Stauffer reflects on the contradiction between the proliferation of appropriation 
during Romanticism, and the Romantic poets’ development of an “artistic model 
wherein individual subjectivity is paramount” (79). The critic explains how the 
book’s author, Tilar J. Mazzeo, affirms “Romantic creativity [as] passionately 
engaged with the materials of the past.” Mazzeo reconciles this celebration of 
historical texts with the Romantic principle of individual subjectivity through the 
following instruction for contemporary poets: “steal all you want, just be sure you 
really own it in the end.” Stauffer and Mazzeo are confident that the enduring history 
of appropriation in poetry continues through to the Romantics, for whom 
composition was “anything but a process of original creation ex nihilo.” This thesis 
traces the history of appropriation through to the present era, where the self-
consciousness of modern and postmodern poetic examples have, counter-intuitively, 
limited contemporary definitions of the practice. Through close readings of the 
poetries of Joyce, Halsey, and Howe, I demonstrate how the range and scope of these 
poets’ practices exceed the current understandings of appropriation, and thus demand 
a redefinition of the term for contemporary criticism.  
In proposing a critical redefinition of appropriation, it is necessary first to 
establish the contemporary understanding of the term. The thesis begins with an 
investigation of appropriation, its definition and meaning, and proceeds by outlining 
the history of appropriation from the early Latin poets up to the Renaissance and 
Romantic periods and through to the present era. This delineation of the diverse 
history of appropriation contravenes the contemporary predilection of conceptualist 
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poetry to use appropriation “against expression” (Dworkin 2011). This thesis is a 
tripartite analysis of Joyce’s, Halsey’s, and Howe’s poetries and the innovative 
nature of their appropriative practices which variously exceed the parameters of 
appropriation as it is contemporarily understood.  
The appropriative style of individual poems from Joyce’s 2003 and 2007 
collections betray a poetic concern with the forms of expression that dominate Irish 
poetry. Poems such as “Trem Neul” and “De Iron Trote” constitute a poetic 
renegotiation of the lyricism that characterizes Irish writing. Joyce’s appropriations 
eschew confessionalism and transform the means of expression, which encourages 
Joyce’s alternative account of personal and collective histories. The declarative 
effects of Joyce’s practices of appropriation are echoed in Halsey’s poetry, though to 
different effects. In The Text of Shelley’s Death, Halsey appropriates a multitude of 
textual accounts of Shelley’s drowning at sea where their many conflicting details 
call into question the reliability of literary tradition. Halsey’s textual remodelling of 
tradition reveals the critical capacity of his practice of appropriation, where the 
accumulation of conflicting accounts of Shelley’s death serves to reject the authority 
and autonomy of the inherited Eliotic model of literary tradition. This tradition also 
occupies an important position in Howe’s Eikon Basilike, though here again the 
declarative nature of her poem reflects the particularities of her appropriative style. 
Howe’s appropriations support an alternative definition of authorship which 
exchanges the strictures of the patriarchal definition for a feminist alternative that 
celebrates multiplicity, diversity, and contradiction. These three poets’ practices of 
appropriation achieve declarative effects in a variety of ways, and thus exceed the 
parameters of contemporary definitions of appropriation.  
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The encroachments on lyricism, tradition, and authorship that Joyce, Halsey, 
and Howe effect through their appropriative practices indicate directions for the 
redefinition of appropriation. These encroachments reflect the declarative and critical 
capacities of appropriation which exceed the contemporary definition of the practice. 
The significance of Joyce’s, Halsey’s, and Howe’s innovative appropriative styles is 
that they reveal the inadequacy of the contemporary understandings of appropriation. 
By extending the traditional definition to accommodate these innovations, literary 
criticism can begin to reconcile formally complex practices of textual borrowing 
with inherited ideas of expression and meaning in poetry. This tripartite analysis of 
textual borrowing does not reject the conceptualist definitions of the practice as 
effacing the poet writing, but rather recognizes the need for alternative or indeed 
multiple definitions of the practice. The conflicting understandings of appropriation 
also challenge the subjugation of the practice as a symptom or feature of more 
prominent concepts of textual borrowing in poetry and criticism. This poetry 
provides aesthetic and critical direction for the redefinition of appropriation in art 
which encourages a broader, more comprehensive understanding not just of 
individual poems but of our concept of appropriation as a practice and pattern of 
cultural exchange.   
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Appendix I: “De Iron Trote” (Section 1) 
As man, in deep and level sleep, periodically draws a  
long inspiration, song is learned and figured in the brain. 
Think of the way a musical box, wound up, potentially  







Clothes, however thick, diminish little the sonorities of 
breath. Touch the stop and the air sounds out; send an 
impulse along the proper afferent nerve and voice starts 
on song. Succussion, too may raise a splashing sound 







Garments of silk, or thin dry wool, also give rise to a 
noise calculated to cause error, sometimes mitigating 
the production and carefully controlled cropping of live 
creatures for high ends. Else, from every corner of the 
woods and glens see them come creeping on their hands 
for their legs cannot make fast, as in humans the larynx 
migrates down the neck since the age of eighteen 
months, from which arises the sound of voices. In time 
these come to speak of a political meeting, of market 
shares. Someone tells of a woman who murdered 
her lover. “A chauffeur kills his wife,” says another. 
All teetotallers like sugar. No nightingale drinks wine. 












Clendening: “when a man, in 
deep and peaceful sleep, 
periodically draws long 
inspiration” (324) 
Huxley: “A song which 
has be learned has its 
molecular 
representative, which 
potentially represents it 
in the brain, just as the 
musical box wound up 
potentially represents 
overtures” (59) 
Clendening: “Clothes, even when their thickness is 
considerable, do not appreciably diminish the 
intensity of the sound produced by respiration.” 
(325) 
Huxley: “Send a 
molecular impulse 
along the proper 
afferent nerve and the 
singer begins his song” 
(59) Succussion, OED: “Succussion almost invariably 
develops a splashing sound, frequently having the 
same kind of musical intonation as the respiration, 
voice and tinkling of sounds” (Quotations: Flint) 
Clendening: 
“Garments are of silk, 
or thin dry wool, gives 
rise to a noise 
calculated to cause 
error” (325) 
Schafer: “the production 
and carefully controlled 
cropping of live 
creatures for high ends.” 
(323) 
Spenser: “out of euerie 
Corner of the woodes & 
glennes they came 
crepinge forth vpon 
theire hands, for theire 
legges could not beare 
them” (135) 
Ponting: “In humans the larynx migrates down the 
neck from about the age of eighteen months (25) 
Krauss: “of a political 
meeting, of market 
shares. Someone tells of 
a woman who murdered 
her lover. “A chauffeur 
kills his wife” (25) 
Carroll: “All teetotallers like sugar. No nightingale 
drinks wine.” (n. pag.) 
Clendening: “for the respiration of the fattest 
children is more forcibly heard even through thick 
clothing than is that of the thinnest adult examined 




The respiration of the plumpest child is louder clothed 
than of the thinnest adult frame stripped down. The 
throat is delicate and worthy to be protected. Says 
who? Whose voice? What proof is there these brutes 
are other than a superior race of marionettes, which eat 
without pleasure, cry without pain, desire nothing, 
know nothing, merely simulating true intelligence, for 
all it has been said that when emotions stir within, they  







To be included here is the agopithecus, an ape-like goat  
Whose voice is very like a man’s but not articulate 
sounding as if one did speak hastily with indignation 
or sorrow, as here, where one such encounters in the 
woods a boy: ‘What’s that you have?” The boy holds it 
out. It is a toy, a bear. A teddy bear. The boy’s eyes are 
large but without expression. “I don’t want it, keep it.” 
The boy hugs the bear again. A house takes fire. Later 
comes the writing of authorizations and designs on 




In women who are both grown up and far, the respira- 
tion is often audible with great force, even through 
the breasts. When your raptors are at fault, prevent  
all speech: let such as follow them ignorantly and 
unworthily, stirrup all aloof for whilst such are chat-
tering, none with hunt. A-propos, Sir, a politician will say:  
“What news from America?” A-prospos, “Do you think 
both the admirals will be tried?” Or, a-propos, “Did you 












Krauss:“Who says? Whose 
voice?” (25) 
Huxley: “What proof is 
there that brutes are other 
than … true intelligence” 
(55) 
“Wen Xuan”: “When emotions stir within, they take form in 
words” (77) 
French [John Dee]: “There is also the agopithecus, the ape-like goat whose voice is 
very like a man’s but not articulate, sounding as if one did speak hastily or with 
indignation or sorrow” (51) 
Dick: “What’s that you 
have?” Hendricks said 
sharply. The boy held it 
out. It was a toy, a bear. A 
teddy bear. The boy’s eyes 
were large, but without 
expression. Hendricks 
relaxed. “I don’t want it. 
Keep it.” The boy hugged 
the bear again” (n. pag.) 
Clendening: “In women 
who are both grown up 
and fat, the respiration is 
often audible with great 
force, even through the 
breasts.” (327) 
Beckford: “When your hounds are at fault let not a 
word be said: let such as follow them ignorantly 
and unworthily stand all aloof, - Procul, O procule 
este profane! For whilst such as chattering, not a 
hound will hunt. A-propos, Sir, a politician will 
say: “What news from America?” A-prospos, “Do 
you thinkboth the admirals will be tried?” Or, a-
propos, “Did you hear what has happened to my 
grandmother” (150) 
Spenser: “they looked 
Anotomies of death, they 
spake like ghostes cryinge 
out of theire graues, they 
did eate of the dead 
Carrions, happye were 
they could fynde them, yea 
and one another soone 
after in so much as the 
verie Carcases they spared 
not to scrape out of theire 
graues, and yf they founde 
a plot of water cresses or 
shamrocks, there they 




Such rustling sensations are nothing else than a purring-
thrill, and when this co-exists with the sound of the 
bellows, rasp or file we may be assured others will soon 
resemble anatomies of death, like ghosts crying out of 
their graves, and will eat the dead carrions, happy where 
they find them, and the very carcasses they spare not to 
scrape back out of their deeper sleep.  
 
Ticket writers may proceed to designs for posters when 
they can name their own figures. The illusion of experi-
ence, as a rule, begins by filling in provided letters with 
paint, and letter gets on to the proper writing and 
lettering. Attendance at technical classes would be 
useful in order to bring up a good style of writing with 
some originality. 
 
A dull but strong sound like that produced by a file on 
wood has something harsh in its sound. So, other boys 
start as heaters, then exercise as rivet-carriers, holders 
up, anvil-hands, and lastly platers. Hear the whizzing 
sound of the left auricle. 
 
Caution: Boys are often required to stand inside the  
chamber, as supporters, while the men pierce, and then 
hammer it outside, and deafness is apt to result. I found 
one who had abandoned his laborious occupation, and 
gained an easy place as servant to a priest. 
 
Work with letters may be done sitting without difficulty 




Clendening: “a peculiar 
rustling sensation  … is 
nothing other than the 
purring thrill already 
described … when the 
sound of the bellows, rasp 
or file, persists in the left 
auricle…” (328) 
Laennec: “A dull but 
strong sound like that 
produced by a file on 
wood has something 
harsh in its sound.” (696) 
 “Trades for London 
Boys”: “learn their trade  
as an angle-iron smith, 
plater, riveter,  or 
caulker, and be out of 
their time at 21” (10) 
Clendening: “the 
whizzing sound of the left 
auricle.” (330) 
Clendening; “I found that 
he had abandoned his 
laborious occupation of 
gardener, and had an 
easy place as the servant 
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